


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# HISTORY OF THE THIRD ARMY

Study No. 17

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1946

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**The Army Ground Forces**

**HISTORY OF THE THIRD ARMY**  
**Study No. 17**

**By**

**Lt. Francis G. Smith**

**Historical Section - Army Ground Forces**

**1946**

HEADQUARTERS ARMY GROUND FORCES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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1 September 1945

SUBJECT: Studies in the History of Army Ground Forces

TO: All Interested Agencies


1. The history of the Army Ground Forces as a command was prepared during the course of the war and completed immediately thereafter. The studies prepared in Headquarters Army Ground Forces, were written by professional historians, three of whom served as commissioned officers, and one as a civilian. The histories of the subordinate commands were prepared by historical officers, who except in Second Army, acted as such in addition to other duties.

2. From the first, the history was designed primarily for the Army. Its object is to give an account of what was done from the point of view of the command preparing the history, including a candid, and factual account of difficulties, mistakes recognized as such, the means by which, in the opinion of those concerned, they might have been avoided, the measures used to overcome them, and the effectiveness of such measures. The history is not intended to be laudatory.

3. The history of the Army Ground Forces is composed of monographs on the subjects selected, and of two volumes in which an overall history is presented. A separate volume is devoted to the activities of each of the major subordinate commands.

4. In order that the studies may be made available to interested agencies at the earliest possible date, they are being reproduced and distributed in manuscript form: As such they must be regarded as drafts subject to final editing and revision. Persons finding errors of fact or important omissions are encouraged to communicate with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Attention: Historical Section, in order that corrections may be made prior to publication in printed form by the War Department.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:

  
J. L. TARR  
Colonel, AGD  
Acting Ground Adj General

1 Incl:  
Historical Study

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- III. Staff Inspection Report Form
- IV. Letter Hq Third Army, 8 May 1943, Subject: "Status of Training Cards, Third Army Units"
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# PREFATORY NOTE

The History of the Third Army, 1932-1944, was prepared in compliance with 1st indorsement, Hq ACF, 210.4/2(ACF)GNAGS (15 Jul 42), 2 December 1942 to WD letter AG 210.31 (26 Jun 42) MR-F-PS-M, 15 July 1942, Subject: "Appointment of Historical Officers." and subsequent instructions. It was forwarded to Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, 28 January 1944, too late for revision and correction in the light of further information available at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. At the end of Chapters II and III, pages presenting such information have been added, referring to certain statements indicated by asterisks on pages 47 and 59 of the text. On the same basis certain deletions, of minor importance, have been made.

25 February 1944

KENT ROBERTS GREENFIELD  
Lt. Col., Inf.  
Chief, Hist. Sect.

# HISTORY OF THE THIRD ARMY

## CHAPTER I

### PERIOD OF PLANNING AND TRAINING (1 August 1932 to 1 October 1940)

The lights of peace were flickering in August 1932. Japan had grabbed Manchuria and attacked Shanghai; the League of Nations revealed impotence; Facist Italy rattled swords, and Germany was giving itself to Nazism.

On 9 August 1932, without fanfare and almost without public awareness, the formation of four field armies within the continental United States was announced.

In a letter that day<sup>1</sup> General Douglas MacArthur, the Chief of Staff, laid down the following five fundamental purposes of the armies:

"a. To provide appropriate agencies to complete the development of war plans prepared by the War Department General Staff.

"b. To provide commanders for high units and their staffs, prepared to take the field and execute the plans prepared by them.

"c. To provide agencies for the conduct of command post and other suitable peace-time training exercises.

"d. To provide as a preliminary step to any general mobilization an adequate force, within the minimum of time with the maximum of training, sufficient to protect any general mobilization that may be necessary.

"e. To provide a force sufficient to handle all emergencies short of a general mobilization."

The letter went on to say:

"The field armies will comprise those divisions of the Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserves, organized into Corps, allbated to the corresponding corps areas for mobilization by the War Department Mobilization Plan as follows:

\* \* \*

"Third Field Army: Fourth and Eighth Corps Areas. Its mission deals with the region of the Gulf of Mexico and the southern frontier."

The Eighth Corps Area commander, Major General Edwin B. Winans, was senior corps area commander and as such assumed command of the Third Army on 15 September 1932. Headquarters of the Eighth Corps Area at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, also became headquarters of the Third Army. In his first general order<sup>2</sup> as Army commander, General Winans announced that the Army consisted of the following units:"

Army Headquarters  
Army Special Troops  
Army Troops

Cavalry Divisions  
1st  
23rd  
63rd

VIII Corps  
Corps Headquarters  
Corps Troops  
2nd, 36th and 45th Divisions

XIV Corps  
Corps Headquarters  
Corps Troops  
81st, 82nd, 90th and 95th Divisions

IV Corps  
Corps Headquarters  
Corps Troops  
4th, 30th and 31st Divisions

XVIII Corps  
Corps Headquarters  
Corps Troops  
87th and 103d Divisions

Only three of the divisions listed -- the 2nd and 4th and 1st Cavalry -- were Regular Army elements. The 30th, 31st, 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions and the 23d Cavalry Division were National Guard units. The 81st, 82d, 87th, 90th, 95th and 103d Divisions, as well as the Corps, existed on paper only as Organized Reserves.

The initial staff was announced as:<sup>3</sup>

Chief of Staff - Colonel George P. Tyner, G. S. C.  
Adjutant General - Colonel James Totten, A. G. D.

In a second letter<sup>4</sup> the Chief of Staff made additionally clear the reasons for his decision. He pointed out that up until the World War the U. S. Army was "conceived of and administered as a 'collection of infantry, cavalry and artillery regiments.'" Preparations, even in 1932, he declared, had not, "except in a theoretical and most limited degree, gone beyond the development of separate divisions for employment in emergency, and the formulation of general mobilization and broad strategical plans."

The organization of the four field armies furnished the machinery for decentralizing control, giving Army commanders peace-time and emergency power and jurisdiction to recruit and train soldiers and enabling the War Department, always weighed down with greater considerations in time of stress, to center attention "upon the vital functions of operating and commanding field forces."<sup>5</sup>

The Chief of Staff went on to say, "Past experience demonstrates that unless necessary authority for the segregation and disposition of this influx of recruits at declaration of war be reposed in tactical commanders, the inevitable effect is to immobilize existing units and swamp them under a maze of organizational and training detail. But with recruit assignment policies developed by Army commanders in time of peace so as to conform accurately to local needs, there will be produced a progressive increase, rather than a temporary paralysis, in combat effectiveness. The four field army organization thus constitutes a logical and definite basis for initial expansion."

A third directive, prepared after a conference in Washington between the Chief of Staff and the Army commanders, plotted out more ground for the latter to cultivate and fenced off their proper boundaries of authority.<sup>6</sup> The Third Army commander was to organize his staff, prepare rosters for the Army Corps and their divisions, set up and allocate commanders and staff nuclei for units to be activated upon mobilization. The Third Army commander was to be a "tactical commander," as distinguished from a Corps Area commander, whose function was to remain principally administrative. In peacetime, the Army commander's control of the Corps Area commander was limited to training exercises, preparation of war plans and assignment of officers to specific commands. In wartime, if he did not take to the field with his Army at once, but remained as strategic reserve, he was to supervise all training of troops. If he went to the front, Corps Area commanders were to assume responsibility of training of replacements.

With the directives of the Chief of Staff as the foundation, General Winans began to build. From the adjutants general of the states within the Army area he received recommendations of National Guard officers most capable for staff work. He appointed Corps commanders and, from their recommendations, he selected additional staff members. Even though on duty but two weeks a year, both groups of officers received valuable training.

General Winans' tour of duty as Third Army commander ended 30 September 1933. Major General Johnson Hagood assumed command 4 October 1933.

A sidelight on the early preparations of the Third Army was a minor skirmish concerning the insignia. The Third Army, the War Department judged, was not to be considered a continuation of the original Third Army, A.E.F. Then, asked General Hagood, why not a new insignia, instead of the old A within an O, referring to Army of Occupation? But the War Department said "No" to three entreaties and the third "No" stuck.<sup>7</sup>

Throughout General Hagood's command, which ended 27 February 1936, the Third Army existed mostly on paper and did its fighting through correspondence, planning for future expansion, scrapping for staff officers and other personnel, blueprinting for the future. But in October 1936, under Major General Frank Parker, who assumed command on 4 April 1936, some 270 Third Army officers met in San Antonio for the first Command Post Exercise.<sup>8</sup> The funds available were ridiculously small--a little more than \$63,000. More than two thirds of this went to pay officers, warrant officers and enlisted men for travel--but the command did not build its CPX on any such puny scale. The general situation was:<sup>9</sup>

"Strained relations exist between the United States and a Pacific power, maroon. Taking advantage of this situation, a European power declared war on the United States on August 20, 1936. The same day the Commanding General, Third Army received a radio from the War Department as follows: COALITION PLAN BLACK IN EFFECT STOP M DAY AUGUST TWENTIETH NINETEEN THIRTY SIX STOP TAKE IMMEDIATE MEASURES FOR FRONTIER UNDER CATEGORY D STOP.

"Special Coalition Black was adopted for this exercise, although no such plan existed among our war plans. For the benefit of those to whom 'Category D' is unfamiliar, attention is invited to the War Department pamphlet, 'Joint Army and Navy Action'. In the defense of a frontier the War Department was visualized situations in which the attack by a foe may be a major or minor character, and has classified these situations into categories 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', etc. Category 'D' presupposes a major attack."

The Battle of Texas went on for two weeks, with attacks and counterattacks.

Umpires, the training of whom was a new and difficult problem, served alternately as unit commanders and umpires. After two or three days of learning, the system progressed without delay. In his final critique,<sup>10</sup> the chief umpire pointed to faults in liaison between aviation and ground forces, in the phrasing of orders and messages, and in the time factor (umpires allowed some messages to be delivered at once when their actual delivery would have required as much as an hour). Found praiseworthy were the liaison of ground troops and some tactical moves adopted by opposing commanders.

The exercise had given the Army an opportunity to assess its strength and weaknesses; it was now ready to prepare for bigger problems.

These began when Major General George Van Horn Moseley, who succeeded General Parker as Army commander on 1 October 1936, launched plans for maneuvers to be held in 1938. His original hope was to bring all the Third Army troops into one area.<sup>11</sup> BROWN troops were to assemble and concentrate along the gulf shore of Mississippi, near Biloxi, with the mission of capturing New Orleans and advancing up the river. Defending BLUE forces were to be massed sixty miles up the river.

This plan had to be abandoned because of lack of funds, so plans then were based on the division of the Third Army forces in such a manner that extensive travel would

not be necessary. In the extensive exchange of correspondence with the War Department on the project, General Moseley wrote, "...I am very anxious that our problem shall be a perfectly natural one, based on a natural situation which might confront the Third Army in the Gulf of Mexico and along the Rio Grande. Although funds will not permit us to have the Third Army in any one spot, each exercise can be based on the same general situation and be a perfectly natural incident in that general situation."<sup>12</sup>

The general situation finally agreed on was as follows:<sup>13</sup>

"A coalition of Brown powers has declared war on the United States, and gained control of the South Atlantic. The U. S. Fleet is engaged in the Pacific Ocean and unable to detach any units for operations elsewhere. Mexico, loyally adhering to her traditional friendly attitude, opposed the landing of Brown forces but was unable to prevent a hostile landing at Tampico. These BROWN forces and others which landed at Port Isabel, Port Aransas and Corpus Christi, have advanced northwest and are now threatening San Antonio and El Paso.

"Our Naval Intelligence reports a strong hostile convoy in the Gulf of Mexico sailing north toward the Gulf Coast of Mississippi apparently with the mission of opening the Mississippi River. Our Naval Offshore Patrols have encountered hostile naval scouting forces in the Gulf of Mexico but none along the Atlantic Coast.

"Except for coastal and land frontier guards, the mass of the Third Army was initially concentrated on the Pacific Coastal Frontier. It is now being moved to protect the Southern Land and Coastal Frontier with its reserves to be held in the vicinity of Fort Warren, Wyoming, at the disposition of GHQ."

The general situation's theoretical initial concentration of the Third Army on the Pacific Coastal Frontier was for the purpose of making an enemy invasion of Texas logical.<sup>14</sup>

The purpose of the maneuver, as stated by General Moseley, was to provide training in mobilization, concentration and field exercises under simulated conditions of modern warfare; to train active units of the Third Army to concentrate at existing strength for field exercises; to train all echelons in the logistics covering such a maneuver, and to develop further the spirit of cooperation among the three components of the Army.<sup>15</sup>

Third Army forces of the Fourth Corps Area were to assemble in DeSoto National Forest, Mississippi. Third Army Forces within the Eighth Corps Area (commanded by Major General Herbert J. Brees) were to be divided further in order to permit all National Guard units in the area to participate.<sup>16</sup>

The maneuver period of the Fourth Corps Area forces in the DeSoto National Forest extended from 31 July to 14 August. Brown forces with a strength of more than 1,000 officers and 14,000 enlisted men concentrated in the Biloxi-LaRue-Wortham area, with Biloxi as the Supply Base. Brown was represented by the 4th and 31st Divisions and Corps troops. Blue forces with a strength of more than 600 officers and nearly 8,000 enlisted men concentrated southeast of Wiggins, with Camp Shelby as the supply base. Blue was represented by the 30th Division and the 6th Cavalry. Both sides had observation aviation.<sup>17</sup>

The special situation, Blue and Brown, in summary was as follows:<sup>18</sup>

BLUE - The 30th Division with the 6th Cavalry and 16th Observation Squadron attached, moving by rail from the Pacific Coastal Frontier, had the mission of

blocking the movement northward of Brown forces from the vicinity of Gulfport and Biloxi pending the arrival of other Third Army elements.

BROWN - A Brown corps consisting of the 4th and 31st Divisions and 55th Cavalry Brigade, and attached troops, landed at Gulfport and Biloxi (theoretically) with the mission of seizing these ports and advancing at once to the north and northwest with a view to opening up the Mississippi River.

The actual play of the maneuver was from 3 August to 9 August inclusive and took place within the boundaries of the National Forest. It was a free, two-sided maneuver, with a provisional corps opposing a reinforced division.

Units of the Eighth Corps Area concentrated in the vicinity of Fort Sam Houston, Texas; Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyoming, for their maneuvers.<sup>19</sup>

The Fort Sam Houston concentration was in the Camp Bullis area and the maneuver period extended from 6 August to 20 August. The concentration consisted of more than 23,000 officers and men. Brown was represented by the 2d and 45th Divisions (-), the 1st Cavalry Brigade and attachments, including observation aviation. Blue was represented by the 36th Division, the 56th Cavalry Brigade and attachments. The maneuver had a reinforced provisional corps opposing a reinforced division. The special situation had the Browns moving northwest to destroy the ammunition depot at Boerne and the Blues taking up positions to defend the depot.

The Fort Bliss maneuver period was from 13 August to 27 August, the concentration consisting of about 4,500 officers and men. Blue was represented by the 7th Cavalry and attachments and Brown by the 8th and 11th Cavalries and attachments. Both sides had observation aviation. The special situation had the Browns arriving in El Paso and interrupting rail communications, and the Blues, theoretically moving in from the Pacific Coast by rail, seeking to secure El Paso and rail communications to the Pacific.

The Fort Huachuca maneuver extended from 13 to 27 August, the concentration consisting of about 2,200 officers and men. Blue was represented by the 25th (-) and 158th Infantries plus attachments and Brown by flags simulating two regiments of infantry. The situation had the Browns crossing the border in the vicinity of Douglas. Mission of the Blues was to move east from Fort Huachuca and intercept the Browns.

The Fort Francis E. Warren concentration of 5,500 officers and men was in the Pole Mountain Military Reservation. Blue was represented by one regiment of the 2d Division and the 76th Field Artillery (-) and other attachments, including aviation. Brown was represented by the 4th Brigade, 2d Division, less one regiment, the 157th Infantry and the 168th Field Artillery and other attachments, including aviation. It was a maneuver of a regiment, reinforced, versus a provisional brigade, reinforced. The special situation here had the troops constituting the Third Army reserve and their maneuver was considered to be in the nature of training for combat employment as directed.

Some of the deficiencies noted by General Moseley were:<sup>20</sup>

- a. Some commanders appeared overcautious in advancing.
- b. Inadequate dissemination of information; some units did not know the situation; information was slow in getting back to higher headquarters in some instances.
- c. Some orders were long, involved, or late in reaching subordinates.
- d. Bunching of vehicles on motor marches.



Some of the commendations by General Moseley were:<sup>21</sup>

- a. "...it was demonstrated very clearly that the elements of the Third Army can properly fulfill their War Department mission...The troops involved showed a high morale throughout..."
- b. "...the command and staffs were competent..."
- c. Use of G.H.Q. air force units was "extremely profitable."

General Moseley considered that the maneuver demonstrated the continued usefulness of horse cavalry for close-in reconnaissance and urged that the National Guard cavalry not be destroyed. He also advised the perfection of a War Department organization which, in battle, could produce rapidly maps and charts for use in delivering unobserved fires. He said the maneuver also emphasized the need of a survey unit in divisions and higher echelons of field artillery.<sup>22</sup>

The 1938 maneuvers were valuable proving grounds of morale, equipment and command. One cavalry major wrote General Moseley after the maneuvers:<sup>23</sup> "Our squadron had everything from night marches, lost connecting files, delaying rations, missent orders, delayed reliefs, misunderstood instructions, down to even improperly buried dead horses to deal with. All of these could have happened in actual war, but the fact that they did happen in the Third Army maneuvers, the errors will be remembered and corrected the next time."

General Moseley retired on 30 September 1938 and Major General Stanley D. Embick assumed command on 1 October.

The next maneuvers were held in the spring of 1940. America was in a world at war. Germany had overrun Poland and invaded Norway. The fall of France was only a few weeks away. Americans began to be alarmed and there was much talk of conscription; sharp debate arose as to whether the nation should consider the possibility of again fighting overseas. This was reflected in the Third Army's plans for spring maneuvers. The problems for the 1936 CPX and the 1938 field exercises had been based on the Third Army's mission of defending the Southern Frontier against invasion; the 1940 problem did not involve invasion by an alien power but was a clash between two compact forces over a wide and varied battlefield.

The Army maneuvers were preceded by maneuvers of the IV Corps and IX Corps (Provisional). The IV Corps was assembled at Fort Benning, Ga., for a series of exercises against a provisional corps organized from units made available at Fort Benning by the Fourth Corps Area. The maneuvers covered the period April 12-25. The IX Corps, organized by the Eighth Corps Area, was concentrated in the Sabine area of east Texas for corps exercises from 27 April to 8 May. The exercises wound up on the right bank of the Sabine River, where the Corps awaiting Army orders to cross into Louisiana for the final maneuvers against the IV Corps. The IV Corps meanwhile had moved from Fort Benning to the vicinity of Camp Beauregard, La.<sup>24</sup>

The movement of the IV Corps provided a "logical opportunity for the organization of an Air Warning Service covering its march to the Mississippi..."<sup>25</sup> The warning service covered all of Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana and portions of Arkansas and Florida. It was organized under the direction of the Commanding Officer, 4th Coast Artillery District in his capacity as Army Antiaircraft Officer. The American Legion provided about 1,400 observer posts manned by approximately 7,000 observers. Operation of the service was limited by the small amount of GHQ aviation available for attack and interception missions but the net functioned effectively and was able to track virtually all enemy missions.

Selection of the Sabine area in Texas and Louisiana as the most suitable for Army maneuvers was the result of reconnaissance the previous fall.<sup>26</sup> Rents and Claims Boards

were established in each Corps Area to acquire land. A board of 12 officers operating in the Sabine area began its work on 20 February and by the end of April had acquired the use of 1,776,000 acres including 259,400 acres of the Kisatchis National Forest. In Texas 402,800 acres of privately owned land were acquired for the IX Corps. Private landowners cooperated patriotically in this huge real estate operation and the total of 3400 square miles was made available to the Third Army for this and future maneuvers without cost to the Government.<sup>27</sup>

General purpose of the Army maneuvers was "to train the new type corps, composed of triangular divisions, in concentrations over long distances against a mobile enemy, and in maneuver under combat conditions, both alone and coupled with combat aviation and mechanized forces."<sup>28</sup> The new type corps utilized motors instead of horses for supply and movement of weapons. Triangularization had been accomplished for Regular Army divisions on an experimental basis during the early part of 1940.

Pleased by the increased funds made available and by the opportunity to test motorized and mechanized materiel, the Army launched the big maneuver with enthusiasm and vigor.

The "war" was between Texas (Red, the IX Corps) and Louisiana (Blue, the IV Corps). The IX Corps comprised the 2nd Division and the 1st Cavalry Division and Corps and Army troops. The IV Corps comprised the 1st, 5th and 6th Divisions plus Corps and Army troops. Both sides had mechanized cavalry, observation, pursuit and bombardment aviation, and evacuation hospitals. The IV Corps also had a provisional brigade of medium and light tanks. Three Coast Artillery regiments (less one battalion) armed with 3-inch anti-aircraft guns also took part in the exercises.<sup>29</sup>

The maneuvers began on 9 May and four separate exercises, covering a period of three weeks, were staged to develop the following operations:

- "(1) The operation of an air warning net covering several states.
- "(2) The use of various types of movement for large units: rail and motor.
- "(3) The functioning of the army and corps organization in command, administration, supply and maintenance during sustained action and a determination of the needs in army and corps troops and in reinforcing elements, if any.
- "(4) The operation, during periods of rapid movement, of the motor transport provided and the handling of large motor masses.
- "(5) The use of combat aviation in the preliminary stages of an advance and against enemy concentrations.
- "(6) The combined action of combat aviation and mechanized forces.
- "(7) The operations of cavalry in combination with and against mechanized and motorized forces.

"In general, the four phases provided for the concentration, an advance and development, an attack, and a defense by the IV Corps with corresponding operations by the opposing IX Corps."<sup>30</sup> The two Corps slugged it out. The only victor, of course, was the Third Army itself: the spoils were the lessons it learned. The maneuvers perhaps were a case of "too much, too soon" rather than "too little, too late." The new mobility and the new materiel blinded many to facts which had not changed.

General Embick in the final critique reminded listeners of a basic fact: "The new corps is not mechanized cavalry. It is not an armored unit like the Panzer division. It is an Infantry Corps. It must still fight on foot."<sup>31</sup>

Among deficiencies in training, troop leading and staff work noted by commanders in the final critique were:

a. Staff officers regarded the maneuvers as "too much of a map problem, a war game, and failed to go out and look at the ground."<sup>32</sup>

b. Insufficient attention to concealment for combat aviation.

c. Inadequate reconnaissance. Orders for reconnaissance frequently were too indefinite; agencies tried to cover too much territory; many reports were too late to be of use.<sup>33</sup>

d. "Infantry and cavalry were decidedly road-bound."<sup>34</sup>

e. Road discipline: Trucks bunched at halts; excessive speeds resulted in too many fatalities.<sup>35</sup>

f. "...there were many reports of commanders of all grades failing to play the game...decisions of umpired must be accepted without challenge."<sup>36</sup>

g. Opportunities for counterattacks were overlooked.<sup>37</sup>

Commanders agreed that the new type Corps and the triangular divisions had proved themselves. The recommended, among other things, more anti-tank materiel and personnel, more 105's in divisional artillery, slow-speed corps and division observation, and divisional reconnaissance agencies.

A sidelight of training in this maneuver was the attachment of commanders and staffs of National Guard infantry and cavalry divisions to regular divisions. They received instructions in staff sections for two days during one of the field exercises and, where practicable, took over division command and staff positions for one day's operation.<sup>38</sup>

The second 1940 Third Army maneuver period was arranged in accordance with the same War Department directive which governed the May maneuvers.<sup>39</sup> Basic plans had been formulated at the winter conference in Washington which had prepared the way for the spring exercises.

The maneuvers were held in August in the same area that was used in May. Major purpose this time was the training of National Guard divisions. Consequently as much time as possible was allowed for unit and division training under the direction of the division commanders. Only four days were devoted to the final Army maneuver period.<sup>40</sup>

In general, only troops of the Fourth and Eight Corps Areas participated in the exercises. All movements of both Regular and National Guard troops to and from the concentration area were controlled by the corps areas concerned. Base camps were established for the preliminary training of three National Guard divisions in the Camp Beauregard area. One Guard division, the 30th, conducted its unit and division training at Camp Shelby, Miss., and did not move into the Louisiana maneuver area until 16 August just in time to take part in the final Army maneuver 16 August to 20 August.

For the final maneuver the Regular Army and National Guard units were organized into two corps, IV Corps (Blue) and VIII Corps (Red) Major General Albert H. Blanding

was announced as commander of the IV Corps and Major General Walter Krueger as commander of the VIII Corps.<sup>41</sup> IV Corps troops included the 30th and 31st Infantry Divisions and the 23rd Cavalry Divisions; VIII Corps included the 2nd, 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division. Both sides had observation aviation.

Operations in the final phase were initiated through control instructions and orders from Third Army headquarters. Resulting operations were summarized as follows:<sup>42</sup>

"The IV Corps (BLUE) being smaller and less mobile, was pushed across the Calcasieu River at midnight 16-17 August. Contact was gained shortly after daylight generally along the VIII Corps (RED) outpost line by the scout car elements of the 6th Cavalry (BLUE). These were easily pushed back by the Cavalry Division (RED) and the remainder of the day was consumed in the clash of opposing cavalry forces. By dark the 23rd Cavalry Division (BLUE), both men and animals, were considerably spent. It was necessary for the Third Army to send trucks to this unit to move its men, thus allowing its animals some needed rest. The majority of the National Guard horses were rented and proved to be of little value as cavalry mounts.

"During the next day, infantry divisions advancing behind the cavalry screens relieved the cavalry units in their front. The BLUE forces assumed the defensive, while the RED Corps drove in the hostile covering forces, moved its 2nd Division to the west flank, and prepared for an attack at daylight 19 August

"This attack met with immediate success, especially on the front of the 2nd Division, which was opposed on the west flank by BLUE cavalry. During these actions, the IV Corps was moving the 30th Division and the 13th Field Artillery Brigade into position for a counter-attack on 20 August. The maneuver ended after the initiation of this attack."

It was a hard maneuver under a relentless sun, and it laid out clearly for the War Department and the Third Army commander the next tasks on the "must" list. The exercises proved, first, the necessity of establishing permanent corps and army units, with essential troops permanently assigned, in order to eliminate improvisation of such elements by with-drawing combat troops from division. They proved, second, that the peace-time training of the National Guard was insufficient.

General Krueger stressed the inadequacy of a jerry-built corps in his remarks at the final critique.<sup>43</sup> He said:

"VIII Corps Headquarters was made up of personnel gathered from many sources, hastily thrown together, and expected to operate as an effective corps headquarters. Thus the Headquarters Detachment, Headquarters Company, and MP unit were improvised and had no previous training as such. There was neither a medical unit nor an engineer unit...A provisional signal company was improvised...its equipment was wholly inadequate...The Provisional Ordnance Battalion was formed...from the 36th and 45th National Guard Divisions. There was no units to form a corps artillery brigade Headquarters and headquarters battery. Further comment would be superfluous."

General Krueger praised the "enthusiasm and willingness"<sup>44</sup> of the troops but added that "this is not enough." The National Guard units, he said, showed the effect of inadequate intensive field training. He pointed to faults in field sanitation, march discipline, transmission of information. He observed that, though marches were short, large numbers of men dropped out from heat prostration and foot soreness, that patronage of soft drink stands led to too many gastro-intestinal disturbances, and that supervision and execution of orders fell short. But he stressed that improvements

were noted during the course of the maneuver and said, in conclusion, that he felt confident "that the National Guard components could be made effective elements of the corps battle team."

General Krueger recommended that the Guard units "be given intensive training leading progressively from basic training of individuals and minor units to the higher units, discipline and hardening being stressed." He said battalion training should not be taken up until companies had become effective teams and that regimental training should wait until battalion training had been satisfactorily completed. He urged that the Guard units "at the earliest possible moment be equipped with the new equipment, weapons, and motor transportation." (He previously had noted that the Guardsmen had been handicapped by old weapons and lack of weapons carriers.)

Major General H. J. Brees, co-director of the maneuvers, addressed most of his remarks to the National Guard at the final critique.<sup>45</sup> He stressed that the Guardsmen and the Regulars could not be judged by the same standard because the former were citizen-soldiers who had been able to devote only a small part of their time to military training. But he pointed to their impending federalization, when military service would become a full-time job with them, and on this basis presented his criticisms.

Both officers and men were soft, he said. Many officers and men were unable to take care of themselves in the field. Water discipline was poor. Many men went about stripped to the waist and severe sunburn resulted. There was still too much of a CPX and map maneuver complex in command and staff procedure. Radio was used too much in the clear. Too many camps were left in a poor state of police, indicating insufficient discipline and supervision.

But lessons had been learned and a framework for improvements had been created. Meanwhile, the day, not only of National Guard mobilization, but of selective service was close at hand. The Third Army was ready for it. From a paper organization it had grown, under its five commanders, into a real field army prepared and determined to do well whatever it might be called on to do.

\* \* \*

## CHAPTER II

### PRE-WAR EXPANSION AND ARMY MANEUVERS (1 October 1940 to 7 December 1941)

Under the system of having the senior Corps Area commander serve also as the Field Army commander, headquarters of the Third Army had been located both at Fort Sam Houston, headquarters of the Eighth Corps Area, and at Atlanta, headquarters of the Fourth Corps Area. During the tenure of General Winans, for example, headquarters was at Fort Sam Houston; under Generals Moseley and Embick it was at Atlanta.

When General Embick relinquished command of the Third Army at midnight 30 September 1940 and Lieutenant General Herbert J. Brees took over, headquarters simultaneously changed from Atlanta to Fort Sam Houston.<sup>46</sup> Early in November, however, Third Army moved to the Smith-Young Tower (later named the Transit Tower) at 310 South St. Mary's Street in downtown San Antonio. This move was a result of a War Department letter redefining the responsibilities of Army commands.<sup>47</sup>

The letter removed all troops of the field forces from Corps Area jurisdiction and put them under Field Army control. It also relieved Field Army commanders of all responsibility for Corps Area activities.

The letter defined field forces as consisting of "General Headquarters (GHQ); Armies, Corps, and Divisions; GHQ aviation; The Armored Force; Air Defense Commands; Coast Artillery Districts, including harbor defense troops; and other GHQ reserve troops."

The letter stressed that it was "the desire of the War Department that field force commanders spend the maximum time on supervision of training and the minimum time on post administration."

It went on to say: "With a view to reducing to a minimum the time spent on post administration by field force commanders, each officer who is both a field force commander and a post commander will designate an officer available to him as 'Post Executive', preferably one not assigned to a field force unit, and delegate to this officer the routine administration of the post, under prescribed general policies."

The letter charged Army commanders with providing Corps Area commanders with commissioned and enlisted personnel to operate installations under control of Corps Area commanders until such personnel could be obtained from Corps Area service commands. The letter commented that the War Department was studying the question of providing station complements for post overhead and administrative duties in order to relieve field forces of such demands. This later was done.

A later letter cleared up any confusion about responsibility for supply.<sup>48</sup> stating that the existing supply system would remain in effect except that during field maneuvers Army commanders would assume supply functions comparable to those of an Army commander in a Theater of Operations where supplies are received direct from Zone of Interior supply points.

Up until this time the Third Army, except during CPX's or maneuvers, usually had consisted of one full-time officer, the deputy chief of staff, with the Army commander giving as much time to its functions as his duties of a Corps Area commander permitted. When General Brees took command, his staff comprised two officers and four enlisted men.<sup>49</sup> Of first priority then was the acquisition of an adequate staff for full-time headquarters duty. As yet there was no Field Army T/O but greater allotments in

officers were allowed General Brees and he set about to pick his men. On 11 November 1940 he announced his General and Special Staffs as follows:<sup>50</sup>

CHIEF OF STAFF: Brigadier General Harvey D. Higley, GSC.  
ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF: Lieut. Col. George R. Barker, GSC.  
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1: Lieut. Col. Beverly H. Colner, GSC.  
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3: Lieut. Col. George R. Barker, GSC.  
ASSISTANT TO G-3: Lieut. Col. Homer C. Brown, GSC.  
ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4: Lieut. Col. LeRoy Lutes, CAC.  
ADJUTANT GENERAL: Lieut. Col. Walter O. Rawls, AGD.  
ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL: Capt. Thomas J. Marnane, AGD.  
ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL: Capt. Samson Zelic Abelow, Cav-Res.  
ANTI-AIRCRAFT SECTION: Lieut. Col. Charles S. Harris, CAC  
ENGINEER SECTION: Col. DeWitt C. Jones, CE.  
JUDGE ADVOCATE'S SECTION: Col. William A. Turnbull, JAGD.  
ORDNANCE SECTION: Col. Lucian D. Booth, OD.  
SIGNAL SECTION: Lieut. Col. Harry C. Ingles, SC.  
SURGEON: Col. Robert C. McDonald, MC.

On this date the move to the Smith-Young Tower also was announced;<sup>51</sup> two days later Headquarters Company, Third Army, was activated at Fort Sam Houston.<sup>52</sup>

Following up its letter of 3 October, the War Department had issued a directive on 7 October 1940 listing groupings of divisions, corps and Coast Artillery Districts for the purposes of training and tactical control.<sup>53</sup> The Third Army had been given the IV, V and VIII Corps, and divisions had been allotted to the corps as follows:

IV Corps--4th, 31st and 43d.  
V Corps--32d, 34th, 37th and 38th.  
VIII Corps--2d, 36th and 45th.

The 1st Cavalry Division, the 56th Cavalry Brigade, the 4th Coast Artillery District and the Harbor Defenses of Galveston had been placed under Army control.

This cleared the "big picture" of the Third Army's new tactical control but brought about problems involving many units which General Brees referred to as "spare parts."<sup>54</sup> On 30 October 1940 he wrote to Major General L. J. McNair, Chief of Staff, GHQ, as follows:

"The assignment of units to armies, especially the spare parts, and odds and ends, should be settled as soon as you can do so. Aside from the major units which have been already turned over to me, I have no idea what I have in the way of corps and Army troops... For example, there are a number at Benning and nobody there seems to know where they belong..."<sup>55</sup>

Units belonging to the Third Army eventually were determined and on 25 November 1940 all units were assigned either as Army troops or under Corps control. Each Corps also was assigned its own special Corps Troops.<sup>56</sup> In the same general order General Brees "farmed out" dozens of smaller Army units, widely scattered from Florida to Arizona, to corps and divisions.

"Shortly after I took over," General Brees recalls, "I set out of town and visited every installation - all the way from the Atlantic to Colorado...At Fort Benning, for example, I found a dozen units which belonged to us, but no one was responsible for them, so I put the V Corps, then at Blanding, in charge. They (the V Corps) kept an officer up there all the time in direct command. At every station I found the same thing: They trained as they saw fit...If the Corps was nearest, I put the Corps in control. If a division happened to be on the post, I charged the division with the responsibility."<sup>57</sup>

In a letter to General McNair several months later, General Brees commented that "this scheme seems to have worked."<sup>58</sup> He added:  
"...these 'spare parts' units inevitably get too cocky or get the impression they are being treated as orphans."

Another major task faced by General Brees and his staff was the close supervision of the early training of National Guard units which were being inducted under the peacetime emergency decree.

"I saw every unit in the Army, at least once, during my nine months as Commanding General," General Brees recalls. "My wife said I was only a traveling salesman. The inspections were always informal. I never let a unit know when I was going to drop in. One thing I always checked on was schedules of training...Too many units simply did as they wished."<sup>59</sup>

National Guard and training problems are further illuminated in exchanges of correspondence between General Brees and General McNair during the period October 1940 - March 1941. One early problem was the physical unfitness of some National Guard officers. General McNair wrote that "there has been considerable grief in connection with the physical examination of National Guard officers on induction."<sup>60</sup> General Brees replied that the examinations so far had caused little trouble in the Third Army. He wrote:

"We have two types of medical officers - those who are hardboiled and those who are easy-going. I have tried to strike a happy medium...I have gone on the assumption that waivers should be granted in border-line cases and that the weeding out, if such is necessary, should be done in those doubtful cases after those National Guard officers have had a chance to adjust themselves to their new environment."<sup>61</sup>

A major problem from the start, was the shortage of training equipment. In one letter, General McNair wrote that it was "lacking in some cases in an objectionable degree."<sup>62</sup> A typical example was target carriers for known-distance small arms ranges. General McNair wrote that only 50 percent of those needed in the Fourth Corps Area would be immediately available and suggested that General Brees weigh the needs at each camp so there would be an equitable distribution.<sup>63</sup>

The War Department and Third Army also were troubled with a shortage of officers, particularly ones who were immediately qualified to supervise training of the newly inducted National Guard divisions. War Department policy was to attach five Regular officers to each division for a four-month tour of duty. General McNair advised General Brees that requests for more than five for any particular division would have to be approved by the War Department.<sup>64</sup> He also mentioned that there were instances where the detachment of an excessive number of a division's officers to attend special service schools had jeopardized effective training.

As the divisions were inducted and closed in at camps for training, General Brees journeyed from one place to another for informal inspections. His letters to General McNair reflected dissatisfaction with some of the things he saw. On 30 November 1940 he wrote:

"In my inspections of these National Guard units I am coming right definitely to the opinion that in their anxiety to go places they are trying to run before they have learned to walk. What I mean is - they seem to have a tendency to slur over things instead of getting down to brass tacks and thoroughly learning details."<sup>65</sup>

To which General McNair replied:



"We have observed...that their training is far from perfect in the many small but important details which the Regular Army always has stressed. I incline to the view that the fault is due to inadequate leadership: the officers conducting the training themselves have too little knowledge of the same details and do not appreciate their importance. However, it seems to me that they are doing better in this respect than ever before..."<sup>66</sup>

This improvement noted by General McNair continued, of course, and the Third Army kept right on growing as divisions continued to be inducted and the first stream of selectees filtered through the ranks. There were frequent changes in assignment. On 16 January 1941 the strength of units, attached and assigned, substantially was as follows:<sup>67</sup>

Third Army: 1st Cavalry Division; 56th Cavalry Brigade (inducted 18 November 1940); 24th and 25th Infantries; approximately 20 Coast Artillery (AA and Harbor Defense) regiments and battalions; 18 Quartermaster Companies; six Ordnance companies; one radio intercept company; one Signal company; one evacuation hospital and medical laboratory.

IV Corps: 4th Division; 31st Division (inducted 25 November 1940); 43d Division (to be inducted in February); Corps troops.

V Corps: 32d Division (inducted 15 October 1940); 34th Division (to be inducted in February); 37th Division (inducted 15 October 1940); 38th Division (to be inducted 17 January); Corps troops.

VIII Corps: 2nd Division; 36th Division (inducted 25 November 1940); 45th Division (inducted 16 September 1940); Corps troops.

During January and February a long list of units was activated--Signal battalions, pigeon companies, Chemical companies, Quartermaster regiments and battalions, station hospitals, Field Artillery observation battalions, Engineer companies. Assigned or attached to Third Army, they were "farmed out" to the three Corps for control and supervision of training.<sup>68</sup> Individual units submitted their training programs and schedules up to Corps; Corps in turn underwent the scrutiny of Third Army inspectors.<sup>69</sup> These component units of the Third Army were scattered through seven states from South Carolina to Arizona.

On 15 May 1941 General Brees retired as Commanding General and in his final general order he could state with pride: "Starting practically from scratch, the Third Army has grown to over 300,000 officers and men. While there is still a long way to go, I am happy to say that distinct progress has been made to date. I bespeak for my successor the same loyalty and cooperation as has been extended to me."<sup>70</sup>

Lieutenant General Walter Krueger became Third Army commander on 16 May 1941.<sup>71</sup> He had started his military career as a Spanish-American War volunteer, in Cuba. Re-enlisting in the Regular Army as a private in 1899, he went to the Philippines and took part in numerous engagements. In July 1901 he was appointed a Second Lieutenant of Infantry in the Regular Army.

In the 18 years that followed he studied and served at the Infantry-Cavalry School, served with Infantry regiments in the U.S., mapped the Philippines, was an Army language instructor, planned the organization for National Guard overseas service in the World War, was acting chief of staff of the 84th Division, was at the front as G-3 of the 26th Division, returned to the U. S. and went back to France as G-3 of the 84th, became chief of staff of the A. E. F. Tank Corps and, after the Armistice, G-3 of the IV Army Corps in Germany. In the post-war years he instructed at the Infantry School, commanded

Infantry regiments, studied and instructed at the Army War College and the Naval War College, cruised with the Fleet, studied in the German war archives, served with the War Plans Division and attended the Air Corps Primary Flying School.

In July, 1938, now a brigadier general, he took command of the 16th Infantry Brigade. In February 1939 he was promoted to Major General and assumed command of the 2nd Division and Fort Sam Houston. He commanded a provisional corps in the 1940 Third Army maneuvers. His promotion to Lieutenant General came simultaneously with his assumption of command of the Third Army.

General Krueger's concept of the conduct of war was summed up in an expression he used time and time again: "Simplicity in strategical conception; perfection in technique; firmness in execution." He believed that every movement, every action of every soldier on the battlefield was worthy of the critical concern of the highest general. To him a life needlessly sacrificed was a crime chargeable to faulty leadership; that whereas strategy was an exclusive function of the commander in the field, tactics and technique belonged to every soldier in the Army, and it was the duty of officers to ensure that soldiers learned these tactics and this technique.

General Krueger had no patience with pedantry. Campaigns and battles were not won, he believed, by conjuring with pedantic rules but by recognizing the critical point, making the bulk of one's forces available there in time, and then striking hard. He frequently quoted the Jacksonian injunction: "Surprise, mystify and mislead the enemy." But he rejected the idea that surprise and mystification of the enemy resulted from clever and complicated maneuvers. The surest way to surprise the enemy was to hit him so hard that he was dazed from the outset, the best way to mystify him was to continue to hit so hard and so often that the enemy could not discover from whence each new blow had been delivered. Hence General Krueger was a great believer in speed. Finally, he was convinced that generals belonged at the front, and that to share hardships with the troops was one of the best ways to maintain morale.

Two important and time-consuming tasks faced General Krueger after he took over. One was the reassignment and reclassification of officers -- putting the right men in the right jobs. The other was making arrangements for the 1941 maneuvers, which were to be far and above the greatest in the nation's history.

To assist him in his ever-increasing work, General Krueger obtained Colonel (later General) Dwight D. Eisenhower as his Deputy Chief of Staff on 2 July 1941 and on 9 August 1941 made him Chief of Staff.<sup>72, 73</sup>

Putting the right man in the right job had always been an Army ideal and a part of Army routine, but the rapid expansion now made it a pressing matter of highest priority. There were important jobs to be filled, and many promotions to be made; among the newcomers there were many unknown quantities and among the older heads there were men unfitted by age, physical condition or inability to adapt themselves to the swiftly changing picture. Third Army leadership was to be tried, tested and frequently changed, from platoon leaders up. This task imposed a heavy responsibility on higher commanders and their staffs.

However, the bulk of the changes in personnel was to wait until after the summer CPXs, field exercises and maneuvers, which were to culminate in the now-famous "war" between the Second and Third Armies.

General purpose of the summer exercises was to develop Corps and Army technique in handling of large units. Where in previous years of Third Army history, a maneuver was considered large scale if two or three understrength divisions (6500 men each) were

drawn up for battle, now full-strength Armies of six or more divisions each were to fight it out.

The VIII Corps, commanded by Major General George V. Strong, was the first to test its staff work--and basically, of course, its soldiers' knowledge of soldiering--in the Army-controlled exercises. Using Dry Prong, Louisiana, as a concentration area, it had its first CPX on 2-5 June 1941, and its first field exercise on 8-10 June 1941, and its second field exercise on 12-13 June 1941.<sup>74</sup>

The CPX involved the invasion of Blue territory by a Red Corps that included motorized divisions. General Strong in his critique saw little realism in the CPX, and advised his staff when on real maneuvers to "watch your information, feed your men, and calculate very carefully time and space factors."<sup>75</sup> General Krueger criticized many things--antitank plans, communications, orders, ration breakdowns, movements--but applauded all concerned for performing on the whole in a "creditable manner."<sup>76</sup>

The first field exercise of the VIII Corps was a replay of the first two days of the CPX. General Strong again pointed to unrealistic use of time and space factors and to "perfectly rotten road discipline."<sup>77</sup> General Krueger's critique stung like a whip. He said:

"No doubt some of you feel that you are getting pretty good. I, myself, had that notion, too, and to a considerable extent, to tell you frankly, I was disappointed... Many, many things were done wrong. Some of them were very wrong. And the things about which I am most chagrined are a few things that were done wrong, although I have preached to you, I have pleaded with you, and I have ordered you to correct them. They have not been corrected. That is inexcusable."

General Krueger then made lashing criticisms of traffic control and road discipline, of local security provisions, of lateral contacts, of light discipline, of feeding ("they must get hot food."), of anti-mechanized defense. He closed by saying:

"I must again urge upon you seriously and earnestly to take immediate steps to correct the matters to which I have called your attention today. It is only by doing so, it is only by the most earnest, sleepless vigilance, energy and attention to all these matters by commanders of all grades, that we can possibly hope to train the army that our nation needs and must have."

In the third field exercise the VIII Corps organized and defended a line covering the routes to railheads and road centers. General Strong saw marked improvement over the preceding exercises, although he criticized several things, including conduct of smaller units, some "comic opera" patrolling, road discipline and dissemination of information.<sup>78</sup> General Krueger also noted the improvements but reiterated some criticisms and made some new ones, including the facts that the defense was on too wide a front and that there was insufficient reconnaissance.<sup>79</sup> General McNair congratulated the Corps on the progress made and voiced few criticisms, dwelling largely on the necessity of improving the large picture of anti-tank defense.<sup>80</sup>

The V Corps, commanded by Major General E. L. Daley, likewise went through its test, concentrating on Alexandria, Louisiana, from 16-27 June 1941 for a CPX and two field exercises. The CPX involved a Red force that had crossed the Sabine River. Mission was to advance and defeat the enemy. Both General Daley and General Krueger expressed pleasure in the general handling of the problem but strongly criticized the flow of information. At the close of his critique General Krueger delivered a stirring eulogy to the 1941 American soldier. He said:

"Our men are a fine lot...They are the finest lot by far of any bunch of men I have ever seen...Their care is a holy duty...In spite of the great mechanized and air forces, we are dealing with human beings. I love them, and I am proud of them."<sup>81</sup>

The two V Corps field exercises followed the same pattern as those of the VIII Corps: The first was a continuation of the CPX; the second a defense of railheads and road centers against a highly mobile enemy. General Krueger made criticisms similar to those he made after the VIII Corps exercises. At his critique of the first exercise he told those present: "You are going to get the surprise of your life unless you correct these errors. That is not a threat, of course; it is a solemn promise."<sup>82</sup> At the end of the third exercise he said the maneuver had been "well done" but dwelt at some length on the matter of discipline and warned, "Orders are orders; they must be obeyed."<sup>83</sup>

On through the hot summer the officers and men of the Third Army kept plugging away at their jobs. In late July the 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Major General Innis P. Swift, went through two field maneuvers. General Krueger was on hand and had many commendations for this hardened outfit but he warned them that they were doing some things that they could not get away with in the coming Louisiana maneuvers--carrying items not on the T/BA, simulating ammunition supply in some cases, failing to use ground scouts to supervise rigidly the care of mounts. He assured them that, though the desert terrain over which they had maneuvered might be difficult, it was not nearly so difficult as that in Louisiana.<sup>84</sup>

During the period 11 - 23 August the IV Corps, commanded by Major General Jay L. Benedict, went through a CPX and two field maneuvers in Louisiana. Critique notes prepared by Third Army listed deficiencies that included the following:<sup>85</sup>

- Command Post Locations,
- Light discipline,
- Communications and liaison,
- Troop frontages,
- Road discipline, and
- Water discipline.

The Louisiana concentrations of future South Pacific, North Africa and Mediterranean warriors grew progressively larger during August. While the IV Corps exercises were still going on, the V and VIII Corps engaged in a large Corps vs Corps maneuver that involved seven infantry divisions, one cavalry division and, for the first time, an armored division - the now famous 2nd commanded by Major General (later Lieutenant General) George S. Patton, Jr. The V included the 32d, 34th, 37th and 38th Infantry Divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Tank Group. The VIII comprised the 2d, 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions, the 2nd Armored Division, the 18th Field Artillery Brigade and the 56th Cavalry Brigade.<sup>86</sup>

The first exercise had the V Corps (Red) moving north after a theoretical landing at Lake Charles and the VIII Corps (Blue) moving south with a mission of attacking and defeating the Reds. The VIII was in a bottleneck so far as roads were concerned and General Strong decided to secure the dominant Peason Ridge, drive south of Leesville to secure the road net there, split the Red force down the middle, clean up east of the main north-south highway, 171, and drive the rest into the Sabine River.<sup>87</sup> With this in mind, he utilized the 2nd Armored, supported by a 155-mm howitzer regiment, as a covering force with the leading regimental combat team of each committed division directly on the heels of the armored force.<sup>88</sup>

Participation of an armored division in the Louisiana maneuvers was something new and different. The nature of the problem and the summary of operations for that historic field maneuver<sup>89</sup> do not offer any basis for saying that the 2nd succeeded or

failed in its mission. The record does show that units of the division advanced aggressively, that some elements suffered severe tank losses in clashes with infantry, that others penetrated deep into Red territory in a comparatively short time, and that others made a brilliant "end run" at a critical stage of the battle.

In his critique General Krueger criticized the early commitment and continued use of the 2nd against organized resistance. "It reduced, through tank wastage, the strength available for the final blow, and forced the piece-meal rather than concentrated use of these vehicles", he said.<sup>90</sup>

"The most effective use of armored forces and their natural foes, the massed anti-tank formations, can be attained only through thoughtful planning and perfect technique," General Krueger said. "There must be continuous reconnaissance to determine the practicability of the terrain for the use of armored forces. If this is done, then the direction of their attack should be such as to strike at a vital area or element in order to make their use worthwhile. To barge ahead, gain local successes in numerous places and then be stopped by a natural obstacle is a waste of power."<sup>91</sup>

General Krueger also stressed that defensive infantry affected by an armored penetration should remain steadfastly in place and continue the defense while other forces, including anti-tank formations, are rushed up to counterattack the flanks and rear of the penetration.

In the second and final problem the VIII Corps was given the mission of organizing and defending ground in the vicinity of Peason in order to cover the theoretical concentration of the Third Army in the Shreveport-Mansfield area. The 2nd Armored and other units were attached to the IV Corps, making it far the stronger. Operating under secret orders, the 2nd Armored crossed the Sabine and moved north on the Texas side of the river with the mission of recrossing the river and attacking the Blue rear in the Mansfield-Pleasant area. This it did, while infantry combat teams engaged the Blue frontally. General Krueger in his critique said he believed the Blues, whose lines were anchored on the Red and Sabine rivers, could have accomplished their mission had they "taken more active means of preventing the armored division from crossing the... rivers in its rear."<sup>92</sup>

In preparation for these huge Corps vs. Corps maneuvers and for the bigger Army, and Army vs. Army, maneuvers yet to come, Third Army Headquarters had closed in San Antonio on 11 August 1941 and had opened simultaneously at Lake Charles, Louisiana.<sup>93</sup> Personnel and supplies of Headquarters and Headquarters Special Troops (which had been activated 2 June 1941<sup>94</sup>) had moved into the maneuver area by motor convoy.

Countless and varied were the problems officers had to wrestle with in preparation for the big maneuvers and one of the most complex of these was supply. Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier General) Loyal M. Haynes was assistant G-4 of Third Army at the time and he recalls that a dozen depots were set up in the maneuver area.<sup>95</sup>

"The area over which they maneuvered was so great that centralization of supply was impracticable," General Haynes recalls. "Furthermore, even though we knew in advance - had to know - the general plan of action, and therefore where to supply, generally, we also had to make plans on the unpredictability of people like General Patton, then commanding the 2nd Armored Division. He loved to, and did, make 250-mile 'end-run sweeps.' I finally had it figured out so that wherever he went in the entire area he'd always be within 20 miles of gasoline supply for tanks. You cannot imagine the tasks involved...Third Army along had 48,000 vehicles; we had \$900,000 worth of spare parts, either there or on call, and had to make arrangements for supply of eight different kinds of gasoline - for stoves, airplanes, cars, tanks, and so forth..."<sup>96</sup>

"And we had to keep those men fed," he said. "I remember General Krueger saying to me before the maneuvers, 'Haynes, I want those men to be fed, all the time, on time, unless I order otherwise.' On two or three occasions, I know, he did order otherwise. To train and harden troops, orders went out saying, 'Railhead No. X destroyed. No supply ration available.' This put the problem...right up to the CO or CG - he would have to face such possibility frequently in real combat."97

That the supply problem was successfully met and conquered is evidenced by the accolade of General McNair at the end of the maneuvers. He said, "The essential effectiveness of supply was an outstanding feature of the maneuvers...Combat commanders and the services alike deserve the highest praise for the results achieved."98

Early in September, after the Corps vs. Corps maneuvers had been completed, the Third Army further sharpened its claws for the GHQ-directed battle against the Second Army with a CPX and two field maneuvers. The CPX involved operations against a theoretical "Red Second Army" which was organized essentially the same as the Second Army of the United States. General Krueger was highly critical of Army staff operations--the original Army order, he said, was "inexcusably delayed" in reaching major units; message centers, particularly that of the Army did not function properly; liaison personnel was not efficiently used; section reports were neglected.99

The field exercises, 4-6 and 7-9 September, pitted the V and VIII Corps, operating as the Third Army, against the IV Corps, operating as the Red force. General Krueger served both as Third Army commander and as director of the maneuver. The Blue force was ordered to advance and seize the crossing of the Red River, while the Red force was directed to seize and hold the crossings of the Calcasieu River. The Blue force was considerably stronger than the Red as the purpose of the problem was to exercise one corps in the rapid organization of an area for defense while the remainder of the Army received practice in the conduct of a "relentless offensive."100

This time General Krueger noted marked improvements in staff work of higher headquarters and in signal communications--things he had criticized after the Army CPX. But he leveled a warning that was to serve through the Army vs. Army maneuver. He said:

"If you will take the trouble to read over the notes of past critiques, you will be struck with the consistency with which many technical criticisms have been repeated. They have dealt with such subjects as traffic control; concealment and dispersion of personnel, vehicles and command posts; tactics of small units; infantry-artillery liaison; road and march discipline; transmission of information and orders; simplification of staff procedure; aggressiveness in all echelons; wearing of proper equipment; defense methods against tanks and aircraft; conduct of infantry units when being transported in trucks; feeding of men; re-supply of ammunition and many others. Over and over, general and specific criticisms have been leveled at the proficiency of troop commanders with respect to these matters. There can be no doubt that, so far as mere talking can assure, all our senior officers and staffs -- at least, all officers present in this room -- are conversant with the standards demanded in the Third Army."101

As the summer wore on the eyes of the nation had become focused on the Louisiana maneuvers. Scores of top-flight press and radio correspondents had converged on the area to cover the Third Army exercises and the climatic battle between General Krueger's forces and the Second Army of Lieutenant General Ben Lear.

The big battle began at 0530 15 September 1941. The battlefield was 30,000 square miles of tough and varied Louisiana and East Texas terrain. In the field there

were some 500,000 men -- by far the greatest number of troops ever concentrated in an area this size in the United States, in war or in peace.

For the first phase, 15-19 September, General Krueger's Blues included nine Infantry divisions - the 2nd, 31st, 32d, 34th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 43d and 45th - the 1st Cavalry Division, a provisional tank group and brigades and regiments of Cavalry, Field Artillery and Antiaircraft. General Lear's Reds had fewer Infantry divisions but had a powerful provisional armored corps consisting of the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions. He also had a Cavalry division and other attached and assigned Cavalry, Field Artillery and Antiaircraft.

Each side had about 500 combat and observation planes under direct control of the Army commander. The Third Air Task Force of the Third Army included many of the newest planes being built--A-20 and A-24 light attack bombers; B-25 and B-26 medium bombers; P-38, P-39 and P-40 fighters, and O-47 observation planes of the Army and SB2C dive bombers and Grumman fighters of the Navy. The Second Army was similarly well outfitted. An aircraft warning service utilizing 18,000 civilian observers and 800 observation posts also was in operation.

As the "war" began the Second Army was poised along the Red River with bridge-head assigned as jump-off places. The Third Army, far to the south and southwest, was behind a restraining line just above DeRidder, Louisiana.

The first directive given the Third Army commander by GHQ had stated that "present plans in event of war call for immediate invasion by your Army in direction of Monroe (La.) to destroy hostile forces in that area."<sup>102</sup> This later had been amplified by instructions directing that the Army be prepared for prompt advance toward the north and northeast. General Krueger then had issued orders for the Army to advance in the general direction of Monroe to attack and defeat the Red forces wherever found.<sup>103</sup>

This order had directed the V Corps to seize the crossings over the Red River at Alexandria and vicinity to support the operations of the IV Corps and to destroy the Red River bridges below Alexandria. The IV Corps was to seize the crossing over the Red River at Boyce and the VIII to operate in the general direction of Many-- Natchitoches and protect the flank of the main operations. The 1st Cavalry Division was to cover the Army's left flank and the air task force was to make the enemy armored forces its primary objective.

The Third Army moved forward on the morning of 15 September on a 150-mile front. During the first day there were but brief skirmishes between reconnaissance elements on the ground but the V Corps occupied Alexandria and the Blue air force blew up permanent and ponton bridges over the Red River and attacked armored columns, Red planes attacked the Lake Charles Airport. On the second day provisional anti-tank groups of the 2nd, 36th and 45th Divisions routed General Patton's tanks along Peason Ridge. General Krueger was staging a blitz defense. Air activity was heavy over the whole area and one squadron of A-20s attacked Barksdale Field at Shreveport, destroying many fighters on the ground, while another squadron destroyed planes at the Monroe airport. The Reds again bombed the Lake Charles airport.

On the third day the Blue continued to push the Reds back all along the front. Operating on a tactical mission for the first time, American parachute troopers went into action with General Krueger's forces. A company of paratroopers jumped from 13 transport into a cotton field behind Red lines near Clarence, La., and sent frightened cotton pickers scurrying for shelter. The troopers harassed local Red forces and disrupted communications.

By the beginning of the fourth day the Blues had pushed the Reds back across the Red River for 60 miles along the east end of the line. On the west, however, the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions struck ferociously; the Blue line bent but anti-tank groups, medium bombers and an acute shortage of fuel for the tanks combined to halt the attack. On the morning of the fifth day an armistice was declared.

In his critique General Krueger applauded his foot troops, many of whom had marched more than 50 miles in 48 hours and had arrived in the line "full of pep and eagerness for the fight."<sup>104</sup>

The "war" was resumed at 1200 24 September 1941, the Third Army's mission being to advance to meet Red forces moving south from Shreveport, to defeat them and capture Shreveport. For this phase the 2nd Armored Division was attached to General Krueger's forces.

During the first night a 50-mile battlefront was built up, extending from the Sabine River north of Burr Ferry to Boyce and across the Red River. Blue pushed a salient in the center of the Red lines. On the second day the Third Army swept forward along the entire front, the stiffest opposition being a tank attack near Hornbeck-Peason, which was turned back by coordination of bombing, artillery and anti-tank fire. The Reds demolished bridges in the path of the Blues.

On the third day Blue aviation strafed and bombed withdrawing Reds and engineers labored to repair blown bridges. On the fourth day Blue tanks entered Shreveport from the north and the Blue airforce unleashed an unparalleled attack on the city. Meanwhile, the 45th and 36th Divisions forced a great bulge in the Red lines before the beleaguered city. Fighting intensified on the fifth day, the Reds staging a powerful counter-attack near Mansfield, but the bulge broke and triumphant Blue infantry entered the city as the big maneuver was brought to a close."<sup>105</sup>

In a message radioed to all concerned General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, declared that the maneuvers had been a "complete success, on the ground, in the air and for the supply and maintenance services." He added that "the zeal and energy, the endurance and the spirit of the troops had been a model of excellence."<sup>106</sup>

In his final comments General McNair said the maneuver should be called "the Battle of Bridges."<sup>107</sup>

"If there is any one lesson which stands out above all the others, it is the decisive influence of destroyed bridges," he said. "In spite of outstandingly intense and effective efforts by the engineers, it was demonstrated that destruction is vastly easier than repair...The old principle that a route must be secured before it is used becomes a must and a first under the conditions we have seen in this maneuver."

In his final critique General Krueger stressed the part that "material advantage" had played in accounting for the Third Army's spectacular success.

"...the comparative rapidity of the Blue advance should not lead to false impressions," he said. "Blue had the great advantage of being numerically much stronger than Red, and the further advantage of absolute immunity of its line of communications from the edge of the maneuver area to the base at New Orleans. Had that line been subject to attack, much of the Blue strength would have been consumed in its protection..."<sup>108</sup>



Gradually the divisions and corps moved back to their proper stations. The evacuation, which required logistical planning of a nicety never before required, took two weeks. Headquarters and Special Troops, Third Army, were among the first to leave and headquarters reopened in San Antonio at 1300, 2 October 1941.

The priority task of improving leadership faced General Krueger and his staff following the maneuvers. Both he and General McNair had dwelt on the matter in their final critiques.

"Lack of effective leadership is still very prevalent in the Third Army," General Krueger had said.<sup>109</sup>

General McNair had discussed the subject at length. He had said in part:

"I feel emphatically that leadership and command can and must be improved -- and I refer to no particular echelon. On the other hand it would be unfair to create the impression that all leadership is bad...So far as I know, no drastic purge of weak leaders is contemplated, although the issue undoubtedly has been clarified in many cases by performance during these maneuvers -- the fairest test short of war itself... It seems reasonable and probable that leadership will be improved by removal of weak officers as developments warrant in each case...When a weak leader can be replaced by a strong one, the necessary action certainly should be forthcoming without hesitation on the part of higher commanders, as soon as the situation is clear. And time is fleeting."<sup>110</sup>

Meanwhile, the process of reassigning and reclassifying officers had been stepped up. This greatly increased the burden of staff work in an Army headquarters that long ago had forgotten about the 40-hour week. To aid in the tasks ahead Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Alfred M. Gruenther, GSC, was appointed deputy Chief of Staff on 17 October 1941.<sup>111</sup> With him and Brigadier General Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, to translate his orders and ideas into action, General Krueger set about correcting the defects maneuvers had revealed.

General Marshall had expressed concern about the progress of reclassification in the spring of 1941. On 7 May 1941 he had discussed the matter in a confidential letter to General Brees. Excerpts follow:

"Last January tentative Army Regulations No. 605.230 concerning reclassification of commissioned officers were published. Up to the present time I believe only one case has come to the attention of the War Department under these regulations.

"...it is...important that a start be made in the matter of reclassifying commissioned personnel...the matter will have to be handled with considerable forethought and diplomacy. I think it is important to protect the pride and reputation, in other words, to save the face, of good men who by reason of age or lack of opportunity have not the ability for command leadership which we know is necessary..."<sup>112</sup>

And on 4 September 1941 he wrote General Krueger:

"As you know I am particularly interested in vitalizing our leadership through a liberal application of reclassification procedure where necessary...

"On August 25, the War Department issued a revised Army Regulation as to reclassification, incorporating the changes that were deemed advisable as a result of six months' experience. The new regulations now embody the best thought of the field as well as the War Department. I am doubtful, however, that the new regulations will be productive of the desired results unless there is present among the field force

commanders a sincere desire to rid their units of unsatisfactory officers. The results of reclassification, to the present moment, force me to believe that vigorous and purposeful measures toward that end have not been adopted by some of our major commanders, particularly the division and army corps commanders...I am convinced that the key-point, and in some instances the weak point, in the administration of reclassification where that is clearly the solution and to overcome the reluctance of subordinates to initiate and expedite reclassification proceedings. On the other hand, the army corps commander is far enough removed from the individual to be free of the impulses which make his subordinates cautious about reclassification.

"It is obvious, in any case, that the army corps commander must be the active force behind reclassification. I, therefore, request that you convey to your army corps commanders a sense of the responsibility which is theirs in this important matter."<sup>113</sup>

Promptly upon receipt of this letter General Krueger sent a reply to the Chief of Staff detailing the action he had taken to date.<sup>114</sup> He reported reassignment, resignation, reclassification and institution of reclassification proceedings in sixty-odd cases ranging from junior officers to major general.

This shuffling of officer personnel to provide the Third Army with the leadership it needed and deserved continued steadily throughout the latter months of 1941. General Krueger and his staff tirelessly supervised the job of taking vigorous and expeditious action, and at the same time seeing that discretion and consideration were employed in the process. General Krueger stressed this latter point in a letter to his Corps commanders on 14 November 1941. He wrote in part:

"The regulations governing elimination are specific, and I have again and again stressed the necessity of carrying them out with care and exactitude. I have also tried to impress all concerned with the necessity of employing discretion, tact and consideration in the process. It is obvious that unless this is done, officers who have devoted years to the national defense and whose only shortcoming is that they are not suited for the position they occupy, will become justifiably antagonistic and embittered..."

"It is the duty of leadership to exhaust every available resource toward correcting deficiencies in a subordinate before reclassification proceedings are finally initiated..."

"Individuals who are obviously inept and so lacking in qualities of leadership as to preclude their satisfactory development should, in all cases, be eliminated as quickly as possible. But so far as young officers are concerned, basic qualifications of character and mental and physical fitness are of greater importance than mere technical proficiency, which can and should be produced through proper training. It is manifestly a wasteful process to eliminate good material when all that is needed is efficient instruction."<sup>115</sup>

The routine of building and training, of polishing and repolishing this great Third Army was suddenly and fiercely shaken by the explosion of bombs thousands of miles away. On 7 December 1941 the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Third Army units, whose sum strength now stood at 15,057 officers and warrant officers and 257,235 men,<sup>116</sup> were alerted. An Army "that our nation needs and must have" was ready for its orders.

\* \* \*

### CHAPTER III

#### FIRST PERIOD OF WAR

(7 December 1941 to 16 February 1943)

The primary job of the Third Army was now to prepare units for overseas duty as soon as possible.

Although troop movements began immediately after the start of war, in accordance with Concentration Plan Rainbow Five, the Third Army was not called on for great numbers of troops until 11 December 1941. On that day, Brig Gen (now Lieut Gen) Brehon B. Somervell, War Department G-4, telephoned the Army Commander a list of 24 units which would be used in planning a large-scale shipment of troops to the Pacific Coast.<sup>117</sup> Although the immediate danger in that area soon abated, as far as the Third Army was concerned, the work of moving troops assumed tremendous importance at Army Headquarters during December and January.

So many units were placed on an alert status, so many calls for troops were received from Corps Areas and other agencies charged with internal security, that early in December, 1941, Brig Gen (now General) Dwight D. Eisenhower, chief of staff, Third Army, told the Deputy Chief of Staff, GHQ, Brig Gen (now Lieut Gen) Mark W. Clark, That "...any effort of ours to carry out any kind of training program is just postponed."<sup>118</sup>

The War Department had advised Third Army to take "utmost precautions" along the Gulf Coast and Southern border of the country.<sup>119</sup> Orders were transmitted 9 December 1941 by General Eisenhower over the telephone to various subordinate commanders. A typical excerpt of these orders make dramatic reading:

E: "You are to expect surprise. Now, this is what General Krueger wants done. First, every weapon, anti-aircraft weapon, those in the hands of mobile troops and of the anti-aircraft elements of the fixed defenses...to be constantly ready to open fire. That's on a 24-hour basis, and he means that the troops must be ready to open fire instantly. That is, there must be a detail on each weapon all the time...In other words, the machine guns of the infantry and your own weapons to be loaded and ready to shoot with a detail on the job. Now, it may be that with some of your (AA) weapons you can slip a shell in them damn fast. But I know a machine gun, and they're to be ready to fire...The General wants reports to cover this: The instant that the mobile troops arrive at these various places --we've sent them all the way from Wilmington to Galveston --I believe there's eight of them all together. He wants reports that they understand thoroughly their mission of instantaneous readiness to carry out their mission of protection against any kind of raiding force."<sup>120</sup>

The great movement of units in and out of the Army continued to slow down the training program.

The V Corps, which has been assigned to Third Army in February, 1941 was transferred to the First Army early in January, 1942. The 32nd, 34th, 37th, and 45th divi-

sions packed their barracks bags and rolled to staging areas in the first months of 1942. The 36th found a new home at Camp Blanding, Fla. Other new divisions, the 82nd, 90th, 93rd were activated in the first half of the year; the second half saw the X Corps, XIV Corps, and the 84th, 86th, 88th, 89th, 95th, 99th, 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Division sew on their distinctive insignia.<sup>121</sup>

The 43rd<sup>122</sup> moved back to Third Army control at Camp Shelby, Miss. So did the 31st,<sup>123</sup> which, owing to transfers to bolster up the 43rd, was forced to reorganize and start retraining in the latter months of the year.

The pulsating expansion and contraction of the Third Army during the entire year of 1942 is evidenced by the strength reports. Figures for various dates, including total commissioned and enlisted strength, were as follows:<sup>124</sup>

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
31 Dec 41	240,165
30 Apr 42	174,520
30 Jun 42	199,367
31 Aug 42	230,091
31 Dec 42	331,192

Wholesale transfers were nothing out of the ordinary. "It is the policy of Third Army," read General Order 94, "to furnish the best qualified personnel to units going overseas. In carrying out this policy other units of the Third Army will be injured. If the extent of the injury is considered excessive, the matter will be brought to the attention of the Third Army."<sup>125</sup> Many considered the injury excessive, but the policy was maintained.

There was more than one reason for these transfers. Cadres for new divisions and smaller non-divisional units had to be furnished at a man-a-minute rate. In the huge expansion of the army, Officer Candidate Schools were quadrupling their quotas. For several months, units of the Third Army were furnishing potential officer personnel at the rate of 10,000 a month. Then, too, there was Classification, a new instrument of war. The actual weapon consisted of a yellow card, the WD AGO Form 20, and a few needles; but the result was to place the right man in the right job, to equip units of any size and description with personnel that could do the job with a minimum of training. Hard working commanding officers quickly learned what the code numbers -- 055, 060, 078 -- meant, and made every effort to see that their units had the trained men their T/Os demanded.

This expansion, like those preceding, had its growing pains; the difference was that now they hurt more, since this was war, and each unit wanted the best of everything, men and materiel, first. New posts and installations sprang up overnight. There were wild clamors for priorities. So great was the growth that several new units (the 89th Division, activated 15 July 1942 at Camp Carson, Colo., is one example) were forced to wait five months for half of their filler replacements.<sup>126</sup>

The shortage of materiel was noted throughout the first part of the year in almost daily requisition upon Third Army for equipment to be furnished for overseas use. When equipment could be acquired no other place, the War Department seized in the hands of training units. The problems thus created were graphically put in two telephone conversations. The first was between Brig Gen (now Maj Gen) A. M. Gruenther, Army Chief of Staff, and Major General G. V. Strong, Commanding General of the VIII Corps:

S: "...This last requisition for material that your G-4 and the Corps Area (and, by the way, their figures don't agree at all, the figures submitted by G-4 vary somewhat) say in the matter of gun slings. He told us we had to furnish 899 and the Corps Area told their people up here that they wanted 914."

G: "What was this item?"

S: "That was gun slings. But that's just a detail. The principle is this--now, in order to fill that requisition for instance, on the .50 caliber machine gun, I've got to cut in on the 2nd Division. When that thing is done, I won't have a .50 caliber machine gun in the 18th Field Artillery Brigade, I won't have one in the 45th Division. I won't have one in the 36th Division. I've simply got to cut in on the 2nd Division to fill that requisition."

G: "I'm afraid you will, General. We have taken from all of the other units all of the .50 caliber machine guns-- and the only ones that are left in the whole army now are those that are under your control, in the two cavalry units and also the VIII Army Corps proper."

S: "O.K., if it's necessary, but I just want you to know it; and when it comes to 37 mm guns, it's not as bad, but it's going to leave in one outfit, for instance, just one 37 mm gun. But now you're beginning to cut in rather hard on this training business. I can go back, of course, to the galvanized iron pipe and ration carts for 37 mm guns but that's going to react rather badly on training and worse on morale. Now if the stuff is necessary, O.K. But I think the people up above ought to know what we are facing and how it is making more difficult the training proposition." 127

The second conversation was between General Gruenther and Major General Dan. I. Sultan, Commanding General of the 38th Division:

S: "We've been drawn on for a number of people and vital equipment and supplies to equip camps and forces of troops that have been alerted. All of which is perfectly all right until something happened today-- they're beginning to take my rifles away from me; and if they take the rifles away from me that they say they're going to take, I'll have only about 2,000 rifles for 5,100 men. In other words, I will have less than one rifle for every two men. That's an insult, I think, to an infantryman to take his rifle away from him."

G: "I quite agree with you, General."

S: "I can't help but believe that there's some way to get rifles other than to take them away from us and leave 2,100 rifles to supply 5,100 infantrymen. That's men present for duty; that isn't T/BA or tables of allowances of any kind -- that's actually present for duty."

I'll have less than one-half a rifle per man."

G: "I will get after it right away, General, and see what we can do about it. I do not know about your specific case, but yesterday we were called upon for a recommendation that involved another unit, and the casualties in rifles were almost as heavy. I do not know about the 38th Division because that was something that was handled over in Fourth Corps Area. You understand, of course, there is a unit in your area that cannot be touched. That is probably the reason you were hit so hard. This problem is a very real one to General Krueger. He called General McNair at GHQ this morning to bring to his attention the shortage of equipment in the Third Army generally. He didn't mention rifles specifically because the casualties in other items are even heavier. In fact, the supply of some articles is very, very low."

S: "I didn't quarrel as long as it was a matter of field glasses, etc., but, my gosh, you can't joke an infantryman about not giving him any rifle."

G: "I think that is correct, sir."

S: "Especially when he's been in training for a whole year. I can't help but believe that there are rifles somewhere that should be gotten rather than robbing us."

G: "They are putting the heat on us in a big way, General, and we can't do anything about it. The War Department issues there orders by telephone, and they are usually such rush affairs that we can do nothing about them. However, I'll look into your case immediately and let you know what I find out."<sup>128</sup>

Together with the growth of divisional strength within the Third Army came a mushrooming of smaller units -- engineer battalions and groups, all types of quartermaster, ordnance, and medical units, and many other organizations which did not belong within the purview of corps and division authority and responsibility. Almost all of these "spare parts" units--and there were many--needed particular and specialized training, which demanded both time and trouble from the headquarters supervising such training.

The problems involved were pointed out and a solution indicated in a telephone conversation between the Army chief of staff and the AGF chief of staff 2 May 1942:

G (Gen. Gruenther): "...We have a little over 200 (spare parts units) now. They are getting to be ... a burden, especially when they get out of our area."

C (General Clark): "We are working at the present time on the suggestion that General Krueger made that we set up a little provisional headquarters training for loose ends. It is in shape to bring in here in draft form, so

it is getting along in good shape. It is to be set up on a sliding scale, a commander and a small staff to administer and be responsible for the training of some odds and ends at one place. Then if you have another place where you have twice as many they would have more officers authorized. We will make a trial case in the IV Army Corps and let you people comment on it.<sup>129</sup>

Corps and divisions were engrossed with their most important mission -- training -- and obviously suffered a reduction in efficiency by being compelled to oversee large number of units in which they had no actual tactical interest. Direct command of these small units by Army was obviously impracticable also, as AGF noted in a letter of 21 May 1942. The AGF letter pointed out that "some intermediate organization is necessary."<sup>130</sup> Third Army took remedial action 17 June 1942 by establishing a Provisional Headquarters Third Army at Camp Beauregard, La., to which were assigned 78 smaller units located in four separate camps.<sup>131</sup> These units had been under the IV Corps, which was preparing for movement to maneuvers.

This first Provisional Headquarters was later officially designated as Third Headquarters Detachment, Special Troops, Third Army, and moved to Camp Livingston, La., a few miles away from Beauregard. Its successful operation paved the way for the elimination of all attached Army units from corps and divisions.<sup>132</sup>

Almost immediately, beneficial results were noted in a preliminary report on the operation of this first sub-headquarters. Its executive, Col. Frederick R. Lafferty, reported to the Army Commander that the details of administration and training were being done "in that the personnel of this office are in constant contact with subordinate units. By this close liaison and constant use of the telephone, we have been able to curtail, or even eliminate, many reports formerly required of these organizations. The elimination of reports and paper work has therefore released the officer and enlisted personnel to devote their time to training matters."<sup>133</sup>

This "intermediate" headquarters proved successful, and further clarification of its functions by AGF (delegating in so far as practicable all administrative, house-keeping, hospitalization, housing, and supply functions to the service commands)<sup>134</sup> enable organization to be revised and improved toward the general and ever-present goal of devoting major emphasis to training.<sup>135</sup>

The increasing load of administration which was borne by Army was amply evidenced by the activation of the 5th Machine Records Units (Mobile), attached to the Third Army; and the 13th Machine Records Unit (Mobile), attached to the VIII Corps. Both units were stationed at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Henceforth, the Army was to keep track of its own strength, whether at home station or in the field.<sup>136</sup>

The Headquarters, paradoxically, was handicapped by the high caliber of its staff officers; the War Department transferred many of them to even more responsible positions.<sup>137</sup> On 1 January 1942, Colonel (now Major General) Alfred M. Gruenther became Chief of Staff, vice Brig Gen (now General) Dwight D. Eisenhower, transferred to the Operations Division, War Department. Later, Colonel George Honnen became Chief of Staff, upon General Gruenther's transfer overseas.

Despite the shocking and unmistakable urgency of war, the lessons of the 1941 maneuvers, whose importance was now multiplied by the rush of events, were not forgotten.

The inadequate leadership afforded by inexperienced junior officers led the Third Army to establish a Junior Officers Training Center at Camp Bullis, 18 miles north of San Antonio, Texas, in November 1941.<sup>138</sup> Utilizing a flexible system of practical instruction, the JOTC, or "Krueger Tech" as it came to be called, rapidly expanded during 1942, approximately 700 officers going through the course in the four classes held. Each class lasted six weeks.<sup>139</sup>

To improve organization of Third Army Training activities at Camp Bullis, the Third Army Training Center was organized 16 March 1942. The commandant of the JOTC was placed in command.<sup>140</sup>

The JOTC was not devised as a substitute for any of the service schools, but as a means of employing practical application of service school teachings. Instructors were picked with great care, and students were selected on the recommendation of unit commanders as outstanding in qualities of leadership and potential instructional ability.<sup>141</sup>

The course devised was strenuous. Each officer was required to maintain his own quarters and equipment, and was subject to as many rigorous and painstaking inspections as could be devised. The object, naturally, was to teach every officer how to inspect his own unit. In each class there was a special quota of field officers, who, with company grade officers, did the work of privates, corporals and sergeants of infantry -- and liked it. The coach and pupil method of instruction was used, and the student officers were organized into squads and platoons, command rotating among the group so that each officer obtained experience in leading his unit through the course's many problems in the field. A colonel might be a first sergeant one day, a rifleman private the next, a member of a mortar crew the day after that.

Although the course comprised only infantry training, officers of all arms were detailed to attend, in order to familiarize them with the problems and minor tactics of the infantry.

The day's work took place in the field, usually, and varied terrain afforded opportunity for extensive maneuvering. Conduct and criticism of small-unit problems were among the most important exercises.

The subjects in which each student received intensive, practical instruction were many. Thirty-six subjects, ranging from use of the compass to study of the rifle squad in hasty defense, formed the curriculum. In addition, some instruction was given in 12 other subjects, such as administration, field sanitation, and supply operation.<sup>142</sup> Proficiency tests with ball ammunition were given each squad and platoon, with realism the dominant note of such field exercises.

The principles of care, thoroughness, and accuracy guide the course of instruction. Students were admonished by the Army Commander: "When you return to your respective units, you will be marked men, and I want you to go back as apostles of care and thoroughness...The men will follow anybody if they know that he knows every thing they should know. To teach you these things will be the purpose of your training here. When you pass the knowledge you have gained along to the men you command, do it so thoroughly that when your decision is made in a situation, the resulting action will be automatic."<sup>143</sup>

The course of instruction was divided into basic and advance phases, the basic including instruction in all infantry weapons and elementary subjects, the advanced devoted to development of leadership and teamwork in small units by requiring students to apply tactics and technique learned in prior training to a definite tactical problem.





2nd. Lt. Robt. W. Nicholson, Kretz Springs, Louisiana, receives diploma from Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger upon his graduation from the Third Army Junior Officers Training Center at Camp Bullis, Texas, Friday, June 5, 1942.

Although the students usually remained in the field during the day and attended lectures and supervised study periods at night, they did not fall behind on world news. Each evening a lecturer called time out from class and discussed the news of the day.

The strenuous nature of the course was emphasized by General Krueger at graduation exercises of the Third Class:

"Gentlemen, you've ended today six weeks of very hard work. I know it's been hard," he said, "because I've made it my business to see that it was. If it was humanly possible, this course would be even harder."<sup>144</sup>

Third Army sought to have the training center established on a permanent basis, with an authorized table of organization, but the rapidly expanding output of qualified junior officers by Officer Candidate Schools caused AGF to disapprove. "While the purpose for which the Third Army Junior Officers Training Center was established, "the AGF indorsement on the request said, "was based upon an acute need at the time to raise the standards of junior officers, and the results it was obtained are commendable, it is hoped that in the near future it will not be necessary to continue its operation... the Prisoner of War Interrogators School will not necessarily be affected, as that section of the present school does not require the type of organization which is recommended...however, there are studies in progress by the War Department toward the establishment of a centralized Prisoner of War Interrogators School which, if they materialize, will relieve unit commanders of the Field Forces from conducting this necessary training."<sup>145</sup>

The JOTC was discontinued after the fourth class for this reason and because of the approach of the 1942 maneuvers in Louisiana.

Based on experience of the IV Corps and upon the prime urgency of adequate intelligence training, the Third Army had established at Camp Bullis a Prisoner of War Interrogators School--German, operated in conjunction with the JOTC but under academic control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Third Army.<sup>146</sup>

The school operated by the IV Corps under the guidance of Colonel (now Major General) Harry J. Collins, G-2, furnished the initial faculty for the Third Army project.<sup>147</sup> The First Course was conducted 30 March 1942 - 9 May 1942. The purpose as set out in the Third Army letter announcing the course, was "to train both officers and enlisted men, who already (had) a good conversational command of the German language, to become competent Interrogators of Prisoners of War; and return them to their units."<sup>148</sup>

Students were selected by Third Army after instructor teams from the school had visited all units of the command and interviewed prospective students.

Operation of the school attracted the attention of the War Department very early in its career, and several lengthy summations of the operations, methods, techniques of instruction, organization, and conduct of the school were prepared by the Army G-2 and by the director of the school on request of War Department G-2.<sup>149</sup> During the first two weeks of the course, stress was placed on German language and script, basic map reading, combat intelligence, and other basic subjects. German was continued throughout the seven weeks of the course, but with decreasing intensity. In all subjects pertaining to the U. S. Army, the German language was employed. Instruction was largely applicatory, with weekly examinations.

During the last five weeks of the course, technical subjects and the major item under consideration -- interrogation of POWs, were studied. These included German Army organization, tactics, psychological warfare, rank and regimental insignia, German

map reading, German military correspondence and orders.<sup>150</sup> Texts were compiled by the faculty, with the aid of civilian lectures and visiting experts, including officers with intelligence experience in the first World War.

As a by-product of the research made at the school, a special demonstration involving dramatic presentation of techniques and values involved in proper interrogation of prisoners was produced. With a cast of actors from the faculty and student body, this production, entitled "Hill 66", was presented 21 times at nine posts, with an estimated 10,850 troops of the Third Army as a combined audience.<sup>151</sup>

Three courses were conducted at the school. Centralization of all IPW training by the War Department, however, soon became more than rumor. On 17 June 1943 the director of the Third Army school submitted on request a lengthy outline for a War Department school.<sup>152</sup> Most of the faculty, both commissioned and enlisted, were transferred by War Department orders dated 1 July 1942 to the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Md., and there proceeded to establish the War Department IPW School.<sup>153</sup> Many students followed the faculty to Camp Ritchie, and the commandant of the Military Intelligence Training Center told the Chief of Staff Third Army, that every single enlisted man who had graduated from the Third Army School was desired for transfer. Although officer graduates were likewise desired for military intelligence duty, the extreme shortage of commissioned personnel obviated any large-scale transfer. A very great percentage of the 171 enlisted graduates were assigned to the Military Intelligence Training Center, where they entered the basic intelligence course and were then held available for task forces and other combat duties.<sup>154</sup>

Developments on world-wide battlefronts likewise demanded attention from Third Army training specialists. The failure to apply "scorched earth" tactics in Malaya and the subsequent heavy loss of property useful to the enemy led to special demolition training for troops of all arms.

"Mobile warfare has created a wide variety of problems for commanders of small units which involve the use of demolitions, and which often must be solved without engineer assistance," the training directive stated. "This necessitates the training in the use of explosives of a limited number of men in each company and similar unit of the infantry, cavalry, and field artillery."<sup>155</sup>

The demolition training was given in five two-hour periods, including lectures, demonstrations, and practical work. This latter phase included calculation and placing of charges, and placing and charting a mine field. All personnel given the training witnessed the burying and exploding of a service anti-tank mine. Both TNT and dynamite were used in the training and each student was required to actually handle all blasting materials involved. Qualified engineer officers and enlisted men were used as instructors.

A 44-hour weekly training program was ordered for all Third Army units early in 1942, with corps and unit commanders authorized to extend this period to 48 hours when justified by the status of training.<sup>156</sup> Third Army schools which were designed to improve training throughout the year included instruction for umpire instructors, liaison officers, and air-ground schools which were conducted by each corps.<sup>157</sup>

The training problems involved by modern war fought under changing conditions in every terrain were aptly illustrated by the subjects of Third Army training memorandums for the last half of 1942. Typical are the following: "Captured Prisoners and Documents", "Observation Aviation", "Combat Intelligence", "Air Support", "Chemical Warfare Training", and "Air-Ground Coordination".<sup>158</sup>

Third Army inspection teams "hit the road" almost continuously during the last ten months of the year. The team usually consisted of a senior General Staff officer with assistants from the various general and special staff sections of Army Headquarters. Each member of the team checked inspected units in his own particular specialty under the supervision of senior officers. The system evidently worked, as the Chief of Staff, Third Army (General Gruenther), remarked to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces (General McNair), in a telephone conversation 2 March 1942:

G: "...We have been having very good success with our inspection team. We have an inspection team on the road all the time inspecting one division after another."

M: "An Army inspection?"

G: "Yes, sir. The General goes out with them and spends a couple of days with them when they go into a division and they have been getting along very well. We think the results are very gratifying. They submit a rather exhaustive report and then we have a follow-up system to see that the deficiencies are corrected. In general, we think they are doing a very fine job."

M: "Fine..."159

#### MANEUVERS

Though maneuvers in 1942 were not on the grand scale of 1941, they were of four months' duration and encompassed every type of problem which the terrain allowed. The VIII Corps, consisting of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 2nd and 31st Infantry Division, and the 6th Armored Division, went through ten field exercises in the period August 4 - September 19. Maneuver director was Major General Daniel I. Sultan.

The IV Corps came next, with the 28th and 38th Infantry Divisions, the 7th Armored Division, and various service units taking part. This period, 22 September to 8 November, was directed by Major General Oscar W. Griswold, with the Army Commander in charge of three of the ten problems.

Though the divisions had maneuvered over Louisiana terrain before, the tests -- culmination of 18 weeks' basic training under an AGF schedule, and 16 more weeks under supervision of Corps -- were, for many officers and enlisted men, the first. In the months following Pearl Harbor the divisions had been "cadred" down to the last pfc; now they were off the assembly line again, rebuilt, and ready for a shakedown proofing.

Emphasized in these maneuvers for the first time were river crossings and attack and defense of a river line, of which there were five during the maneuver period. Also coming into its own was greater use of bombardment aviation and air-ground liaison.

"One of the primary purposes of these maneuvers", General Krueger said in his critique 6 August 1942, "is to train the air-ground team more effectively".

For the VIII Corps maneuvers, a Provisional Air-Ground Support Command was organized, with the Air Forces providing a Light Bombardment Group and an Observation Group. A similar set-up was followed in the IV Corps maneuvers, with the addition of an aviation signal battalion.

As the VIII Corps maneuvers got under way, critique remarks about air-ground operations developed generally as follows:

- 6 August: "Missions were not specific".
- 11 August: "Ground commanders are not getting anywhere near the air support of which the air units are capable."
- 16 August: "Maximum efficiency in performance of observation aviation is not yet realized".

As maneuvers progressed, the air-ground coordination grew closer. At a critique 14 September 1942, the Director states: "Considerable improvement was noted in bombing. The operation of the air-ground CP was very good...air-ground coordination generally has distinctly improved."

During the tenth problem of the VIII Corps maneuvers, air support reached its maximum of that period. Summarizing the operations, General Krueger said:

"...Throughout September 16th the weather permitted air operations about 50% of the time. During this period the Red bombing force dropped 144,000 pounds of bombs on bridging equipment, on rail and road bridges, and on command posts and other objectives. From about nightfall on the 16th to noon of the 17th, air operations were possible about 60% of the time. During this period about 96,000 pounds of bombs were dropped on bridging equipment and on bridges under construction. During the remainder of the exercise the weather permitted flying about 70% of the time, some 300,000 pounds of bombs dropped on ponton bridges and boats and foot bridges. These figures are extremely impressive, and while no doubt the Red bombing force would have suffered considerable losses, the effectiveness of its operations would have been very great. At any rate, the work done by the Red bombing force and other aviation units on both sides was very creditable indeed."160

During the IV Corps maneuvers the same slow, difficult progress was noted. Illustrative of the operations are the following comments, made at critiques of the first and sixth problems.

- 24 September -- "Missions assigned to observation aviation were frequently too general in nature. In consequence, much of the value of that aviation was practically nullified. It is a great mistake to ask observation aviation to cover too large an area. Mission assigned must be definite and specific. Due to radio failure, delivery of information was often delayed for hours. That, of course, was unavoidable. This delay was aggravated when the pilot, after having gained most of the information desired, had to go after another item assigned to him in the same mission .."
- 18 October -- "The quality of information furnished by air reconnaissance, however, has steadily improved, as has the coordination of the air-ground team. This is gratifying indeed and a credit to both air and ground forces. Artillery air reconnaissance appeared to be greatly enhanced when artillery officers were used as the aerial observers by both Red and Blue..."

Observation by AGF officers generally bore out the steady improvement noted, but emphasized that there was much work still to be done to improve air ground coordination to its effective, maximum state.161

Critiques during the four months of maneuvers were unusually detailed and pointed; individual officers and enlisted men were mentioned by name for their initiative, or their lack of it. This resulted in some improvement. However, in order to secure the best results, mistakes must be corrected on the spot. In most cases this was not done. The director headquarters was not organized to do this.

Critique remarks during the 1942 maneuvers were almost identical with reports from the battle fronts in 1943. Typical excerpts:

"Commanders generally were not at the critical points of their command at the critical moment...There is no use being 12 to 15 miles to the rear."162

"Make up your mind quickly as to what you propose to do. Then make the other fellow dance your tune." 163

"In general, much more attention must be devoted to improving small unit leadership."164

"Air warning precautions were generally unsatisfactory."165

"Most of the deficiencies noted are, of course, due to lack of that high state of discipline that is a mark of seasoned troops." 166

"The principal detailed criticism of both sides was in the misuse of tank destroyer battalions...Tank destroyer battalions are still being used improperly. They are being too much dispersed."167

"Battles will not be won by the extra men who are sitting in bantam cars, command cars, and weapons carriers, just plain loafing."168

"The outstanding characteristic of a successful attack across a river line is secrecy and the surprise that goes with it."169

"Counter-attack and counter offensive. That is the essence of defense."170

"Air missions requested are still too numerous for the aircraft available." 171

Despite the large amount of criticism, there was a large measure of good to be noted in the performance of the troops. The men were in fine physical condition and an aggressive mood. Camouflage was improved. So were the wording of orders, supply, digging in on the defense, and other deficiencies noted in previous maneuvers.

The spirit of the men was summed up by General Sultan: "In spite of the fatigue, the dust, the heat, the mud, the long marches and the long periods without rest or sleep, the men have never reached the point where they could not take still more...I predict a brilliant future for you when you enter actual battle."172

Yet another indication of the tremendous importance assigned to the development of air-ground coordination came after the 1942 maneuvers, when AGF designated the Commanding General, Third Army, as director of an Air-Ground CPX to be held in the Louisiana maneuver area 1 - 15 December 1942.<sup>173</sup>

A very large number of units, including the X Corps headquarters, was selected:<sup>174</sup>

Army Ground Forces Units

Hq & Hq Co, X Corps  
86th Inf Div cadre  
87th Inf Div cadre  
103rd Inf Div cadre

Army Air Forces Units

2d Air Sup Comd  
321st Med Bomb Gp  
77th Obsn Sq  
928th Sig Bn (Air Support)  
7th Communication Sq

The problem involved an air-support command supporting a corps which had been assigned an aggressive mission into enemy territory. It was divided into two phases, with a two-day break in between. The first phase covered the attack of a prepared position followed by a pursuit. The second phase involved action against a covering force followed by a river crossing.<sup>175</sup>

In spite of adverse weather conditions and inadequate communications, the exercise proved an excellent medium for training air-ground teams. The need for training air and ground units together so that each had a better understanding of the tactics, technique, capabilities and limitations of the other, became even more apparent as the exercise progressed.

In a lengthy critique held at the conclusion of the exercises, the Director noted the following conclusions:

- "1. In order to fight effectively as members of the same team, air and ground units must train together at all times; and each must have a thorough knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the other.
- "2. The suitable marking of front line units in heavily wooded terrain, if not entirely an unsolved problem, still leaves much to be desired; the practical solution of which must either involve the use of organic rifle company equipment, or other equipment that is readily obtainable and simple to transport.
- "3. The air support of ground units is still subject to weather conditions in spite of the rapid strides made in instrument flying.<sup>177</sup>

The Director's remarks made evident that staff work had been very commendable on the part of the X Corps: "The problem involved the very difficult operation of attacking a river line held by a determined enemy. Both the driving in of the enemy covering

force, and the forming of the river line itself, were carried out in a manner which evidenced a lot of hard work and careful planning on the part of both commanders and staff officers...Notable improvements were shown in the preparation and issuance of field orders, the promptness of issuing orders, staff coordination, the flow of intelligence, camouflage, and the digging of slit trenches...In more ways than one this command post exercise was one of the most satisfactory that it has ever been my privilege to witness... I am anticipating the pleasure of again being in the field with General Hodges and his X Corps..."<sup>178</sup>

On 17 December 1942, the XIV Corps was ordered in the military service,<sup>179</sup> and three days later received orders to move to San Francisco, California for foreign service.<sup>180</sup> This activation took away all but fourteen officers of the VIII Corps, and left the Commanding General and his Chief of Staff the task of rebuilding the Corps almost from scratch.

On 2 February 1943, General Krueger, in compliance with War Department orders, departed for overseas station.<sup>181</sup> He was assigned to command the newly organized Sixth Army, with station in Australia. Many of the organizations and individuals he had trained had already preceded him. In addition he took with him from Third Army Headquarters 111 officers, including all Chiefs of Sections, except the Public Relations Officer, Adjutant General, Chaplain, and 500 enlisted men. The move was made in two sections, with a forward echelon going by air, and the remainder of headquarters traveling by boat.

This left the headquarters depleted in personnel, with the 1943 maneuvers under way. The task of building up the Army Headquarters fell squarely on the shoulders of the new Army Commander, Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges.



## CHAPTER IV

### SECOND PERIOD OF WAR (16 February 1943 to 1 October 1943)

Lieutenant General Courtney Hicks Hodges took command of the Third Army 16 February 1943.<sup>182</sup> Few officers in the United States Army could have brought to this command an equal wealth of experience in training large units. General Hodges knew the enlisted man's viewpoint for he had served three years as private, corporal and sergeant of the 17th Infantry, 1906-09. He also knew the demands made on officers and soldiers in battle for he served as a battalion commander in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensive, he was awarded the Silver Star. During the Meuse-Argonne drive, he won the Distinguished Service Cross when his regiment forced a crossing of the river: the citation commended him for his fearlessness and courage, "mainly responsible for the advance of his brigade to the heights east of the Meuse." He knew field artillery - he graduated from the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill in 1920.

But, above all, he knew tactics of infantry, and the weapons it needed to do its job. From 1921 to 1924 he served in the Department of Tactics at the United States Military Academy; upon graduation from the Command and General Staff School in 1925, he served at the Infantry School as instructor, and from 1926 to 1929 as infantry instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School, Langley Field, Va. After a brief period with the 38th Infantry (August-November, 1929), he returned to Fort Benning as a member of the Infantry Board, which position he held until 1933. After graduating from the Army War College in 1934, General Hodges was ordered to Vancouver Barracks, Wash., where he served until May, 1936, as Executive Officer of the 7th Infantry and later as Executive Officer of the 5th Infantry Brigade and the Vancouver District of the Civilian Conservation Corps. For two years beginning May, 1936, he was on duty at Headquarters of the Philippine Division and later at Headquarters of the Philippine Department, Manila, with the General Staff Corps. In this latest job he became thoroughly conversant with the plans for the islands' defense, going over time and time again, with troops and maps, the strategic withdrawal to Bataan that General MacArthur was later to make.<sup>183</sup>

In August, 1938, he reported for duty at Fort Benning as Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School; one month later, he was promoted to Colonel. In October 1940, he was appointed Commandant of the Infantry School. It was in this position and as Chief of Infantry, to which he was appointed 31 May 1941, that General Hodges had the opportunity to press the development of new infantry weapons and new ideas of infantry organization. The U. S. Carbine, Caliber .30, M-1, a weapon he had suggested as far back as 1920, was one of the weapons which he was instrumental in developing. Organization and training of parachute and airborne troops was begun under his command; the great expansion of the Infantry School to turn out the number of second lieutenants required likewise got under way while he was in command.

In the reorganization of the War Department in March, 1942, the Army separated into three major commands: Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Services of Supply (later to become Army Service Forces). With the Chief of Infantry's office not included in this reorganization, General Hodges became Commanding General of the Replacement and School Command, which, operating under Army Ground Forces, included the Infantry School, the Cavalry School, the Field Artillery School, the Coast Artillery School, the Infantry Replacement Training Centers, the Cavalry Replacement Training Center, and the Branch Immaterial Replacement Training Centers at Camp McClellan, Ala., and Camp Robinson, Ark. This job was of less than two months' duration; in May he took command of the X Corps, a post he held until 16 February 1943.



LIEUT. GEN. COURTNEY H. HOLCOMB

"Fire-eating" statements make the reading public conscious of a colorful character, but they are not necessary for or indicative of the conduct of a soldier's trade. General Hodges was soft spoken and retiring; although he was the son of a Georgia publisher, he was "publicity-shy." But commanders before 16 February 1943 and since knew the bite in his voice when he uncovered faulty training or other unsatisfactory work. He was a firm disciplinarian, believing the highest standards of discipline to be the backbone of any unit. He believed the mistakes made by American soldiers in battle in the Second World War were not because the United States Army tactical doctrines, training programs, or equipment were in any way inferior to those of the enemy, but simply because units had not sufficiently absorbed what was written there for them to learn, either because of poor leadership, lack of control, or carelessness. General Hodges envisioned his principal job, as Army Commander, as being simply to revise and tighten control of the training of Third Army units so that upon departure for overseas duty each officer and enlisted man would be thoroughly and effectively trained to perform his battle mission.<sup>184</sup>

Since his predecessor had taken so many officers and enlisted men of Headquarters Third Army with him, (see last paragraph, Chapter III) General Hodges' first concern was to obtain qualified personnel to build a new Third Army Staff. By General Orders No. 18, Brigadier General George A. Davis, his Chief of Staff at the X Corps, became Chief of Staff, Third Army. Within a period of three weeks, officer strength had returned to the level, 166, at which General Krueger had customarily kept it; by 30 June the authorized T/O of 233 was filled. The T/O for Headquarters Detachment and Headquarters Company combined called for 755 enlisted men; by 15 April, Third Army had brought it back to its 1 February level of 660; by 21 July sufficient skilled personnel had been added to fill completely the T/O.<sup>185</sup>

#### MANEUVERS, 1943

The 1943 maneuvers, which had been in progress two weeks upon General Hodges' assumption of command, were his second and most important concern, and remained so for the balance of the year.

Since these months were to bring quick and important changes in the choice of participating units, and in Third Army's administrative and tactical control of these units, a review of the early Army Ground Forces directive and the planning stages immediately following is in order.

The basic AGF letter,<sup>176</sup> conforming to a previous directive<sup>187</sup> ordering maneuver training for each division "as soon as practicable after completion of combined training," had set up the principal units to participate in Third Army maneuvers as follows:

#### February 1st to March 28th

- Number 1. VIII Corps  
10th Division  
90th Division  
191st Tk Bn (M)  
241st Tk Bn (L)

#### April 12th to June 6th

- Number 2. VI Corps  
1st Division  
2nd Division (colored)  
10th Cavalry (M)  
10th Cavalry (L) (colored)



BRIG. GEN. GEORGE W. DUFFY

June 21st to August 15th

Number 3. X Corps  
88th Division  
95th Division  
31st Division  
11th Armored Division  
747th Tk Bn (M)  
749th Tk Bn (M)

AGF anticipated that the troop strength<sup>188</sup> of these maneuvers would be as follows:

First Maneuver..... 61,300  
Second Maneuver..... 72,200  
Third Maneuver.....105,900  
Fourth Maneuver.....145,900

Paragraph 4 of this directive left the choice of service units and non-divisional combat units up to the Third Army. It required units participating to have satisfactory air-ground training, and to have an adequate number of umpires properly trained according to FM 105-5.

Maneuvers were to be free; participating troops were to have no knowledge of the type or duration of any proposed action. Without laying down in black and white the exact number or type of maneuver phases (problems), AGF suggested there be eight to ten in number, and that they include:

1. Movement to contact, meeting engagement and aggressive action by both sides.
2. Meeting engagement, aggressive action by a large force, and the withdrawal of a small force.
3. Aggressive action against a covering force, with a view to forcing it to withdraw across or through an obstacle.
4. Attack and defense of a river line, the objective of the attacker to require the crossing of his major elements.
5. Coordinated attack of a prepared position. Situation to be so drawn as to permit at least 24-hours of uninterrupted and unobserved work on the defensive position.
6. Delaying action on successive positions over a considerable distance.
7. Break-through of an over-extended position and the withdrawal of the defender over a considerable distance.<sup>189</sup>

This year, as in 1942, maneuvers had a three-fold purpose:

1. To give participating troops the kind of training exercises necessary to prepare them for combat duty--a "dress rehearsal," as AGF expressed it.<sup>190</sup>
2. To test the efficiency of training directives then in force.
3. To give Third Army itself an opportunity to test the effectiveness of its own supervision of training, to check officer personnel and to give its Headquarters the desired and necessary field practice.

On 29 December, G-3 of the Third Army suggested that for the first two periods, the "respective staffs of the VIII and IV Corps not participate,"<sup>191</sup> but that instead a few selected officers from each assist Army Director Headquarters. General Honnen, Chief of Staff, put this up to AGF the very same day.<sup>192</sup> The next day, "after much discussion" in Washington, General McNair approved.<sup>193</sup>

In the third maneuver period, consequently, were to participate all four Corps--IV, VIII, X (as originally scheduled), and III Armored, which General McNair said he would "get."<sup>194</sup>

General Krueger's approaching departure, unknown at Third Army except to headquarters personnel, forced the second major change. Because of these "circumstances" over which General Krueger had no control,<sup>195</sup> he appointed Major General Dan I. Sultan, Commanding General VIII Corps, as Director in his stead. Named Deputy Director was Colonel Philip Thurber, artillery officer, Third Army.<sup>196</sup> Meanwhile, the wires between San Antonio and Washington and San Antonio and Louisiana hummed with impatient voices. To move 61,000 men (or more than three quarters of the population of Austin, capital of Texas) into a small land area from points as far distant as 1,500 miles, to feed them, to keep them clothed, to repair 9,000 pairs of shoes a week, to take in 48,000 bundles of laundry,<sup>197</sup> to keep their transportation running (a division needed from 12,000 to 30,000 gallons of gasoline a day)<sup>198</sup> to keep their morale and discipline high, presents a problem in logistics and a demand on leadership.

In compliance with paragraph 16 of AGF's basic "maneuver" letter, Third Army set to work on its supply plan. This was discussed with key officers of AGF at a conference in Washington 4 February 1943, attended by Third Army's Ordnance Officer, Quartermaster, G-4, and Assistant G-4, and a representative of the Surgeon.<sup>199</sup> AGF, pointing out that operations in North Africa had indicated the necessity for "dealing with supply problems without benefit of permanent installations."<sup>200</sup> rejected Third Army's proposal to supply units directly from a depot at Polk, thus eliminating the Army from the supply picture. Finally agreed upon was the establishment of two Army depots, one serving each side from which distribution, under tactical conditions, would be made. This major change, together with several minor ones, was worked into the supply plan eventually confirmed and approved. Insofar as possible the plan for supply was to be that practiced in a Theater of Operations. The play of supply was to begin with the arrival of supplies at Army installations, and prior to that, to be as "realistic" as practicable. Under non-tactical conditions, three base depots were designated: San Antonio Quartermaster Depot for all classes of supplies except ordnance, San Antonio Arsenal for all ordnance supplies except motor vehicle parts and tools, which Normoyle (San Antonio) Ordnance motor base would furnish. Advance depots, to function as communication zone-depots, were located as follows: Camp Polk, for all classes of supplies, except II, to be handled as the responsibility of SOS: Camp Claiborne, Class I, and Camp Beauregard, ordnance (sub-depot to Polk).<sup>201</sup> Army Service Forces put its approval, 2 January, on the SOS installations proposed. At this Washington conference, AGF also stressed that:

1. Service units should be used only for the purposes for which specifically organized and trained.
2. Service units should receive training in providing for their own security. Combat lessons had taught that service troops were often front line troops.
3. The rubber shortage notwithstanding, motor transportation should be used without stint, when failure to do so would result in unrealistic supply methods. To add further realism, ammunition play should be by boxes of prescribed size instead of the sand bags theretofore employed.
4. Evacuation of casualties should more nearly approximate battle conditions. Common practice had been for umpires to designate a group of patients instead of designating a simulated casualty here and there. Result: Medical Corps men considered the evacuation of casualties no more difficult than picking up pecans under one tree.
5. All units should continue to remove the physically unfit as rapidly as possible.

While this conference was going on, distribution was being made by Third Army on Maneuver Memorandum #1.<sup>202</sup> It was made clearly evident that Army would "run the show" issue concentration orders, designate commanders, assign troops, give troop movement directives, assign specific missions, furnish information of friendly and opposing troops, and issue all administrative instructions. Participating units were instructed to choose their umpires, in accordance with Annex No. 1, and send them to Louisiana for instruction.

Non-divisional troops and service units had been selected by the respective Third Army Special Staff Sections and G-4, but there was a shortage of necessary QM units. Third requested permission to activate some QM units for the express purpose of using them in maneuvers. AGF denied the request but did furnish assistance by transferring in one QM railhead company, two QM gas supply companies, one QM car company and one QM laundry company.<sup>203</sup> Third Army made arrangements, as directed, with the Second Air Force, Spokane, Washington, for air support throughout the maneuvers.<sup>204,205</sup> The responsibility for this support was relayed to the Second Air Support Command, first located at Colorado Springs, Colo., later moved to Barksdale Field, La., and assigned to the Third Air Force, Tampa, Fla. It was originally believed that no bombardment aviation could be spared, but finally available were planes from the 344th Bm Gp (M), the 312th Bm Gp (D), and the 386th Bm Gp (M). In addition, the 71st Obsn Gp and a Photo Mapping Flight arrived to take part.<sup>206</sup> Second Air Force also agreed to supervise the necessary schools in air support prior to and during maneuvers.

G-4 notified the San Antonio Quartermaster Depot what they would need<sup>207</sup> and when they would need it, what strength was expected in Louisiana in the late days of January and early days of February.<sup>208</sup> AGF put approval on movement by motor of the 90th Division from Camp Berkeley, cutting travel time (and the Division needed time to finish its combined training exercises) to two days.<sup>209</sup> Units received their movement orders from Third Army. Slowly the maneuver area began to be an armed camp.

Director Headquarters opened 25 January with a staff of 33 officers and 48 enlisted men picked from various Third Army staff sections as ordered by G-3.<sup>210</sup> The Control Section of 8 officers and 10 enlisted men, together with liaison and other officers from participating troops,<sup>211</sup> was located at the base camp, a few hundred yards west of the main gate of Camp Polk, La., in two gigantic circus type tents, with sawdust sprinkled on the floor.<sup>212</sup> The remaining officers comprised the forward echelon, which was to be mobile and follow the action--first at Florien, La., and later at Burr Ferry, La.

#### FIRST MANEUVER PERIOD

##### First Phase:

The first phase of the first maneuver period, beginning at 0800, 1 February, pitted the 90th Motorized (Blue) Division against the 77th Infantry (Red) Division in three problems involving reconnaissance, movement to contact, meeting engagement, attack of hastily prepared positions and counteroffensive and delay on successive positions.<sup>213</sup>

The weather was colder than "blue hell"<sup>214</sup> and in the opinion of at least one observer, "paralyzed the men", reducing their fighting efficiency. But General McNair, who paid a visit during 8 - 12 February with members of his staff, out all day and most of the night among the troops, found there was more than the weather to blame. Air support was uncoordinated and poorly executed; air field signals were not sufficiently employed. Infantry action was unsatisfactory, with the following deficiencies most common: poor location of weapons, failure to use cover and concealment, congestion of troops, and unrealistic withdrawal of small units from close contact in the open.

In his post-visit letter to General Hodges<sup>215</sup> General McNair summed up: "The performance of the infantry of the first of the new divisions to engage in maneuvers is disappointing. Leadership, training, and discipline must be improved. It is possible there are faults in our general training scheme. Your comments and recommendations are desired."

General Hodges made two trips to the maneuver area - 26 February to 2 March, and 12 to 17 March to size up conditions before he replied to the AGF commander's letter in a lengthy indorsement dated 22 March, which set out in full the tactical doctrines to which he had long subscribed and which he now intended should become Third Army SOP.<sup>216</sup>



Lt. Gen. Leslie J. McWair, Army ground forces chief, right, explains a point to Maj. Gen. Henry Terrell, Jr., left. The picture was taken in the Louisiana maneuver area of the Third Army.



His indorsement read as follows:

"1. The comments reflect a condition which has been more or less characteristic of units participating in maneuvers in the past.

"2. After personal observations recently, and in past maneuvers, I feel that there are certain basic weaknesses which are reflected by the poor performance in the maneuver area. These may be summarized as follows:

a. Lack of thoroughness and exactness in training during the basic unit and combined periods of training at the home station.

b. A general failure on the part of officers to correct errors and deficiencies on the spot.

c. A lack of control exercised by commanders of units from platoon to division.

d. The tendency to look upon the maneuver period as a contest between opposing commanders as distinguished from a final period of instruction in which the units should be perfected in field operations.

e. Failure to conform to established tactical doctrines.

"3. It is believed that the training program as now set up for the divisions at their home stations will produce the desired results if all commanders are impressed with the necessity of establishing and demanding a higher standard of discipline, training and leadership. Steps are being taken to bring this about by requiring more rigid control; vigorous personal leadership on the part of all commanders from the highest to the lowest; and the correction of deficiencies on the spot.

"4. Steps are being taken to impress commanders of participating units with the fact that it is of no great consequence which side 'wins' the maneuver provided the units properly perform their prescribed roles. This should go far toward eliminating the effort of commanders to outmaneuver and overcome their opponents by fantastic and unorthodox methods which violate sound tactical doctrines, and which would have disastrous results if undertaken in active combat.

"5. Many of the deficiencies noted may be attributed to improper tactical handling of troops by battalion, regimental, and division commanders. In spite of the fact that the majority of our commanders are adequately educated and trained, the maneuvers have been characterized by a failure to apply approved principles with which our army has been indoctrinated for years and which have been proved by battle experience to be sound. These violations include the following:

a. Improper use of reconnaissance agencies.

b. Failure to provide adequate security.

c. When contact is imminent, failure to adopt suitable approach march formations.

d. Failure to definitely locate, develop, and fix the enemy before disposing the troops for attack.

e. Failure to bring the mass to the critical point in the attack.

f. Dispersion of force by attempting to attack over excessive frontages where supporting weapons, including the artillery, cannot possibly render the support required.

g. Inadequate communication and loss of control brought about through over-extension and road running, resulting in uncoordinated piecemeal action.

h. In defensive situations, improper disposition of troops, organization of the ground and over extension.

i. In retrograde movements, a general lack of knowledge as to the proper steps to be taken to insure control and an orderly withdrawal.

j. Commanders limiting their activities to the vicinity of the command post rather than active leadership in critical areas at decisive stages of combat.

"6. No drastic change in the AGF training directive appears to be indicated at this time. The real remedy rests with the commanders in the field, who must establish and maintain higher standards in all phases of training. They must be impressed with the necessity of bringing their units to the maneuver area prepared for their final test before proceeding to a theater of operations. The maneuvers should be used for the practical instruction of troops in each step and phase of operations beginning with the tactical march and progressing through the development, attack, pursuit, defense, and retrograde movements. Steps have already been taken to indoctrinate all Third Army commanders and troops thoroughly in the principles enumerated above.

"7. a. Through personal conferences, I am now engaged in impressing upon corps and division commanders as well as officers of the Third Army Maneuver Director Headquarters the necessity for requiring all commanders and troops participating in maneuvers to:

- (1) Maintain the highest standard of discipline, training and leadership.
- (2) Correct errors and deficiencies on the spot.
- (3) Require more rigid control of troops by commanders of all echelons.
- (4) Adhere to established tactical doctrines.
- (5) Execute all phases of operations in the same manner as would be required in action.
- (6) Hold commanders of all grades to a strict accounting for the conduct of their units in the execution of tactical operations.

b. In order to assist commanders and troops in overcoming some of the obvious difficulties, I propose to hold a short series of preliminary problems. These problems will be laid on comparatively open and less difficult terrain than that found in the vicinity of the Sabine River Valley. They will be drawn so as to continue the training afforded by the Division (D) Series problems. They will be designed so as to enable the division commander and his staff to get the 'feel' of the entire division in the execution of each phase of tactical operations. In addition, these problems will be conducted so as to perfect all units in the technique of deployment and to develop a more rigid control of troops by commanders of all echelons. In this connection it is noted that during the (D) Series problems the division is usually split

in order to conduct a two-sided maneuver. This being the case, the division commander and his staff are not afforded the opportunity to control the entire division. Therefore, it is believed that these preliminary problems will bridge the gap between the Division (D) Series problems and the problems encountered during maneuvers.

c. It is also planned to:

(1) Use terrain such as that found in the Sabine River Valley for more advanced problems to be staged during the latter part of each maneuver period. (This terrain is very difficult and in many places calls for jungle fighting methods involving very slow progress and careful planning and coordination, in order to avoid utter confusion brought about by loss of direction and control).

(2) Draw all problems so that although the period of action is not announced to the troops, the action expected will take about 48 hours for completion of the preliminary problems and from 72 to 96 hours for the more advanced problems held near the end of the maneuver period. While the problems in maneuvers should become progressively more difficult, the theory of habitually driving troops to the point of exhaustion in maneuvers for the purpose of showing the staff and troops how tired and exhausted they may expect to get in campaign is believed to be unsound. Officers and men learn more readily when they are relatively fresh. The entire time allotted is urgently needed for training divisions and corps."

#### Second Phase:

The second phase, opening Sunday, 21 February, called for problems involving delay on successive positions, preparation and attack of hasty defensive positions, night withdrawal and pursuit, action against a covering force to drive it across a river obstacle, attack and defense of a river line, and establishment of a bridgehead. The decisions, long-range and instantaneous, demanded of the opposing commanders were those they would unquestionably have to make later on in combat. It is interesting, therefore, to note how they reacted to the "practice session."

By the initial directives the 77th (Blue) was to advance on the 90th (Red) by crossing the Sabine River at Burr Ferry, defeat it, and establish a bridgehead west of the Sabine to permit crossings at Toledo and Burr Ferry by the remainder of the Blue forces. Red was ordered to contact the enemy, delay his advance, and hold a bridgehead east of the Sabine covering the Burr Ferry crossing. In the division of forces, Red was inferior to Blue in infantry and artillery. When Army reserves were released, Red became equal in infantry and gained an engineer light ponton company. Blue was still superior in artillery.<sup>217</sup>

Red did not know how long the bridgehead should be held, only that reinforcements would not be available for several days. Red's commander considered that if Blue could be held east of the bridgehead position covering the crossing at Burr Ferry until Friday or Saturday (26, 27 February), his mission would be accomplished.<sup>218</sup> On Monday and Tuesday, consequently, Red slowly withdrew before Blue's superior force: Thursday night, learning that Blue had moved around the north flank and was able to cut highway 414, and consequently the avenue of escape, Red again withdrew to a new line. A limited armistice was called that night; on Friday, when hostilities were resumed, CT 358 was released to Red, under an agreement that it would be used for counter-attack.

Red therefore decided to gamble and attack despite the fact that the attack, having to cross Anacoco Creek, could not be given proper artillery and anti-aircraft support. The plan was for the 359th Infantry to make the main effort outside of the Blue right flank.<sup>219</sup> Unfortunately for Red, two battalions of the 359th ran smack into the 741st Tank Battalion, and after heavy fighting the umpires ruled that the two infantry

battalions had suffered 50% losses and had to be withdrawn from the fight under non-tactical conditions. Withdrawal for the main forces was the only course open. A portion of the Red forces withdrew over the Burr Ferry bridge and the bridge was blown. This then left the withdrawal of Red dependent upon a ponton bridge, vulnerable to air attack; in fact, the bridge was "destroyed" for four hours on the 27th, and when the armistice was called at 1800 the same day, Red was, in the words of its own commander, "in a very dangerous situation."<sup>220</sup>

For the second part of the phase, Red held the west bank of the Sabine; its mission was to hold Blue east of the river until March 7, when reinforcements were expected. Covering an extended front of 25 miles, Red realized it could not prevent a Blue crossing; it could only by a most active defense prevent Blue from consolidating a bridgehead. One regiment was placed along the line-Red felt it essential to have early information of the crossing points; one regiment was in reserve and the artillery was where the bulk of its fire could be massed at the probable points of crossing. This proved to be too optimistic. Blue crossed on a broad front though his main effort came near the Toledo Bend. Red did not feel strong enough to risk a counter-attack. Blue put across all its forces, and it was not until March 6, when the 358th finally arrived as reinforcements, that Red drove through dangerously close to Blue installations at Toledo.

In his critique, General Terrell, Red's commander, who had been on the defensive for almost four weeks, pointed out: "Retrograde movements... are the most difficult, in my opinion, of all operations, because the enemy always has the initiative and always determines the hour the curtain will rise... troops fighting in a retrograde movement are called upon to exert themselves to the limit as they must fight all day and move to the rear all night."<sup>221</sup>

In his critique General Sultan pointed out in detail where Red and Blue had committed their most evident blunders. As the Red commander had anticipated, he was criticized for spreading an entire regiment along the line. ("It would have been better to have outposted the river bank with the thinnest screen possible to provide a warning net, and hold all of the troops meanwhile for counter-attack.") Blue was criticized for failing to press on ("never surrender the initiative unless forced to do so").<sup>222</sup>

General Sultan agreed with General Hodges that the outstanding deficiency was "lack of control," from platoon to division: "Regimental and Battalion Commanders...did not know where their battalions and companies were, where they had gone...were attempting to do...whole companies as uncontrolled and uncoordinated as a flock of sheep...deploying to the flank within plain view and at range less than 400 yards of every machine gun...advance in closed-up column on the roads while subject to artillery fire...If control is lost, stop the action, reorganize, and acquire control rather than barge ahead and let conditions get worse." General Sultan also found that "commanders apparently consider it humiliating to get captured, and for that reason, stick too closely to their command posts." To cure their lack of mobility, he made all general officers and infantry regimental commanders, with their G-3s and S-3s, immune from capture.<sup>223</sup>

General Sultan then prescribed that in the break between the second and third phases, division commanders would require all battalions to train in cross-country movements and approach march formations on different terrain, with emphasis on control at all times.

"I have never seen more willing soldiers," the General said. "The unsatisfactory performances which I have harshly brought to your attention lie in faulty leadership. If properly led, the men will do anything you ask of them."

General Sultan topped it off by showing them Signal Corps pictures of the bad and the good the cameramen had caught. Bad were: mob formations, violation of march







discipline, men sleeping while on duty - "a very serious breach of discipline that cannot be tolerated." Good: camouflage.<sup>224</sup>

The list of deficiencies compiled by daily reports of senior officers of Director Headquarters, liaison officers, and umpires bore out the General's critique and the pictures. But there were signs too, that many realized this was a dress rehearsal for the "big show":

"1. CO, Co. B, 359th Infantry personally saw to it that every man of his unit knew the company's mission. All platoons were on the alert with excellent security.

"2. S/Sgt. James Rogers and Pvt. Fred A. Wallace, 315th Engineer Battalion, executed a very commendable mission in penetrating 3 miles into enemy lines to destroy a key bridge, as a result of which enemy communication was disrupted for several hours.

"3. G-2, 77th Division, preparation and dissemination of order of battle was highly commendable. This is first document of its kind produced in current maneuvers. Documents went to all units of the Division.

"4. Lt. Sellars and Pvt. Barlow, 3d Bn, 305th Infantry performed unusual infiltration through Red lines, remaining there until night, noting troop dispositions and CP locations."<sup>225</sup>

During the Second Phase, Third Army carried out two experiments in emergency supply by air, in compliance with AGF instructions.<sup>226</sup> Made available for these tests was a detachment of the 334th QM Depot Co, which had been given special instructions in methods of packaging standard items for delivery by air. AGF pointed out that such supply, from combat aircraft normally unsuited for missions as cargo carriers, would call for "re-sourceful experimentation by ground and air elements participating."

Third Army performed two emergency supply missions, and reported to AGF.<sup>227</sup> In the first, an infantry battalion of the 77th, crossing the Sabine in the south flank of the division, received rations and ammunition--25 containers weighing 3,780 pounds, with 404 rations, 48,000 rounds of ammunition and 45 gallons of water. The supplies, dropped from an altitude of 150 feet, were undamaged. The other experiment, also to a battalion, was not quite so successful. Nine hundred type B rations were dropped, but since the average weight of the package was 156 lbs. (overloading of 20%), 20% of the rations were destroyed and 30% of the containers and 50% of the parachutes damaged. Other tests showed the difficulty of identifying the supply point. Smoke signals were the most satisfactory method of determining the aerial supply point from the pilot's point of view. Use of smoke pots, however, would also furnish an excellent registering point for enemy mortars and artillery. Third Army suggested that a prearranged panel code between air and ground, marking only the aerial supply point, would be the most effective method.


Third Army concluded that the importance of combat aircraft for such emergency support was practical for small units up to and including an infantry regiment and recommended that personnel and equipment for aerial delivery be assigned or attached to the air support commands for further training.

During this second phase, a party of AGF officers visiting one day (1 March) made particular scrutiny of air-ground support - a problem for which, according to reports from observers in North Africa, no solution had yet appeared. Ground forces were complaining that they seldom received support when they asked for it. Air forces were saying that ground forces never designated their targets correctly. In the light of these wordy arguments, what AGF observers saw was particularly hopeful.<sup>228</sup> They found that the 77th Division had assigned air support parties to each of the two front line





Plane dropping supplies by parachute to isolated troops.



210 Air Support Command, 110 Observ. Squadron. Dropping supplies to 357th Inf.,  
3rd battalion. Showing bundle breaking loose from chutes



Smoke pots are employed to indicate the wind direction to planes preparing to drop supplies to ground troops. Cloth panels are also used to assist in the dropping of supplies.

regiments and the Division CP. An advance party from the Division ASP equipped with an air SCR-299 was sent forward on occasions to direct bombers to the target - a procedure effective 50% of the time. "The progress shown in attacking close-in targets of opportunity." said AGF, "is gratifying."

AGF also noted and commended the following "ingenious methods" of target indication:

1. Smoke to indicate position of panels, the latter pointing to targets.
2. Smoke pots attached to wings of liaison planes: the latter preceding a bombing mission and emitting an arrow of smoke to point to the target.
3. Smoke pots similarly used to form a smoke circle above panels, indicating the position of friendly front lines.

Though the identification of aircraft and air-ground visual signaling did show improvement, active and passive defenses against hostile aircraft were "disappointing." Soldiers continued to gape at aircraft with profound interest, seemingly unaware that for pilots of the aircraft they were clay pigeons in a shooting gallery.

In general, this phase had shown little improvement over the first. Troops do not learn new lessons overnight.

#### Third Phase:

The Third Phase was featured by the introduction of parachute troops. AGF had planned to give Third Army both the 505th and 507th Parachute Regiments, with a liaison officer from the 1st Airborne Brigade to assist in the direction of their employment:<sup>229</sup> finally made available for the river crossing problem only (7 to 19 March) was the 507th.<sup>230,231</sup>

The Third Phase called for the following problems: attack of hastily prepared positions, withdrawal across a river obstacle, attack and defense of a river line, establishment of a bridgehead, and an advance to seize an important terrain feature.<sup>232</sup>

The paratroopers were attached to Red--whose mission was to drive Blue from its position west of the Sabine and across the river. Red had made fair progress by noon of the 16th; at 1830 that evening two battalions of the 507th were dropped east of the Sabine behind Blue's rear line. The third battalion followed next morning.<sup>233</sup>

The attack was not entirely successful.<sup>234</sup> The CO of Co H was captured, so disorganizing his men that they operated from that time on in small groups or as individuals. Company G overshot its landing field by 350 yards and twelve men and much of the equipment dangled helplessly from the tree tops. Company E overshot its mark, too. The men of Company D congregated, as for a church social, to discuss their jump, and not to fight.

But neither was the defense against them particularly praiseworthy. G-3, 77th Division, had distributed an "excellent" memorandum alerting all to the probable employment of paratroops, yet the Director's critique censured the 77th Division for its unmilitant attitude in regarding paratroops as "men from Mars" rather than extremely aggressive forces of the enemy. Blue Headquarters had been repeatedly warned that Red airborne troops were to be opposed vigorously.

In some isolated cases they were, indeed, opposed in the desired manner. Paratroops are taught to consider themselves "toughies;" their reputation is seldom exaggerated. Brandishing knives, they yanked at least one captured NCO from his car: they



Paratroopers of the 507th Para. Inf. of the Red Army, stage an attack at dusk in  
La. maneuvers near Burr Ferry, La.



Paratroopers of the 507th Para. Inf., drop from the sky to take up positions.



Paratroopers of the 507th Para. Inf., of the Red Army, stage an attack at dusk in La. maneuvers near Burr Ferry, La.



Sgt. Holbrook of Recon. Troop, captures a paratrooper of the 507th Paratroops on maneuvers in Louisiana.



were also reported confiscating weapons and engaging in physical combat. However, "thug squads" from the 631st Tank Destroyer Battalion, trained for the same close-in fighting, were quick to give back in kind.<sup>235</sup>

The main question posed by the participation of such troops was one of proper control and umpiring. General Woodruff, 77th Division commander, in his critique said:

"The umpiring of parachute troops is out of the question unless they alter, for the occasion, the tactics in which they have been trained. Apparently they did a fine job. Combatting them under maneuver rules was impossible and I believe the only way future actions of a similar nature can be handled is for the paratroops to first participate in ground activities, such as we have been doing, before they drop into a big maneuver."<sup>236</sup>

This phase was also noteworthy for the largest and most successful participation of aircraft in any of the Louisiana maneuvers opposed by automatic weapons of antiaircraft artillery. As General Sultan pointed out in his final remarks, this "greatly improved the training of the air forces. Conversely the coast artillery automatic weapons battalion had targets in quantity and variety such as it has probably never before had opportunity to simulate fire against."<sup>237</sup>

Though the weather was foul, 42 observation missions, 13 medium bombardment missions, five dive-bombardment missions, and nine fighter missions were flown. Approximately 50 planes were available for each day of the phase. Generally, SOP was to set up a division bomb-safety line, beyond which targets were selected by the Division G-3 after consultation with the air-support party and then relayed to the air-support sub-command. The improvement over the preceding phases was striking: on 26 March 80% of bombardment missions were successful, 90% of all reconnaissance missions flown yielded information of value to G-2. Usually within one and one-half hours of requesting observation missions, G-2 of either division had received information reports.

Several missions were flown to locate the front lines: not one was wholly successful. Panels and pyrotechnics were used as marking devices, and wing signals and distinctive maneuvers were used by aircraft to call for the front line markers. But infantrymen on the move or under fire are reluctant to stop to lay out panels, and the terrain plus the speed of aircraft make the latter's signals difficult to see at 4,000 feet; thick pine foliage renders observation at tree top level virtually impossible. As for bombardment missions, practically all were pre-arranged; ground forces had not yet evolved satisfactory machinery for identifying targets of opportunity.<sup>238</sup>

This phase also impressed on all -- thought the "extermination" of one entire infantry battalion -- the necessity of sending security elements ahead. The 1st battalion of the 357th Infantry (Red) had tried to cross the Sabine at 211530: Blue, forewarned, had put two companies of the 6th Tank Destroyer Battalion to meet them. The infantry came over in assault boats, to be met at mid-stream by the fire from nine .50 caliber machine guns, six .30 caliber machine guns, three sub-machine guns, sixty rifles, and one 3-inch gun. Umpires said there were "no survivors."<sup>239</sup>

Also coming in for unusually heavy criticism in the final critique were mortar squads ("base deflection and cross-level traverse unheard of" was a common comment) and first-air men ("compound fracture means shot in the leg, abdomen was chest, morphine was a heart stimulant.")<sup>240</sup>

Though the final critique did not pull punches in describing errors, the third phase was considered by all to have evidenced a vast improvement over the first showing of the maneuvering troops.

On 29 March, General Sultan wrote General Hodges:

"General McNair, General Lentz and about a dozen AGF staff officers arrived on the 24th and left late in the afternoon of the 26th...(They were) out all day and up until midnight each night. General McNair gave me the impression that he saw a great many things that pleased him. He commented most favorably on the fact that he could never find any troops on the roads. As a matter of fact, the commanders and the troops seemed to have taken to heart your instructions and my criticisms and did better during this last phase than they had ever performed before. Battalions really got off the roads, advanced across country in deployed formation, were under control and maintained contact."<sup>241</sup>

AGF agreed with General Sultan's summation. In a letter on 12 April, General McNair wrote: "The improvement shown in these two divisions during the current maneuvers is gratifying. Many faults previously noted have lessened materially. The following deficiencies should be stressed in future training: coordination of infantry and artillery; employment of divisional anti-tank weapons; air guards on motor vehicles; signal security; infantry technique, particularly in small units during withdrawal."<sup>242</sup>

The next day, 13 April, General McNair summarized the first maneuvers as follows:<sup>243</sup>

"The first of the new divisions have completed maneuver training...The final results were gratifying and reassuring. There seems to be no question that such divisions can be developed into combat units of the highest effectiveness. However, the initial performance in the maneuvers were disappointing. There were many defects of technique, particularly on the part of the infantry. The comments of the Commanding General, Third Army, are believed thoroughly sound and of interest in connection with the pre-maneuver training of new divisions under your command." AGF then reproduced and sent to all commands the basic points mentioned by the Army Commander in his March report to General McNair.

#### SECOND PERIOD OF MANEUVERS

The IV Corps had been scheduled to take part in the second period of maneuvers, but by 4 March, it had completed a permanent change of station from Camp Beauregard, La., to Fort Lewis, Washington.<sup>244,245</sup> The XV Corps, Major General Wade H. Haislip commanding, was activated 15 February at Camp Beauregard<sup>246</sup> and on 9 March General Haislip was notified that he would represent the Commanding General, Third Army, as Director of the maneuvers. He was authorized to augment Director Headquarters with selected members of his staff, but the corps staff as a whole would not participate.<sup>247</sup>

There was potential dynamite in the unit make-up of the second period. The 93rd Division (colored) was pitted against the 85th Division which General Haislip had trained - the first time a white and colored division had met, and then on Southern soil. There was rumor that, in the end, the 93rd would not be able to come at full strength-- two battalions were needed to pick cotton-- but finally this detail was cancelled.<sup>248</sup>

The 100th Infantry Battalion, composed of Japanese-Americans, was also scheduled to participate, despite the demurrer of General Krueger. AGF agreed its participation was "not a good idea" because of possible racial flare-up, but "they wanted them over in a certain area right away", and training had to be double-timed.<sup>249</sup>

There were early steps taken to remove possible friction. The first was to assign Negro umpires to Negro troops only; the second was the visit to the Louisiana maneuver area, sponsored by the War Department, of leading representatives of the Negro press,

to remove the current allegations that the 93rd Division was being maltreated.<sup>250</sup> The actual strength of participating troops was only five-sevenths of what ACF had originally anticipated--approximately 50,000 troops--because of a scarcity of sufficiently trained service units, and because of the demands of overseas forces.<sup>251</sup>

This maneuver, the first over which General Hodges had a completely free hand, saw the introduction of important changes in organization and in policy.

In the first maneuver, as planned by General Krueger, Director Headquarters had under its control all non-divisional units for training (during "breaks") and administration. The headquarters consisted of two principal groups-- Control Section for administration and supply, Operations for tactical conduct of the maneuvers proper. The attachment of these tens of smaller units--many on an "alert status"--deflected Director Headquarters' attention which more properly should have been placed on the field exercises. Army's control of Army units in the maneuver area was not, in General Hodges' opinion, sufficiently tight.

General Orders No. 40, dated 5 April, divided Third Army Maneuver Headquarters into four distinct sections:

1. Director Headquarters was charged, principally, with the preparation and conduct of all maneuvers, the tactical disposition of all army troops, the continuation of all umpire and liaison activity, and the maintenance of direct liaison between Director Headquarters and subordinate units.

2. Provisional Headquarters was set up to receive as attachments all Third Army units other than corps, divisions, separate brigades, and units attached to these. It was likewise charged with the supply, evacuation, movement, and service activities of all units participating in maneuvers, the administration of attached units, and the immediate supervision of training of attached units, particularly those alerted.

3. The duties of the Public Relations Section remained as before--to keep the press services posted and to control and supervise military observers and accredited correspondents.

4. A Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment was established to provide necessary orderly and messing facilities.

Also introduced at Director Headquarters by these orders was a system of ratings whereby the Director, at the completion of each maneuver period, reported to Third Army the unit's manner of performance of technical duties, the major training deficiencies as demonstrated by its performance, and a general statement as to its readiness for combat.

The second and more important change was the introduction of the four flag exercises by which General Hodges intended to rid commanders of their "Louisiana Maneuver complex," their inclination to forget in maneuvers the lessons they had learned in previous training.

General Haislip, in a conference 11 April with division and principal unit commanders, outlined these flag exercises and the eight problems following, drawn so as to train the troops, not force them into impossible tactical maneuvering. "Dress rehearsals take more time than the show itself and parts often have to be repeated until they are exactly right" he said. "That is what is going to be done. All problems will be solved slowly, properly, and correctly. The idea of winning and losing must be forgotten. Problems have been drawn so that the final score will be 4 to 4, and no extra innings. First one side will attack and win, and then the other side will attack

and win...each side will solve each type of problem and neither side will be given any advantage whatever. This idea should be impressed on all personnel taking part in the maneuvers."

The four flag exercises of two days each, lasting from 12 to 22 April, involved:<sup>252</sup>

1. Tactical march, reconnaissance, approach march and development of enemy positions.
2. Attack of an organized position, reorganization and continuation of the attack.
3. Organization of defensive position and daylight withdrawal.
4. Reorganization, occupation of position and night withdrawal.

In these exercises, combined training was furnished by attachment of special units such as TD and Tank Battalions; aviation support was likewise attached. Control was furnished by Director Headquarters, using standard umpire flags.

General Hodges soon found these flag exercises had the desired effect. In a critique at the end of the second exercise 16 April, he said:

"I am gratified to learn that there has been a steady progress in these two problems, and that you are taking the opportunity to correct mistakes as you go along. Keep in mind that this whole maneuver is instruction, from start to finish." At the end of the field exercises, each division commander told General Hodges that the field exercises "had been of tremendous training value, both to himself and staff, as well as to the units of the division."

At first, General Hodges admitted, it "was hard to make them believe there was not some trick in it, that we were not going to spring some surprise on them. After the first exercise, when they realized we meant exactly what we told them, they proceeded to take full advantage of the opportunities offered."<sup>253</sup>

The improvement shown by participating troops was reflected in comments of observers. Lieutenant General Ben Lear, at that time AGF commander in the absence of General McNair, visited on May 12 and 13, and came away particularly impressed with the 85th Division, whose "discipline, alertness and interest, appearance and soldierly conduct, concealment of men and vehicles, were noticeably good and especially pleasing." He was likewise enthusiastic about the 100th Infantry Battalion.<sup>254</sup> AGF observers accompanying General Lear wrote, upon return to Washington:

"The maneuver was satisfactory, generally. The 85th Division particularly showed the results of sound basic training. The performance of small units showed improvement. Men of the 93rd Division obviously had received detailed, painstaking instruction, much of which was not absorbed."<sup>255</sup>

The ninth phase, directly following the AGF visit, was the most noteworthy in that it demanded of the attacking Red Force an exact coordination of all arms to an extent seldom seen in the maneuver area.<sup>256</sup>

Red had planned a coordinated attack on Blue, strongly intrenched on high ground, for the morning of 19 May. Its special task force consisted of tank and tank destroyer groups, with artillery groups, bombardment aviation, combat engineers, and an infantry battalion (less two rifle companies) motorized. To command this force, used as a coordinated team in furtherance of the mission of the division commander, Director

## RED FORCE

 93

 100sep

 137

 142

 5 GP

 235

 2

 31 RCN SQ

 71 GP (c)

## BLUE FORCE


 85

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 102 RCN SQ

**SITUATION AT 2230  
MAY 16, 1943**


Map showing military positions and movements in the Hornbeck, Anacoco, and Leesville area. Key locations include Hornbeck, Anacoco, Leesville, Caney, Burr Ferry, and Kurthwood. The map displays various military units (e.g., 337, 338, 339, 368, 25, 100, 369, 35, 93, 92, 94, 85, 86, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100) and a scale bar indicating 0 to 5 miles.



[illegible]



# RED PLAN



Headquarters brought in General R. W. Hasbrouck of the 8th Armored Division, the first time a general officer of a non-participating unit had been thus employed.

The night of the 17th, General Hasbrouck brought forward these task force elements so that they might be used if the enemy had been fixed. This was no easy job: the enemy had demolished many bridges, others needed extensive strengthening to take the 32-ton tank load. This movement to the front was invaluable training for the engineers; a total of 50 bridges and culverts were repaired, reinforced, or by-passed. By the 18th, Red's advance had not progressed sufficiently; employment of the task force was postponed until the 19th. The task force spent the day in "dry running" the problem with air-photo maps on which were moved matches and small pieces of wood. Everybody down to platoon sergeants knew what they were to do. By 2030, the 18th, the necessary line of departure was secured; General Hasbrouck turned his task force over to General Spence, acting CG of the 93rd Division and Red Commander, to employ.

The attack, in early morning, was preceded by a 20-minute barrage--five battalions of medium artillery concentrating on known and suspected enemy positions immediately in front of the main effort. These 270,000 pounds of high explosives were followed by further prearranged fire, for 20 minutes, on known artillery, antitank and TD emplacements. One squadron of A-20's concentrated on the hostile RRL. Fighter planes swooped down to strafe troops and add 250 more bombs to the dust and destruction beneath. Then the medium tanks, followed by the light, in turn followed by infantry, plowed across the field. By 1040, the head of the Red tank advance was in the vicinity of the prescribed objective and the problem ended.

This maneuver, which General Haislip described as the "best" <sup>257</sup> to that date, was valuable to all.

It taught Blue what camouflage, concealment, and "digging in" can do. They were so good in one case--that of the 403rd FA Battalion--that tanks passed on both sides of the three batteries and did not even know they were there. It taught Blue that well-prepared antitank defenses are a match for tanks; Director Headquarters ruled that 16 of the 54 medium tanks had been destroyed. It taught the attackers that infantry must not make a "second attack" behind tanks but must follow directly behind.

As General Haislip pointed out, no commander in the field would have four days of such complete freedom to plan an attack, but he considered that the training received more than compensated for this deviation from realism.

In his critique, General Hasbrouck concluded: "Is the GHQ tank group properly organized? No. No one in the Armored Forces will dispute with me when I say that tanks urgently require the support of other arms. This means that when GHQ tank groups are used, they are always part of a hurriedly improvised team--a team which is neither equipped nor trained to function together." Infantry, he pointed out, did not have the necessary cross country mobility to follow tanks; division engineers did not have the bridge equipment to carry a medium tank. Few field artillery observers were accustomed to functioning from tanks. "The main objection," he said, "is that a team which is to make the main effort in an attack cannot be hastily thrown together a few days before the big game."

General McNair and AGF staff officers were observers of the eleventh phase. General McNair had this to say in a memorandum to General Haislip <sup>258</sup>

"There is no question that you are doing a good, soldierly job. The troops have their minds on the job and are working seriously as though they have the idea of going to war. This condition is more than a reflection of good training and command, but it means also that the maneuvers are conducted soundly and that the umpiring is fair and reasonable.

"Truck driving is sane and good--better than some I saw overseas--but there were a few exceptions. I am one who believes that blackout driving is essential, also that it should be 100% in the combat area--not on the side roads alone.

"Camouflage and concealment was good--equal to war conditions, I should say.

"Discipline is a continuing difficulty overseas, and the results extend into combat. Don't relax discipline on the ground that you are in the field. Field clothing is not ornamental but it can be worn properly. The Blue and Red individual identifications, as I have seen them, are a reflection on discipline. In general, saluting is excellent.

"The objective in these maneuvers should be to do things so very well that performance still will be good in spite of the stress and confusion of battle. You are not yet that good, but you are far along the way. I congratulate the troops on the progress made, and thank the officers who have brought about this condition."

One exception to the general improvement was air support. There were insufficient planes and a shortage of trained personnel. Planes were grounded frequently by mechanical trouble; the operation of communications was unsatisfactory. To top it off, bad weather cancelled many missions. Ground commanders, at first, did not realize either the power or the limitations of air support.<sup>259</sup>

Noteworthy was the first maneuver use of Prisoner of War Interrogation teams, trained at the Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Md. AGF had requested that Third Army employ such teams, complete with T/BA equipment, and report at the termination of maneuvers on organization, equipment, operation, and the need for such teams.<sup>260</sup> Four teams were used in the maneuver; and Third Army found their organization and operation to be "highly satisfactory" and "efficient". To "displace themselves with their own transportation," a  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer was recommended. Third Army also recommended that the teams should only be assigned to the headquarters of the task force and similar units, attached to a regimental CP if a combat mission had been assigned to that CP, and detached therefrom as soon as the combat mission had been completed.<sup>261</sup>

During this period, Third Army also reported to AGF, as requested on  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton amphibian trucks. Director Headquarters, acting on its own observations and after conversation with Infantry Board officers who were testing the vehicle in Louisiana at that time, told Third Army that this "jeep" had been a failure. Frequent damage to the body caused leaks when driven into the water. Practically all "jeeps" driven into the Sabine River, Director Headquarters reported, had to be "given a hand" upon reaching the opposite bank.<sup>262</sup>

Third Army consequently recommended to AGF that:

1. The truck be removed from division entirely.
2. That no more be built.
3. That research and development be continued to provide vehicles similar to the "Alligator" (Marine Corps caterpillar tractor) capable of transporting  $1\frac{1}{4}$ -ton vehicles across streams when needed.<sup>263</sup>

At the end of the maneuver, Director Headquarters rated all units as required by General Orders No. 40. The 100th Infantry Battalion was found excellent.<sup>264</sup> The 85th Division rated very satisfactory in the manner of performance of technical duties, and its readiness for combat. The training deficiencies noted were "matters of omission rather than commission."<sup>265</sup>

The 93rd Division had received a close going over from all observers, many of whom came extremely skeptical of the possible worth of Negro troops as combat troops. The maneuvers did not prove this point one way or the other - only combat would give the final answer - but there were certain common conclusions reached by all:

1. The 93rd had been well trained. Its staff work was excellent. Negro officers were generally satisfactory.

2. The application of strong leadership was needed at all times. There was no lack of knowledge among its men, but there was a lack of will to apply that knowledge. Despite a complete absence of any racial disturbance while there, some of its soldiers felt and the attitude was clearly written into their efforts, that this was a "white man's war" and not theirs. When aggressive leadership was furnished - and aggressive non-commissioned officers were not, in number, as many as desired - the Division performed creditably. Without this, the Division fell apart; soldiers went to sleep at their posts or dice began to roll.<sup>266</sup>

3. First echelon maintenance was uniformly bad; the number of dead-lined vehicles was high. Drivers were reckless. Lack of technical skill and care of vehicles and weapons could be traced more to low intelligence level and general lack of educational opportunity than to deliberate carelessness.

Encouraging was the fact that the Division did show steady improvement throughout the maneuver, progressing from an unsatisfactory performance of technical duties to satisfactory at the close. Its major training deficiencies were "lack of individual and small unit training, disregard for internal security from both air and ground threat," and the lack of necessary technical knowledge, as mentioned above.<sup>267</sup> It was not ready for combat, but there was no expression that this readiness was impossible of attainment. The general conclusion was that the Division had performed better than was expected of it.

Both divisions, AGF concluded, needed additional seasoning. They left the maneuver area for the Desert Training Center upon completion of the Twelfth Phase.<sup>268</sup>

### THIRD PERIOD OF MANEUVERS

The schedule for the Third Maneuver Period, as settled in January,<sup>269</sup> called for the participation of all four corps,<sup>270</sup> four divisions, and two tank battalions, from 21 June to 15 August.

A necessary extension of training time for the 31st Division advanced the opening date. AGF withdrew the 747th and 749th Tank Battalions (L).<sup>271</sup> Third Army, which in April had begun to plan the maneuvers so that two corps would be in the maneuver area at one time and then rotate, with the other two entering the exercises, changed its mind.

General Hodges concluded that the training of units assigned and attached to corps might suffer if all corps were to shuttle to and from Louisiana. He consequently requested that AGF approve participation of the X and III Armored Corps only, with the XV and VIII Corps to enter the Fourth Period.<sup>272</sup> General Lentz, G-3, AGF, was not particularly enthusiastic; he said both General McNair and he preferred to see one corps only participate. However, General McNair finally approved, and accordingly plans were begun.<sup>273</sup>

Before the maneuver opened, Third Army completed its reorganization of Maneuver Headquarters by activating a casual center, a separate postal section, and centralizing supply under Director Headquarters instead of Provisional Headquarters. It also directed



Taking advantage of cover along highway 611, 3.2 miles north of Mt. Carmel. (This was typical of entire battalion in this situation. Troops are on both sides of road).

that personnel for Director Headquarters be drawn, insofar as practicable, from Army Headquarters. The intent was to give added field experience to Army officers and enlisted personnel; or make Director Headquarters a "Third Army field CP."<sup>274</sup>

This most ambitious of 1943 maneuvers opened with the four field exercises.<sup>275</sup> General Hodges, who followed the first exercise of the 31st and 95th Divisions, stressed to both the proper procedure to be followed by reconnaissance troops to cover every road net, to get back information promptly to the troops in greatest danger, and to get rid of the notion, once and for all, that the jeep is a small tank. He also emphasized the proper installation of a CP - distribution of vehicles establishment of a motor part, except camouflage. "The 31st," he told his Chief of Staff, "had a CP that really looked like something;" other divisional CPs, he found, were less satisfactory.<sup>276</sup> Throughout these flag exercises, division commanders agreed as before that they had profited greatly.<sup>277</sup>

The seven phases were organized as follows:

### III ARMORED CORPS

TYPE PROBLEM	PHASE	Inf Div	Armd Div	Inf Div	Armd Div	DIRECTED BY
Meeting Engagement	2d	Offensive 2 (31-88)	1 (11)	Defensive 1 (95)		CG, X Corps
Coordinated Attack	3d	Defensive 1 (31)	1 (11)	Offensive 2 (88-95)		CG, THIRD ARMY
Break Through and Delaying Action	4th	Offensive 2 (88-95)	1 (11)	Defensive 1 (31)		CG, X Corps
Coordinated Attack	5th	Defensive 1 (95)		Offensive 2 (31-88)	1 (11)	CG, III Armd Corps
Reduction of Bridge-head	6th	Defensive 1 (88)		Offensive 2 (31-95)	1 (11)	CG, III Armd Corps
Attack and Defense of River Line	7th	Defensive 1 (95)	1 (11)	Offensive 2 (31-88)		CG, THIRD ARMY
Attack and Defense of River Line	8th	Offensive 2 (31-95)	1 (11)	Defensive 1 (88)		CG, X Corps

Commendable during the second phase were:

1. The performance of the 11th Armored Division which, held in reserve the first two days, "marched" its 3,500 vehicles from out under cover at night 40 miles to arrive at its given line of departure the next morning as scheduled.

2. Communications within the same division. An armistice was called at 0530 before its attack could be launched; within ten minutes, every subordinate unit within the command had been notified.<sup>278</sup>

3. Camouflage of AA units.

4. Control within the 31st Division.

5. Marching stamina of the 88th Division. Outstanding was the performance of the 351st Infantry which on the 12th of July marched 37 miles over difficult terrain; only 33 men dropped out. Before this phase was up, the regiment had marched 62 miles in about 42 hours. Word of this reached the ear of General McNair who requested full



Mess line, HQ Co. 31st Div. showing proper dispersion. 5 miles SE of Kurthwood



Switchboard installations, 31st Div C P, showing extent of excavation, camouflage materials on edge of pit.





Switchboard installation, 31st Div C P, showing proper camouflage.



Motor Park, 31st Div C P. Showing dispersion of vehicles. Ten vehicles in range of camera.

information to give to the Chief of Staff. This report<sup>279</sup> brought commendation from General McNair<sup>280</sup> and a warm paragraph from the Infantry Journal.<sup>281</sup>

Still far from satisfactory were:

1. The information received from reconnaissance agencies - the two mechanized Cavalry regiments participating (15th and 106th), Division reconnaissance troops, and the I and R platoons of infantry regiments. The two cavalry regiments "seemed obsessed with the idea that their primary mission was to seek out and defeat the opposing cavalry rather than to discover the location, formation and movements of the enemy main force... one and one-half hours after the restraining lines had been lifted, one Corps Headquarters had received from all its reconnaissance agencies combined just two messages."<sup>282</sup>

The Third Phase made clear that reconnaissance agencies had understood General Hodges' words. Blue corps headquarters received a total of 123 messages by 1800 the first day, on which hostile contact was reported at 0202. Red submitted an equally encouraging report. All types of communication were used, except visual signaling, and included not only radio, telephone, and teletype, but also officer, couriers, motorcycle messengers, runners, and carrier pigeons. On the very first afternoon, eight "important" messages came in on pigeons from deep within the enemy lines. General Crittenger's personal count revealed that a total of 466 messages of information of Red dispositions were received at his headquarters and there were others, he said, "no doubt, often not recorded."<sup>283</sup>

Also encouraging was the steady excellence of air support. The III Armored Corps requested 45 missions and received 35. Seven key bridges were destroyed, one Red ASP was blown sky-high, and a 6-hours cessation of the railhead operations at Boyce was caused. Reconnaissance kept Blue informed of every major move in time to take action against it; vectographs and obliques of critical positions of the Blue MLR aided in planning defenses.

An interesting sidelight into the "tremendous coordination of effort" necessary for Blue's defense is furnished by these figures:

Total number of Blue party fires recorded and credited by umpires . . . . .	582
Total number of mines planted <sup>284</sup> . . . . .	12,092
Total yardage of mine fields . . . . .	9,334
Bridges prepared for demolition . . . . .	55
Bridges blown . . . . .	27
Other bridges defended . . . . .	23
Number of planes destroyed by AA fire . . . . .	43
Total rounds ammunition fired by AA . . . . .	98,907

#### Fourth Phase:

For this problem, General Persons, Commanding the 31st Division (Red), took over the X Corps staff; outnumbered 3 to 1, his hope was to keep Blue striking but avoid letting him strike with full strength, to keep him off balance as much as possible. This Red did, retiring slowly until reaching Devil's Creek, where the terrain was unfavorable for use of Blue's armor, and setting up an intensive defense, utilizing the TD battalions, AA units with tank defense as their secondary mission, and artillery and infantry weapons distributed in depth. Blue decided to throw its armor in at 1900, Sunday; this order went out at 1600. In four hours the 11th Armored Division moved from its assembly area to the attack--a distance of 25 miles--not so fast as British tanks which covered 40 miles in two hours when thrown into the El Alamein attack but creditable considering the extreme difference in terrain.



Laying a mine field 1½ miles east of Hutton on Route 304.



Completion of mine field  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles east of Rutton on highway 304.



Activating a mine with a booby trap mechanism.



Lesson #13, "Breaching A Mine Field". Light tanks passing through the breach.

This attack, however, was not a success. General Crittenberger admitted that it should have been launched two hours sooner. AGF observers also found the attack "conceived hurriedly and without adequate intelligence. The objectives were reached in the dark with the enemy already withdrawn."<sup>285</sup>

AGF also found that personnel too generally knew the type and duration of the plan and governed their actions accordingly; that unpiring was not up to snuff, that infantry action was characterized generally by exposure of personnel and lack of battlefield realism and that "adequate steps should be taken to educate personnel on the technique of delivery and the effect of artillery fire...Not only must personnel be required by their leaders to protect themselves adequately when subjected to artillery fire, but the leaders must analyze the reason for being subjected to artillery fire, and learn to avoid obvious target areas."

On the other side of the ledger, AGF found that the 31st Division "Delayed skillfully, demonstrating quick and ready control, coordination and mobility;" saluting and military courtesy was good; light discipline had materially improved. The maneuvers were "excellent, generally," AGF concluded; "troops showed they were in hard physical condition...maneuvered rapidly over considerable distances; control was good, and the knowledge of the situation was above the average generally."

Some of these general deficiencies mentioned by AGF were difficult to correct because of the very nature of maneuvers. They had always been there and would doubtless remain, even if to a less marked degree.

It was, for example, impossible for a commander not to know the approximate forces arrayed against him, for he knew what units were in the maneuver area, and he knew what strength his own side possessed. Though generally he did not know on what exact hour or day a particular phase would end, he could make a fairly accurate guess. Enlisted men knew that the weapons against them were not firing live ammunition, and it was hard for four days to pretend that they were. Umpiring had been a headache since maneuvers in 1941, and though it had improved, was still of such a nature as frequently to discourage participating troops. Good umpires could not be developed overnight.

But the errors in tactics mentioned were those of the individual commanders and not attributable to the staging of maneuvers as directed by AGF and carried out by Army and its Director Headquarters. Maneuvers were free.<sup>286</sup> Opposing forces received from Director Headquarters word only of their concentration area, a general statement as to disposition of the enemy, their mission, the time restraining lines were to be lifted, and the armistice. The rest was up to them.

#### Fifth Phase:

This phase, the same as the third, put the 88th Division and its commander, Major General John Sloan (acting as CG, III Armored Corps) on the defensive. The problem ended with the 88th surrounded, with the 31st and 95th Divisions attacking the front and close in flanks, and combat commands A and B of the 11th Armored enveloping the Blue left flank and right rear, respectively.

This problem, as perhaps no other, emphasized the importance of TD units. General Sloan used 72 of his available 108 TD guns to reinforce his artillery. As he said in his critique, the TDs are flexible, and though TD commanders are opposed to using their weapons in any position "which will interfere with their primary mission, this is a command decision. "When the defense is hard-pressed, TDs can stand to and deliver."<sup>287</sup>

In this critique, General Sloan showed that he considered the maneuvers exactly as he would actual battle - American troops do not surrender. "The Headquarters of the



88th Division had burned its documents and was ready to take to the field, the Corps CP was closed, and the KPs were ready to go into the fight. Gentlemen, the III Corps was not licked. No unit is licked until its will to fight has been broken. The will to fight...was not going to be broken as long as there was a man there...If you would have given me either the 155th Armored Infantry or the 154th Foot Infantry as my Corps Reserve, I guarantee you I would have licked the tar out of the whole bunch."

But the "big thing" was the training received. General Sloan said that "within 15 minutes after the operation...the Corps Artillery officer came up...to say "my Corps got more out of this maneuver than in any other we had been in"...To me, that indicated clearly what the maneuver had accomplished."

For General Sloan in this phase, as for the other commanders in those problems preceding and those to follow, the participation of an Armored Division was invaluable in teach them, on the spot, the "limitations and power of armor."<sup>288</sup>

#### Sixth Phase:

General McNair and staff found the Sixth Phase<sup>289</sup>-- reduction of a bridgehead -- the best observed to date in defensive action, though the defensive action was not too successful. "The ratio of three divisions against one was not unreasonable, and it was fair to expect a real defense under such conditions."<sup>290</sup> AGF also found commanders too "CP bound," the umpiring still unsatisfactory.

Departing from customary procedure, AGF also inserted a few paragraphs on "tactical plans." It criticized the Red forces (95th Division) for committing two-thirds of its forces to a static position, instead of holding "the maximum portion...in reserve to await the actions of the enemy;" the defense was too passive. It also took "definite exception" to the employment of two tank destroyer battalions as supporting artillery, instead of holding them mobile to meet a possible threat from the 11th Armored Division. "Little progress," it said, "had been made in the correction of air-ground deficiencies as noted in May."<sup>291</sup>

But AGF found much that was gratifying. Camouflage<sup>292</sup> and entrenching were on "a higher standard than any observed before. The improvement in these aspects, as compared with maneuvers in this area in the past, is outstanding." The identification of both vehicles and personnel was far better...a notable outward manifestation of the discipline prevailing in the command...saluting was uniformly good throughout."<sup>293</sup>

Observers praised for the second time the 31st Division, which they found "impressive -- hard, aggressive, soldierly, and competent."

General Hodges had long felt, and this maneuver had reinforced his belief, that artillery in the maneuvers was not being sufficiently credited for the fire-power..."it had been putting down religiously." On 7 August, directly after the completion of this phase, he wrote to AGF with a request to put into effect, for at least a trial, a system of umpiring that would give the artillery its proper due. For not only should artillery get its credit, he pointed out, but "infantry and other branches should be taught that there is a possibility of being stopped, neutralized, or partially destroyed by artillery fire long before you come in contact with any of them."<sup>294</sup>

This letter<sup>295</sup> proposed, principally, that FM 105-5 be amended to:

1. Reduce the fire power of an infantry element under artillery fire by one-half so long as the artillery fire continued.

2. When the fire of two or more artillery battalions is massed, this 50% reduction of infantry fire power within the area covered by the massed fire shall continue for a period of minutes determined as follows: number of battalions whose fires are massed X minutes of massed fire X 2.

In its first indorsement,<sup>296</sup> AGF, then revising FM 105-5, said the proposals had "merit and will be of material assistance in the preparation of the changes." It desired, however, that FM 105-5 be followed pending publication of changes.

#### Seventh and Eighth Phases:

The Seventh and Eighth Phases were not as successful as those preceding. In the Seventh "there really was no coordinated attack and the defense lacked coordination in a good many cases," General Hodges summed up in his critique. The attack of the river line was piece-meal; some units were early, others were late, and consequently, control was below the high standards maintained throughout the period. The only units in top form were the TD battalions, which claimed more tanks destroyed than the 11th Armored Division possessed.

Inaugurated at the close of the Seventh Phase was a new system of critiques. By meeting in one theatre up to that time, no more than one-third of the officers could attend. Now each division was to hold its own critique - covering the problems thoroughly for the benefit of junior officers - and higher commanders were to meet separately for a less formal session covering points of more concern to them. Also, service units were for the first time to have their own critique.

There could be no doubt, at the close, that troops had profited tremendously. It was true, as commanders testified, that critiques did not vary much from problem to problem, but that was because General Hodges believed that the common errors - and they were fundamental - had to be brought home to commanders and correction insisted upon.

1. Failure of communication between units.
2. Inadequate reconnaissance.
3. Bunching of troops and advancing exposed to enemy fire.
4. Failure to appreciate the efforts of artillery fire.
5. Traffic jamming.
6. Counter-intelligence. Too many officers were captured with documents valuable to the enemy; too many enlisted men cheerfully volunteered all they knew.
7. Umpiring.

But the other side of the ledger was impressive. Supply throughout was excellent; service units showed they understood the meaning of "go tactical." Infantry action throughout showed a vast improvement over the previous two maneuvers. All testimony bore out that commanders had understood General Hodges' insistence on discipline: saluting was good, markings and identifications were improved, light discipline was excellent. Troops were muscularly hard and aggressive; to a greater extent than before they understood down to the platoon the nature of each problem and the tactics involved, and consequently, had a greater will to pursue their assigned missions. Control was consequently made easier.

In its broader aspects, these maneuvers had been valuable to separate arms. TD units had their first opportunity to apply their principles of Training Circular No. 88, published 24 June, just before the maneuvers opened. General Earnest, Commanding General, 1st TD Brigade, reported that the maneuvers had proved those principles "sound."<sup>297</sup> Though there had been violations - especially in "digging in," thus nullifying mobility, one of TD's first necessities -- all commanders to which TD units had been attached had learned successfully the precepts of its primary and secondary missions.

Corps staffs, operating with from one to three divisions under their control, had reaped experience obtainable nowhere else.

Especially gratifying was the first large-scale participation of AA units - one brigade, four groups, nine battalions, and the 101st Barrage Balloon Battery (VLA). Six of the nine battalions were semi-mobile, and though this placed "an undesirable burden" on the mobile units to which they were attached,<sup>298</sup> they performed creditably in most cases. The barrage balloon battery, participating in Louisiana maneuvers for the first time, served with the III Armored Corps, the X Corps, and with Army, and was used to supplement protection of supply installations, bridges, defiles, and river crossings. Pilots were so wary of its 2,000-foot high "sausages" that they gave installations it protected a wide berth. It was rated excellent in its performance of duties.

Air support, however, despite good performance in some phases, was still unsatisfactory.<sup>299</sup> As for the second maneuver,<sup>300</sup> there were insufficient planes and tactical personnel. The use of panels was found generally ineffective because of wooded terrain; smoke pots and colored smoke grenades, however, were used with some success.

At the close of the maneuvers, General Hodges rated the major unit as follows:

X Corps	-	Satisfactory
III Armored Corps	-	Excellent
31st Division	-	Excellent
88th Division	-	Excellent
95th Division	-	Satisfactory


AGF apparently concurred in these ratings. Before the maneuvers were over, it issued orders sending the 31st Division to Camp Pickett, Va., a customary last stop before overseas destination.<sup>301</sup> It sent the 88th Division, likewise outstanding, to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, for post-maneuver training, but on 13 October, the 88th likewise made ready for overseas destination.<sup>302</sup>

#### TRAINING IN THE THIRD ARMY

The high standards of discipline and performance which General Hodges had insisted upon in the maneuver area were only attainable, or at any rate were readily attainable, if the training of all units was rigidly controlled from its inception, or through ITP, UTP, Combined training, and for Divisions, the "D" exercises. Early measures were taken by the Army to bring about the desired uniformity of standards and the required control.

#### Sub-Headquarters:

At the time General Hodges assumed command, eleven sub-headquarters (Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments, Special Troops, Third Army) were in operation with average strength as follows:



Map of section of Louisiana Maneuver Area over which most of 1943 action was fought. Divisional positions on map were for the opening Flag Exercises. (4th Period)

## LOUISIANA MANEUVERS

Under Third Army, troops did everything in maneuvers that they were going to do in actual combat - except kill. The following pages of pictures shows that they ...



... planned their work ...

The 1st. Engineers look over the site where they will establish a beach head at Haddon Ferry on the Dublin River.



... and they did it in a hurry ...

It's cold work, but the 180th Engineers go right ahead with the establishing of a beach head at Haddon Ferry on the Sabine River.



... so that tanks could cross a few hours later ...  
741st Tank Bn. crossing the Sabine River at Haddon Ferry over a pontoon bridge built  
by the 180th Eng.





... worked in dugouts ...

Switchboard operator at door of dugout a short distance from Bn C.P. Canvas flap overhead.



... and lived in mud ...

Surrounded by Louisiana mud and standing knee-deep in water, Cpl. James Coffey, Avon, N. Y., of the 309th Inf., Co. H, keeps on the alert for the "enemy" at Haddon Ferry, during Louisiana maneuvers.



... advanced by foot and ...

2nd. Battalion, 86th Inf. (Blue) driving men from Co. I, 307th Inf. (Red) across roadway three miles North-East of Mt. Carmel.



... withdrew by foot ...

Co. E, 30th Inf., retires from ridge East of Casey.



... while others came in tanks ...

2 miles south of Kurthwood. Good dispersion in poor cover.



... Sometimes it was better to be on foot ...

It will take more than a "heave ho!" to get this tank out of the mud, as Sgt. Chester Perman, Nashville, Tenn., of the 741st tank Bn., is finding out.



... They camouflaged their guns ...

... and ... (in some places with flat top nets) Sgt J. Bezela in charge.



... and sometimes the sun of the winter ...


Excellent canals of the ... near Rt. 17,  
two miles east of Mt. ...





... and installations were safe from strafing ...

3 th Evac. Hosp. ... taken from the air.



... they strung wire ...

Men of 33rd Signal Const. Bn., pulling slack and dead ending wire.



... unloaded supplies during blackout ...

A quartermaster detachment gets some practice in unloading a train during a blackout. Third Army maneuvers in Louisiana.



... brought them up by convoy ...

Third Army maneuvers. Aerial shot of convoy.



... repaired their vehicles ...

Work area of 1st S.S. near Louisville on Ht. #3.



... and once in a while got a minute to wash them ...

Troops of Hq. Co., 2nd Bn., 304th Inf., 77th Div. Anti-tank Platoon washing clothes and jeeps.



... and themselves ...

Pvt. Mirko Dominis, New York City, an former 2nd Lt. in the Yugoslavian Army and Pvt. Steve Kashu Baka, Whitaker, Pa., washout a few clothes during maneuver break.



... sometimes they were taken prisoner ...

Military Interrogation Team. (Left to right). Cpl Joseph A Gross, New York City; Howard Patterson, Richmond, Va.; Cpl Valentine Martinez, East Chicago, Ind. Searching a captured prisoner.





... sometimes they were casualties, simulated ...

1st Lt. Weeks, of Reg't. Hdq. 359th, is being moved to the rear First Aid station from front lines by 1st Bn. Aid Co. 359. Simulated wound, left leg, gun shot.



... and read to ...

Capt. J. Glynn and P. L. Linnell and other men were with a hospital unit, but the legs of a casualty who received multiple compound fractures in an action near Berlin, 1945, during the war in Europe.




... sometimes they ate ...

Evening chew in the field during Ia. maneuvers. Pfc Martin H. Palm of Nook, Pa.



... but, every now and then, there was time for a haircut ...

Pfc. Jeff Harris, Charlottesville, Va., Co Barber for the 501st Engrs. Light Platoon, Co., somewhere in La., has his field barber shop on a stump, during maneuvers. Cpl. L.E. Stanley, of Hall River, N.C., gets the latest in hair cuts from barber Harris.



...and ...

...and ...

Authorized Type "B"

1 - Camp Shelby	13,130
2 - Camp Claiborne	10,909
3 - Camp Livingston	5,817
5 - Camp Swift	17,348
7 - Camp Bowie	6,760
8 - Camp Gruber	6,551
9 - Camp Maxey	9,927
10 - Fort Bliss	4,694
11 - Camp Barkeley	5,851

Authorized Type "A"

4 - Camp McCain	3,468
6 - Fort Sam Houston	3,643

These 88,098 troops<sup>303</sup> totaled almost one-fourth of Army Strength. The Sub-Headquarters operated under a Third Army letter of December 30, 1942<sup>304</sup> which set up their mission as follows: "to direct and supervise tactical and administrative instruction of attached units." Supervision was to be by personal contact; correspondence from a unit to Third Army would by-pass the Sub-Headquarters.

The SOP for Sub-Headquarters which General Hodges had published on 1 April<sup>305</sup> was more exact in its definition of responsibilities. Commanding officers of the detachments were to "exercise command" over the Special Troops; they were to be "responsible" for the preparation and readiness of attached units. In training, they were to make reports of the results of these tests, and they were to maintain records of the status of each unit.

The SOP likewise stressed that supervision would be by personal contact by the commanders with the units in the field, and that the primary mission was training. Service Commands should perform "administrative, hospitalization, housing and supply functions." The post commander, it went on to say, "may be compared to a city manager in which the population consists of units of the Army Ground Forces. He will render all possible service requested by such units."

In addition to the preactivation inspection of units required by AGF,<sup>306</sup> Sub-Headquarters commanders were to require complete administrative inspections of all units one month after activation, each three months after the initial inspection, and upon alerting. For these inspections, an administrative check list<sup>307</sup> was published and distributed. In his foreword General Hodges wrote: "The importance of company administration and personnel records cannot be overemphasized yet reports of the Inspector General...indicate a general lack of knowledge or carelessness in this respect." These instructions were further tightened in April when a new preface to the booklet was issued, ordered unit commanders to immediately and systematically check daily the administrative records and procedures of their command...until the booklet is completely covered."<sup>308</sup>

The Army Commander supplemented this SOP by laying down additional duties and responsibilities.<sup>309</sup>

Unit commanders were to keep a close check of housekeeping which, the Army Commander felt, reflected "the true state of discipline and well-being of an organization." Officers were to remain on post five nights a week. At least two officers would be present at reveille and all officers would be present at retreat formations. Officers would always accompany their troops to and from the training area. Constant inspections of messes, with particular attention to the possible wastage of food, would be made.

Later the Chief of Staff notified the commanding officer of each detachment that there would be on duty at all times a Field Officer of the Day. At all posts, there were several interior guard details, each detailed from a separate Third Army unit. The Field Officers' job was two-fold:

1. To make sure that a uniformly high standard of discipline and performance were maintained.

2. So to organize and co-ordinate the activities of the guard details that, should any serious disturbance arise, there would exist a responsible authority to take charge, and a mobile reserve immediately available for use in putting down the disturbances.<sup>310</sup> This order was the direct outcome of a series of disturbances among Negro troops in late May<sup>311</sup> and early June at Camp Van Dorn, Camp Berkeley, and at Fort Sam Houston. Later trouble was to occur at Camp Claiborne and Camp McCain. Though the worst of the outbreaks and riots happened within a two-week period, there could be found no proof that they were instigated deliberately by any "higher headquarters." At Camp Van Dorn, where the most serious outbreak occurred - among the 364th Infantry - two companies of the 99th Division were kept as mobile reserve, it being the opinion of General Hodges that the Post Commander was not capable of handling the situation with the troops at his disposal. In every case, Third Army directed speedy court-martial of the accused. General McNair summed up the situation: "I can't see any retreat...on any issue at all. If they want to make an issue on 'what kind of day it is', I believe in taking them on, and licking them."<sup>312</sup> Under stringent control, the trouble died away; the last recorded outbreak was on 5 July at Duck Hill, Mississippi. Of eighteen soldiers tried by General Court-Martial after this outbreak, only five were acquitted.

Frequent investigations at Fort Clark (2d Cavalry Division) and Fort Huachuca (92d Division) -- the result of inflammatory newspaper articles or protest letters to Washington -- disclosed there was no truth that Negro troops were receiving different training or discipline from that of white troops.

Likewise the focus of frequent inquiry, because of racial background, was the 442d Combat Team (Japanese - American) at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. Investigation showed that Mississippi was receiving this group courteously and that after a period of acclimation, soldiers of that unit "accepted" Mississippi. All reports indicated the unit was becoming an aggressive well-disciplined force.

Third Army reorganized the increased responsibility placed on Sub-Headquarters, by announcing, by direction of the President, the appointment of ten colonels in command as Commanding Officers.<sup>313</sup> On 30 April, Colonel John C. P. Bartholf, 5th Headquarters, was made a Brigadier General; on 15 September, Colonel T. F. Breneshan, 9th Headquarters. This was in line with the declared opinion of the War Department and Army Ground Forces that the larger detachments generally merited a general officer in command.

In the course of its inspections, AGF had ample opportunity to observe the operation of these Headquarters Detachments and found them generally excellent. At Marey "a good job of supervision and training is being done; checks are made on all activities..."<sup>314</sup>

At the 2d and 3d Sub-Headquarters, "the appearance of men and installations generally was excellent."<sup>315</sup> The 4th and the 10th Sub-Headquarters likewise were "well organized and performing supervisory duties in an excellent manner."<sup>316</sup>

AGF was concerned, however, with "the slow but steady growth in the administration and paper work now performed,"<sup>317</sup> and asked Third Army to consider revision of the SOP,

to this Headquarters, a letter was dispatched to the commanding officer, pointing out deficiencies and requesting a statement of corrective action taken. On subsequent visits, the inspector carried with him the report of previous deficiencies and carefully checked to see if they were still existent.

3. The results of these inspections and the results of tests were entered on a status card at Army Headquarters. All Sub-Headquarters submitted a weekly report of change for all units under their control; corps, a report of change whenever it was believed necessary. These cards - one for each unit - were put to invaluable use in transmission of information to AGF which was calling for units double-time.<sup>323</sup>

4. General Hodges was a constant inspection team by himself. During his first seven months in command, he spent more than three in the field,<sup>324</sup> not only in maneuvers, but inspecting divisional units at distant posts from headquarters. His customary procedure was to drop in, on as short a notice as possible, inspect one barracks, one mess hall, one supply room, and then spend the rest of the day in the field with the troops, pointing out to the regimental and division commanders all errors and deficiencies noted.

5. Six special automotive and armament inspection teams were continuously on the road, visiting monthly, without warning, every Third Army unit.<sup>325</sup> So exacting were these inspections, and so careful the control of parts, supply and ordnance maintenance that the percentage of disabled vehicles dropped from 3.5 to 2.2 per cent - lowest of any major command within the United States.<sup>326</sup>

#### Tests:

1. The Test and Inspection Section customarily kept on the road at least five officers observing or participating in Sub-Headquarters' and Corps administration of TTP and UTP tests, and "D" exercises.

2. If a unit received an overall rating of "unsatisfactory" it was retested not sooner than 30 days and not later than 90 days. Even if its overall rating was satisfactory, it received a retest in all individual subjects in which it did not receive a passing grade. All test results were forwarded to AGF, as required by the November directive.

3. The testing section was usually responsible for any recommendations for extension of training time. If Third Army approved the extension - and there had to be good reason for it<sup>327</sup> - AGF approval was also requested by telephone. In the great majority of cases, the request was approved.

There were frequent amendments to the November AGF Directive.<sup>328</sup> To the majority of them, Third Army put a "for your information and compliance" indorsement, there being no necessity to expand the original directive, but only to check its observance and application. For others, Third Army was more explicit. For example, to the November AGF letter, which had set up Air-Ground training schedules, there came, in April, the tests prescribed for same.<sup>329</sup> To this letter Third Army put an indorsement outlining command responsibility for the conduct of the tests, the procedure necessary to obtain air support, the furnishing of umpires, the distribution of necessary T/BA equipment and visual aids from unit to unit, and the forms used to forward test results to Army Headquarters.

Frequently Third Army demanded more than AGF required. AGF "authorized" but did not demand that AA, FA, Chemical, Signal, QM and Engineer units undergo the "Close Combat" and "Combat in Cities" courses.<sup>330</sup> Third Army, however, making no distinction for these arms, directed that everybody undergo both courses.<sup>331</sup>



with particular attention to the possible elimination of formal indorsements and training status reports. In its revision of the SOP, on 14 September 1943, Third Army inserted a section on correspondence, the effect of which was to all intents and purposes to remove the Sub-Headquarters as a formal channel for communication between Third Army and the unit concerned. The use of the buck slip and every means to reduce the use of formal correspondence to the minimum was approved. Third Army decided, however, that status of training reports should be submitted weekly, as theretofore commanded; only in that way could an accurate picture of training be furnished.

Before the end of the year, Third Army activated three more Sub-Headquarters to take charge of the still growing number of "spare part" units - at Camps Van Dorn and Robinson, and at Camp Polk, where the 14th Sub-Headquarters replaced Provisional Headquarters, up to that time responsible for all non-divisional, separate units in the maneuver area.<sup>318</sup>

#### Training Directives:

Training of most Third Army units in 1943 was governed by the AGF directive of November 1, the objective of which was to "produce well-trained, hard-hitting, fighting teams." The inclosures to this directive were precise in establishing the knowledge units had to possess before readiness for overseas service.<sup>319</sup>

This directive, constantly amended and added to during 1943 with the principal aim of giving battle realism to training, fixed the preparation of ITP tests as the responsibility of Army or Corps. Under General Hodges the Army took over the job.

By 1 April, these tests were prepared and distributed for almost all arms and services, divisional and non-divisional. Likewise completed were UTP tests, not prescribed by AGF, but which General Hodges believed necessary.<sup>320</sup> These tests were a considerable departure from those previously issued, in that emphasis was placed, not on verbal answers, but on performance. To do -- not to say -- was the system introduced by General Hodges at X Corps and brought to Third Army.

Third Army also distributed its own detailed directive on the conduct of the "D" series for both infantry and cavalry divisions. The purpose of such detail was properly to prepare divisions for the flag exercises and maneuvers to come, to enforce the previously expressed views of General Hodges that these problems were not to be considered a "test" of units, but were "designed to train."<sup>321</sup>

To keep constant check on the progress made by all units toward the goal set forth by the November 1942, AGF letter, the G-3 section established a Test and Inspection Sub-Section. Heretofore inspections, though frequent, had fallen hapazardly to officers not busy at the time. Now a hard and fast, well-controlled schedule went into operation.

#### Inspections:

1. A member of the special staff visited every unit prior to activation. He reported before leaving and upon return, as upon each subsequent visit, to the Chief of Staff, G-1, G-3 and G-4 in order that deficiencies, if such existed, could be corrected promptly. For example, if the unit commanding officer was found unqualified, G-1 would find a replacement; if the unit was short necessary equipment, G-4 would arrange an immediate loan from a neighboring unit.

2. The unit was revisited monthly by a special staff officer. Using a standard inspection form,<sup>322</sup> the inspection covered the unit from top to bottom - shortages of equipment, housekeeping, morale, leadership, training aids, AWOLs, venereal rate, etc. A copy of the completed form was left with the unit commander. Within 24 hours of return

In one of its amendments to the November directive, AGF set up training in individual mine laying, detection and removal, after completion of unit training.<sup>332</sup> Third Army broadened the scope of this training by requiring that it be introduced during ITP, and then it would "be stressed throughout all phases of training."<sup>333</sup> Lesson outlines for this training, prepared by Third Army Engineer, were inclosed.

AGF did not require that a unit, which had completed combined training and had moved to other control be retested in ITP unless "Corps or Army Commanders deem it desirable or advisable."<sup>334</sup> Third Army, however, jealous of its standards, required this test be given, regardless of the training period...regardless of tests previously taken."<sup>335</sup>

AGF required training in operation against permanent land fortifications during combined training.<sup>336</sup> Third Army directed that "individual and small unit training" of this type be "continuous throughout" unit and combined periods.<sup>337</sup>

These expansions of directives from "top-side" were a logical follow-up to the AGF letter which complained that too many unit commanders believed training to be "compartmented," that after completion of ITP, the soldier could "forget" what he had learned.<sup>338</sup> General Hodges impressed on all commanders that training was a continuous process, that what you learned the first day you practiced the second day; the third day gave you a chance to show the previous two days' knowledge.

#### "POM"

A unit's readiness for battle, after all Third Army tests, inspections, and, for many, participation in maneuvers, received its final proofing by "POM."<sup>339</sup>

Almost every day AGF telephoned Troop Movements.

AGF: "What can you give us as a date for the 95th Tank Bn (1)?"

Third Army: "Call you right back, sir."

A quick study of the status cards was made; Third Army set its date, and checked it with the responsible corps or sub-headquarters if it thought necessary.

Third Army to AGF: "We can give you that unit on 1 December."

AGF: "See if you can't move it up to 15 November."

Third Army: "All right, I think we can do that, with a little pushing."

The units concerned automatically went into intensive training; a confidential status report giving all necessary information on personnel, firing, training and equipment was submitted to Third Army three weeks before the readiness date; it was sent to AGF so as to arrive by the readiness date. AGF transferred this information on to War Department. The unit waited for its movement orders.

Monthly inspection impressed on unit commanders that preparing for overseas duties should not and could not be done in a few weeks, but must be a process commencing the day of activation and continuous from that day on. The removal of unqualified or physically disqualified personnel from units, for example, was accomplished by G-1 from the first week on, but Third Army took other measures to hasten the process.

The first and most important step was to designate Senior Tactical Commanders for alerted units. Before General Hodges took command, Army G-1 might handle the units'

personnel difficulties, the nearest division commander its training matters, and sub-headquarters its supply problems.<sup>340</sup> The results were not always efficient. On 4 March, Third Army designated Sub-Headquarters CO as STC for all units assigned or attached to him; the Corps Commander as STC for all units similarly assigned or attached.<sup>341</sup> Following regular command channels made one officer only responsible, instead of three or more. In addition, Third Army:

1. Relieved the critical shortage of carbines by setting up a "pool" of these weapons at every post where Third Army units were stationed, so that record and familiarization firing could be accomplished without delay.

2. Sent an Army IG, equipped with a special alert check list prepared by Third Army<sup>342</sup> to every unit directly after it was alerted. These constant "alerts" put a heavy burden on Army IG, and frequently on the Sub-Headquarters, which operated without one, even though, as required by Army, they maintained an inspection team ready for "alerts."<sup>343</sup> The suggestion of sub-headquarters than an IG be assigned to permanent duty was dismissed as unnecessary by the Chief of Staff.<sup>344</sup>

3. Requested of all units a personnel clearance 48 hours prior to scheduled departure from the home station.<sup>345</sup> This was to prevent last-minute shortages of qualified personnel with which units were particularly plagued.

4. Established a supply policy which reduced to a minimum the possibility of impairment of combat training because of equipment shortages.<sup>346</sup> All units reported at set periods on shortages either of controlled or uncontrolled items; with the exception of certain "critical items," G-4 was able to obtain prompt delivery or arrange temporary loan from another unit. Very few outgoing commanders testified that shortages had hampered training of their units.

5. Periodically sent a "POM" team, composed of representatives of G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, Surgeon and IG, to corps and sub-headquarters to check and, if necessary, oil up the machinery, whereby they processed their alerted units.

#### POM - Third Army:

Throughout the year Third Army Headquarters likewise prepared itself for movement overseas, not in knowledge that such orders were coming but to be fully prepared for that eventuality, so that movement could be swift and efficient.

The SOP, Headquarters Third Army<sup>347</sup> set up an alert and movement plan, laid down the local security measures in black and white, and established procedure for the operation of the Command Post and the Rear Echelon as well as preparation and transmission of orders. Each General and Special Staff Section in turn<sup>348</sup> prepared its own alert and movement plan, and tested that plan by moving, bag and baggage, to the Salado Creek Area a few miles away from the Headquarters Quadrangle and setting up operations there.

A provisional, SOP, Third Army, carried preparations one step further.<sup>349</sup> Its purpose was to "promote understanding and teamwork between the commander, the staff and the troops; to simplify and abbreviate the transmission of orders and execution; and to simplify and perfect the training of troops." Though one of its purposes included "training of troops," the SOP was more properly a guide for action, designed to cover every eventuality in whatever theatre of operations the Army might be engaged. Its four main sections were Intelligence, Operations, Administration, and Supply and Signal Communications, in turn broken down into smaller sub-divisions. This SOP was revised in September 1943, to include changes suggested by lower echelons, on the basis of their experience in maneuvers.

To insure that enlisted personnel were prepared, Headquarters Company put all men through intensive field training, including night marches and bivouacs. All officers and EM began to fire their primary weapon for record and undergo the infiltration and close combat courses.<sup>350</sup> At the year's end all Headquarters personnel were POM qualified.

### Personnel Problems

#### Officer:

From 1 March 1943, the officer strength of the Third Army averaged approximately 25,000, deviating from 1,000 to 2,000 officers per month. Beginning 1 June 1943, requisitions for junior officers were filled promptly by AGF except in certain branches. In general, it was difficult to obtain Medical Corps, Engineer, Chaplains, Ordnance and QM Officers. The shortage in these branches hampered, but in no case prevented, Third Army from supplying required cadre and filler officers for units to be activated, replacements for units being prepared for overseas shipment, and overseas replacements called for by AGF. Supplying officers of other branches for these demands was greatly facilitated by the standing authority from the War Department which allowed all tactical units a 25% overstrength in officers. On 5 November 1943, this overstrength was increased to 50% for field artillery and antiaircraft units, with a like increase for horse cavalry units, on 12 November 1943, in order to absorb surplus junior officers in these branches.

#### Overseas Replacements:

During the period subsequent to 1 March 1943, Third Army supplied an average of 430 officers per month as individual overseas replacements. AGF also requested approximately 100 officers per month by name. An average of two out of every three of these officers were declared available and subsequently transferred to units outside Third Army. In addition, AGF requested an average of 40 officers per month by qualification. A few of the officers in the last two categories were furnished for overseas assignments, but were in addition to the 430 officers per month mentioned above.

Third Army preferred that AGF request officers by specification and experience instead of by name - qualified personnel could then be selected by Army from units where the loss would be the least felt, but of course this was not always possible. At any rate, concurrence of Corps and Divisions was always obtained by Army before Army answered AGF's request. If neither concurred, Army so reported to AGF; sometimes it won, sometimes it lost. AGF had a "must" list and it was hard to remove an officer from it.

During the spring and early part of the summer, 1943, furnishing officers as overseas replacements was a relatively new procedure and few officers were so furnished. Later, demands increased, and during the latter part of the summer and fall, replacements were furnished in groups of 100 to 350 officers. Experience was gained by all echelons in preparing qualified officers for such assignment. Most units assigned to Third Army initially encountered certain difficulties in furnishing officer personnel qualified in all respects under the then current directives. The chief difficulty was the short period of time between the call to furnish such replacements and the date the officers were ordered to overseas replacement depots. This was found to be especially true for Medical Corps officers. Due to the continuous under-strength in this branch, turn-over was exceptionally rapid, and many units failed to prepare these officers for overseas shipment at a sufficiently early date. In order to meet AGF calls, it was proven essential that all officers be immunized, complete qualification and familiarization firing, and similar time-consuming qualifying procedures as soon as possible after assignment to Third Army.

In addition there were frequent hurry calls from AGF to furnish 500, 2,000, 3,000 POM qualified men within five to ten days for overseas replacement depots. Approximately 16,000 were thus requisitioned.

This was a heart-breaking experience for many new divisions, which saw their training seriously curtailed by the movement out of many of their best-qualified men, leaving them under-strength in addition to seriously curtailing all training efforts. Inevitably there were errors in shipment records; physically unqualified men were frequently sent. But the constant complaints from the depots, indorsed by AGF to Army, and then to Corps and division for full investigation, were only partially justified and, in some cases barely at all. It was obviously impossible to grant furloughs to men, in accordance with regulations, when they are due to arrive at the depot in ten days. It became likewise increasingly evident that two doctors seldom agreed on what constituted a "psychoneurotic." In many cases, soldiers reaching the depots discovered themselves ailments which they had never previously made known to the Division Surgeon. Though both Division and Corps tightened their control of such processing of replacements, Third Army was, in most cases, satisfied that under given conditions of time, a good job was being done.

#### Leadership:

General Hodges had always believed and stated that soldiers would carry out all and any orders efficiently and be victorious in battle if the leadership furnished them was informed and aggressive, and if orders were so clearly and decisively given or written as to allow no margin for error. In his letter to General McNair in March 1943,<sup>351</sup> General Hodges had emphasized that the maneuver deficiencies noted by AGF were in large part, traceable to inadequate leadership. He stressed that "more vigorous personal leadership" would be "demanded" and that higher commanders would be instructed to see to it that the training of non-commissioned officers and junior officers especially received their constant attention.

That the Army Commander had seen to the core of the problem was proven when, in compliance with War Department orders, he visited the Fifth Army front in Italy, as an observer, in November, 1943. In his report to General McNair,<sup>352</sup> General Hodges noted that "few division commanders are satisfied with the leadership qualities of a major percentage of their platoon commanders." In his recommendations he declared that, as under Third Army, "greater stress should be placed upon the training of officers and non-commissioned officers as individuals in aggressive leadership and self-reliance in order to develop the proper initiative and ability to meet emergencies encountered in battle."

Under General Hodges' regime, therefore, there was no transfer of unsatisfactory officers to other Third Army units. If officers were misassigned on the basis of civilian and army experience, Third Army naturally shifted them to a position and unit for which they were better fitted. But if unsatisfactory leaders, because of character or temperament traits, they were reclassified at once. There would be, in the words of General Marshall,<sup>353</sup> "no temporizing with incompetence or with the morally unfit." Third Army sent an average of 25 such officers each month to the Eighth Service Command Reclassification Board at Dallas. In addition, an average of six officers per month resigned for the good of the service. Particular attention was paid to the calibre of officers commanding units preparing for overseas movement, and to commanders of negro units who had to have a general efficiency rating of excellent or superior.

Reclassification, General Hodges felt, was "a command rather than an administrative function." He so reported to AGF, requesting that authority to reclassify should be vested in him, who in turn should be authorized to delegate such authority to corps and division commanders in so far as company grade officers were concerned. Officers reclassified would be reported to AGF for disposition.<sup>354</sup>

### Service and Trade Schools:

It was AGF policy to value technical or specialized training as means, but only as means, to the end for which armed forces exist. Modern warfare did demand that there be special knowledge, on the part of the few in order that they could either perform necessary skilled jobs on the battle front or more important, that they could instruct others in their arts.

1. One - sixteenth of Third Army's officer strength was at school at any given time during the year, or to put it another way 6,700 graduated from service schools during the year. In the first part of the year a large number of officers were sent to basic courses; later most of the basic courses were discontinued or the quotas seriously reduced. However, the number of officers sent to advance courses and specialist courses increased throughout the year.

2. Officers graduated from various schools in approximately the number listed below:

Command & General Staff School	470	Military Intelligence School	90
Infantry School	1600	Military Government School	15
Field Artillery School	1350	Special Services School	110
Engineer Schools	650	Chaplains School	20
Medical Schools	500	Air Corps Schools	25
Chemical Warfare School	120	Armored Command School	275
Signal Schools	280	Military Police School	15
Ordnance Schools	900	Adjutant General's School	80
Antiaircraft Artillery School	15	Quartermaster School	30
Civil Affairs	80	Baker & Cooks Schools	30
Tank Destroyer School	200		

3. Approximately 17,000 enlisted men graduated from service and trade schools during the year. Less than one-third of these graduated from AGF Schools, the bulk from Army Service Forces and trade schools.

4. Enlisted men graduated from various schools in approximately the numbers listed below:

Infantry School	1400	Signal Schools	1200
Field Artillery School	1700	Ordnance Schools	6500
Cavalry School	850	Adjutant General's Schools	380
Tank Destroyer School	1000	Baker & Cooks Schools	1600
Armored Command School	350	Quartermaster School	30
Engineer Schools	800	Military Police School	10
Medical Schools	2100	Chemical Warfare School	125

### Special Duties:

Three times during 1943, training of Third Army units was interrupted by emergency missions. On 7 April, Washington telephoned<sup>355</sup> that a "distinguished personage" was "coming through," and that Third Army troops would be responsible for his security and would be inspected by him. It developed, in subsequent telephone conversations and by messengers' word, that Third Army troops would cover all the route inside the VIII Service Command (except Camp Robinson, Arkansas) and the VII Service Command. The route of the "visitor" would be from Camp Robinson to Claremore, Laredo, Corpus Christi, San-Antonio and Trinidad. Three thousand five hundred men were turned over to the VIII Service Command for this detail.<sup>356</sup>

Before the trip was completed, the troops learned that the visitor was their Commander-in-Chief. President Roosevelt not only inspected the 88th Infantry Division at Camp Gruber on 18 April, but also the 89th Infantry Division at Camp Carson, on 24 April. Of the latter inspection the 89th Commanding General Thomas D. Finley, said: "The Chief said he was very much pleased with the demonstration and particularly with the soldierly bearing and fine appearance of the men. Some of the newspapermen said it was the best demonstration they had seen so far."<sup>257</sup>

The second previously unassigned task came in the middle of May when the Red and Arkansas rivers, swollen by unprecedented rains, gushed over their banks, isolating farms and communities, rendering hundreds homeless, and sweeping over thousands of acres of rich farm land. The VIII Service Command, acting on War Department instructions called for and promptly received from Third Army five engineer light pontoon companies, portable water purification units, and wire and communication details. More than 50 officers and 1,000 men<sup>358</sup> served in the stricken area for two or three weeks until the water had sufficiently abated and with it, danger to community life. One officer and six enlisted men from the 508th Engineer Light Ponton Company lost their lives when their boat struck a pier near Salislaw, Oklahoma, and sank.<sup>359</sup>

The land devastated by the flood was urgently needed. An "army marches on its stomach," said Napoleon, and the United States now had many armies to feed. Accordingly, AGF, on 8 June <sup>360</sup> notified Third Army that previous secret instructions were to go into effect and that troops would be furnished to put the fields again to work.

Nineteen companies and two battalions - a total of 4,100 troops in all - were immediately dispatched to the worst-hit areas in Arkansas and Oklahoma. For three to four weeks these units drained ditches, cleared debris, repaired fences, did everything asked by the county agents and farmers.<sup>361</sup> Letters of commendation and thanks to the Army Commander testified that they had done their work well.

#### Strength:

In addition to the constant departure of "spare parts" units from Army to overseas station, there was equally great turnover in corps and divisional units within the Army. The activation of new divisions brought total strength of Army from 382,603, on the day General Hodges took command, to 455,521, an all-time Third Army high, on 31 July 1943. Thereafter, with activation of divisions temporarily ceasing in August, and with movement overseas continuing unabated, strength steadily declined.<sup>362</sup>

During the first nine months, Third Army gained four corps and lost three, gained sixteen divisions and lost twelve.<sup>363</sup> This switching put a heavy burden of administrative detail on Army which had to indoctrinate and "work in" the newcomers to its policy and its tests. There were, for example, 140 letters and directives, most emanating from AGF, others from the War Department, and the rest from Third Army that any unit had to function efficiently.<sup>364</sup>

#### Relationship with other Headquarters:

Corps were purely and simply transmission belts for AGF and Third Army directives - "smaller Armies" in themselves. By the efficiency of the units they trained, by their conduct of tests which Third Army witnessed, were they judged.

Reorganization of Corps in July,<sup>365</sup> did not alter their relationship to any marked degree except in supply matters.

By this reorganization of Corps, Army was to absorb the "maximum of administration:" corps, with generally reduced personnel but with an augmentation section attached for

testing and inspecting units, had the primary function of "close and frequent supervision of training."<sup>366</sup>

Under the new setup, G-4 now by-passed corps on all supply items except controlled equipment, sometimes cutting as much as one week off the travel time of papers from a division to Army. For G-1, the new directive also simplified action greatly. On high-ranking officers requested by AGF, G-1 still received approval of all corps and unit or division commanders before reporting to AGF, but on most other personnel matters, the Section telephoned the units directly.<sup>367</sup>

G-3, however, conducted their business as before. Training and training deficiencies were command functions, and Army still was charged with the general supervision of all units without interfering with the more detailed supervision by subordinate headquarters. Since Army had to have the same knowledge of units' training status and training tests as before, no correspondence by-passed corps.

#### Sub-Headquarters:

The relationship between Army and Sub-Headquarters (discussed earlier) likewise underwent no drastic change. The removal of combat units to corps control - FA, Engr, Tank and TD - however, cut their strength to 34,108,<sup>368</sup> less than one-half their strength at the time General Hodges took command.<sup>369</sup> They were anxious for more troops, but Third Army was powerless to help them.

#### Service Commands:

Third Army had dealings with three service commands: The Fourth (for troops in Mississippi), the Eighth (for troops in Louisiana) (including the maneuver area), Texas, Alabama and Oklahoma, and the Ninth (for troops at Fort Huachuca).

The relationship was a "paper one;" and most of the papers originated with G-4 and concerned supply, construction and repair of roads necessary for troops, and construction of range and training aids, and the necessary coordination of troop movements. G-2 cooperated with the Service Commands (Internal Security Division) in checking suspected subversive cases and in investigating possible racial disturbance. There was a general duplication of investigatory work and occasionally an overlapping of authority, but the demarcation line was always drawn amicably by both commands concerned. Other dealings were of a routine nature: wearing of uniforms (over which, with the exception of the maneuver area, Service Command had control), and driving of maneuvering trucks blacked out through towns in the maneuver area. If a Third Army unit complained of the administration of any post (of an officers' club, for example), Army and Service Command each sent an IG and settled the matter amicably. All matters of this nature were handled expeditiously and in friendly conversation over the telephone by the Chiefs of Staffs of both commands.

#### GOAL AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

There was but one goal to Third Army's day to day conduct of business. General Hodges had announced it many times, and no one in Third Army was permitted to lose sight of it: maximum of fighting efficiency. There was no talk of "this is going to be a short war;" "it'll be over before we get overseas." Units were trained in the belief that they were going over as fighting units, and that each and every man within each unit had an important job to do -- assist in bringing victory to our arms.

Third Army's contribution of well-trained troops, of every branch, to every fighting front, can be measured in part by the figures of troop movements during General Hodges' regime - 16 February 1943 to 25-26 January, 1944.



Movement of troops overseas started slowly. Anti-Submarine warfare was just beginning to meet with success, and shipping was still short. But in July and August of 1943 the alert orders flooded the Headquarters in increasing numbers. By 30 December 1943, Third Army had moved to ports, for direct shipment overseas, a grand total of 208,566 officers and men, including five divisions. The breakdown by arms and services reflects the increasing demand of overseas commands for service troops; Ordnance and QM topped the list.

I	White Personnel	
	Total Number of Units	363
	Officers	7,141
	WOs	453
	Enlisted Men	148,883
	Civilians	15
	Total All White Personnel	
II	Negro Personnel	
	Total Number of Units	74
	*Officers	753
	WOs	43
	Enlisted Men	23,900
		24,696
	* This figure includes White Officers	
	Serving with Negro Troops	24,696
	Total Personnel, White & Negro	181,088
III	Units According to Arm or Service:	
	Cavalry	9
	Chemical	11
	Engineer	59
	Field Artillery	26
	Medical	41
	Quartermaster	78
	Ordnance	80
	Signal	15
	Tank	2
	Corps	1
	TD	6
	MRU	1
	AAA	14
	Armored Division	1
	Infantry Division	3
	Cavalry Division	1
	Reconnaissance Squadron	1
	MP	12
	AB Security Bns	5

Though shipment overseas took precedence, in importance, over domestic troop movements, the latter bulked large in numbers. To the Desert Training Center, for final maneuvers before action abroad, went 91 Third Army units totaling 116,308. They were as follows:

Armored Division	1
Infantry Divisions	5
Engineers	12
Ordnance	12

Quartermaster	11
Medical	28
Chemical	3
Corps Headquarters	1
Signal	3
TD	10
FA	4
Cavalry	1

This was not all. The Amphibian Training Center in Virginia received from Third Army ten more units, totaling 22,602, including the 31st Infantry Division; the Second Army received 11,499 officers and men. Thus, in total, Third Army dispatched from its boundaries of jurisdiction 358,975 troops - or its approximate average strength during the year.

As of 1 January, 1944, with the cross - channel invasion on everybody's mind and in everybody's plans, these movements doubled in speed. Transferred to ports of embarkation from the period 1 to 25 January were 27 units with strength of 12,340. There were, by arm, as follows:

AAA	1
Cavalry	1
Chemical	1
Corps Headquarters	1
Engineer	2
Field Artillery	2
Infantry Regiment	1
Medical	3
MP	1
MRU	1
Ordnance	8
Signal	1
TD	4

The 2d Cavalry Division (Negro) called for on 10 January by AGF in its current status of training, started to move from Fort Clark, Texas, on 20 January. The X Corps left for the CAMA on 12 January, and a detachment of the IX Corps, on 9 January, left the Louisiana Maneuver area for Fort McPherson, Georgia. To take over the responsibilities of the XIX Corps, which moved to a port of embarkation on 7 January, the XXI Corps was activated at Camp Polk on 6 December, 1943. To take over control of X Corps Units and those to be left by the XVIII Corps, scheduled to participate in the Sixth maneuver period, the XXIII Corps was activated at Camp Bowie, Texas.

Transfers to the Second Army were even greater. On 5 January the 1st Sub-Headquarters at Camp Shelby, Miss. and the 8th Sub-Headquarters at Camp Gruber, Okla, together with Third Army units at Camp Chaffee, Ark, left Third Army control. This shift took from Third Army the following Divisions:

16th Armored Division	13,096
42d Infantry Division	15,352
65th Infantry Division	14,666
69th Infantry Division	12,658
TOTAL	55,772

and, in addition, 69 non-divisional units with a strength, at time of transfer, of 25,685. Other transfers, to the Fourth Army, XIII Corps and CAMA increased this figure to 26,961. At the close of the Fifth maneuver period, on 24 January, Third Army lost

two more divisions - the 89th Light Division (strength: 9,210) to Camp Hunter Liggett, Calif, and the 97th Infantry Division (strength: 11,566) to the Second Army.

While hundreds of troop trains were moving, the Army was preparing to ship still more. Alerted on 22 December, for readiness on 25 January, 1944, were seventy-four non-divisional units with strength of 16,765. These units were of the following branch:

AAA	4
Armored	3
Engineer	5
Field Artillery	6
Medical	23
Military Police	1
Ordnance	13
Quartermaster	17
Signal	1
Tank Destroyer	1

In the midst of the preparation to "Pom-ize" these units, Third Army received the telephone call it had so long been waiting for. At 0830, the morning of 1 January, AGF informed the Army its readiness date was 15 February. It was to leave at T/O strength; plus a CIC detachment of three officers and thirteen enlisted men.

There were no tremendous preparations necessary. The majority of officers and enlisted men were well on their way to completing POM requirements; equipment was in good shape, and most of it marked as required. Pistol qualification, infiltration, carbine familiarization, close combat training, malaria control lectures, and chemical training were quickly completed at Fort Sam Houston and the Louisiana maneuver area; by 15 January the Headquarters was "POR" and "POM" to the last man. On 12 January the advance detachment, comprised of thirteen officers and twenty-six enlisted men, left for the port.

Meanwhile the Fourth Army, designated to assume Third Army's responsibilities, had arrived in force by 20 January to become acquainted with the complex machinery which, for ten months, had made the Third Army run so successfully. The Fourth Army actually closed at the Presidio of Monterey and opened at Fort Sam Houston on 15 January, but it was not until midnight, 25-26 January, that Third Army turned over all its troops to its successor.

A look at consolidated figures gave everybody working under General Hodges a sincere feeling of pride and accomplishment. During eleven months, Third Army had moved overseas or checked for overseas movement a total of 268,319 officers and enlisted men; it had furnished to replacement depots, in addition, 4,740 officers, and 16,000 enlisted men taken from non-alerted units; it had moved to other commands within the United States 231,316 troops which it had trained and which would soon be making the voyage for the real and final test of skill. The grand total of 520,375 troops moved gave the Third Army a true picture of its accomplishments. What gave the Third Army an added feeling of satisfaction was that no matter to what theatre it moved, no matter what its future role in the decisive operations to come, it was bound to have under its command many of the officers and men for whose training and skill in battle it had been responsible.

E-N-D

1. WD ltr to CGs Corps Areas and Depts, 9 Aug 32, sub: Establishment of Field Armies. 320.
2. Pars 1 and 2, GO 1, Third Field Army, Ft Sam Houston, Tex, 15 Sep 32. 320.
3. Par 3, ibid.
4. WD ltr to CGs of the Four Field Armies, 22 Oct 32, sub: Development of the Four Field Armies. 320.
5. Ibid.
6. WD Directive to CGs Armies and Corps Areas; Comdt, AWC; Assts CofS, WDGS, 6 Feb 33, sub: Development of the Four Army Orgn. 320.
7. Third Army ltr and inds to TAG, 28 Feb 34, sub: Shoulder Insignia, Third Army. 421.
8. CPX Memo 4 and Amendments, Vol I, Third Army CPX 1936. 354.2.
9. Item 23, ibid.
10. Annex 8, Vol VII, Third Army CPX, 1936. 354.2.
11. Introduction to Vol I, Book I, Third Army Maneuver Rpt, 1938. 354.2.
12. Mimeo copy of personal ltr, Gen Moseley to Col Edmund B. Gruber, Office of ACofS WD, 16 Sep 37, incorporated into par 13, Vol I, Book I, Third Army Maneuver Rpt, 1938. 354.2.
13. Par 15, Vol I, Book I, Third Army Maneuver Rpt, 1938. 354.2.
14. Ibid.
15. Par 11, Vol I, Book I, Third Army Maneuver Rpt, 1938. 354.2.
16. Par 25, ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Introduction to Vol I, Book I, Third Army Maneuver Rpt, 1938. 354.2.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Sec V, Vol I, Rpt Third Army Maneuvers, May 5-25, 1940, Sabine Area. 354.2.
25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Annex 8, Vol II, Annexes to Rpt, Third Army Maneuvers, May 5-25, 1940, Sabine Area. 354.2.
30. Sec V, Vol I, Rpt, Third Army Maneuvers, May 5-25, 1940, Sabine Area. 354.2.
31. Comments of Lt Gen S. D. Embick at final critique, Annex 21, Vol II, Annex to Rpt, Third Army Maneuvers, May 5-25, 1940, 354.2.
32. Comments of Maj Gen Walter Krueger, CG IX Corps, at final critique. Ibid.
33. Comments of Maj Gen H. J. Brees of Eighth Corps Area at final critique. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Annex 31, Vol II, Annex to Rpt, Third Army Maneuvers, May 5-25, 1940. 354.2.
39. Appendix I, Rpt Third Army Maneuvers, August 1940. 354.2.
40. Sec V, ibid.
41. App 7, ibid.
42. Sec V, ibid.
43. App 15, ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Third Army GO 1, 1 Oct 40.
47. WD ltr to Chiefs of Arms and Servs, CGs all Armies, Army Corps, Divs, Corps Areas and Depts, COs of Exempted Stas, and CofS GHQ, 3 Oct 40, sub: Orgn, Tng and Adm of the Army. 320.2.
48. WD ltr to Chiefs of Arms and Servs, CGs all Armies, Army Corps, Divs, Corps Areas and Depts, COs of Exempted Stas, and the CofS GHQ, 19 Oct 40, sub: Change in Dir on Orgn, Tng and Adm. 320.2.
49. Statement of Lt Gen Herbert J. Brees (ret) to Lt F. G. Smith, Hist Off, 1 Dec 43. Hist Off file.

50. Third Army GO 34, 11 Nov 40.
51. Ibid.
52. Third Army GO 35, 23 Nov 40.
53. WD ltr to CGs all Armies, Army Corps, Corps Areas and Depts, Divs; CofS GHQ, Chiefs of Arms and Servs, and COs of Exempted Stas, 7 Oct 40, sub: Tact Groupings of Divs and Corps in large tact units and Groupings of CA Districts for the purpose of tng and tac control. 320.2.
54. Ltr of Lt Gen H. J. Brees to Maj Gen L. J. McNair, 30 Oct 40. Orig in AGF files; cpy in Hist file.
55. Ibid.
56. Third Army GO 36, 23 Nov 40.
57. Statement of Lt Gen Herbert J. Brees (ret), 1 Dec 43. See reference 49.
58. Ltr of Lt Gen H. J. Brees to Maj Gen L. J. McNair, 11 Jan 41. See reference 54.
59. Statement of Lt Gen H. J. Brees (ret), 1 Dec 43. See reference 49.
60. Ltr of Maj Gen L. J. McNair to Lt Gen H. J. Brees, 24 Oct 40.
61. Ltr of Lt Gen H. J. Brees to Maj Gen L. J. McNair, 30 Oct 40.
62. Ltr of Maj Gen L. J. McNair to Lt Gen H. J. Brees, 24 Oct 40. See ref 9.
63. Ltr of Maj Gen L. J. McNair to Lt Gen H. J. Brees, 22 Nov 40. Ibid.
64. Ltr of Maj Gen L. J. McNair to Lt Gen H. J. Brees, 24 Oct 40. Ibid.
65. Ltr of Lt Gen H. J. Brees to Maj Gen L. J. McNair, 30 Nov 40. Ibid.
66. Ltr of Maj Gen L. J. McNair to Lt Gen H. J. Brees, 5 Dec 40. Ibid.
67. Third Army GO 4, 16 Jan 41.
68. Third Army GO 7, 1 Feb 41.
69. Third Army GO 9, 21 Feb 41.
70. Third Army GO 20, 15 May 41.
71. Third Army GO 21, 16 May 41.
72. Third Army GO 25, 2 Jul 41.
73. Third Army GO 32, 9 Aug 41.
74. Serial No 1, Third Army Critiques and Critique Notes, Maneuvers, 1941. 354.2.
75. Ibid.

76. Serial No 2, ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Serial No 3, ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Serial No 4, ibid.
82. Serial No 5, ibid.
83. Serial No 6, ibid.
84. Serial No 7, ibid.
85. Serial No 9, ibid.
86. Serial No 11, ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Serial No 13, ibid.
93. Third Army GO 28, 1 Aug 41.
94. Third Army GO 24, 2 Jan 40.
95. Interview of Lt F. G. Smith, Jr. Hist Off, with Brig Gen Loyal M. Haynes, CofS Southern Defense Comd, 3 Dec 43, Hist file.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Serial No 24, Third Army Critiques and Critique Notes, Maneuvers, 1941. (Clipping from Army & Navy Journal, 11 Oct 41).
99. Serial No 14, ibid.
100. Serial No 18, ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Serial No 22, ibid.

103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. (1) This interpretation, to the extent that it suggests a triumphant Third Army entering Shreveport in overwhelming force at the close of the maneuver, is at variance with statements contained in sources not available at Third Army Headquarters when the narrative was prepared. The maneuver closed on Sunday, 28 September. On Saturday night, Gen. McNair, who was on the scene and in close touch with operations, telegraphed Gen Marshall: "In spite of vigorous advance by Third Army, it still is not in a position to launch a coordinated attack." On Sunday night Gen McNair reported to Gen Marshall: "The maneuvers ended at 4:45 o'clock ... with the Blues in a position from which a coordinated attack could be launched in about one more day ... When the maneuver ended, scattered detachments had entered the outskirts of Shreveport." Telgs of Gen McNair to Gen Marshall, 27-28 Sep 41. GHQ 353/565 (Third Army). (2) The Second Army G-2, reporting the operation to Gen Lear after the maneuver ended, stated that the nearest main body of Third Army troops was over forty miles by highway from Shreveport when the problem was terminated. G-2 Rpt on 1941 Maneuvers. Second Army G-2 files.
106. Serial No 24, Third Army Critiques and Critique Notes, Maneuvers, 1941. (Clipping from Army & Navy Journal, 11 Oct 41).
107. Ibid.
108. Serial No 23, ibid.
109. Serial No 24, ibid. (Clipping from Army & Navy Journal, 11 Oct 41).
110. Ibid.
111. Third Army GO 41, 17 Oct 41.
112. Ltr (C) of Gen Marshall to Gen Brees, 7 May 41. GofS files (C), No 2.
113. Ltr (C) of Gen Marshall to Gen Krueger, 4 Sep 41. CofS file (C), No 1.
114. Ltr (C) of Gen Krueger to Gen Marshall, 12 Sep 41. Ibid.
115. Ltr (C) of Gen Krueger to CGs IV, V and VIII Corps; 1st Cav Div; 56th Cav Brig; AATC, Cp Hulen, Tex; and AATC, Ft Bliss, Tex, 14 Nov 41. CofS file (C), No 2.
116. Third Army 1st ind, ltr, sub; Request for Data for Third Army History, to TAG, Washington DC, 2 Dec 43. AG 314.7.
117. Record of telephone conversation (S) between Gen Somervell, G-4 WD, and Gen Krueger at 9:30 PM 11 Dec 41. Telephone files, CofS (S).
118. Record of telephone conversation (S) between CofS Third Army and Gen Clark, DCOFS GHQ, 10 Dec 41. Ibid.
119. Record of telephone conversation (S) between CofS Third Army and Gen Cox, 9 Dec 41. Ibid.
120. Ibid.



121. 8th Svc GO 73, 8 Sep 42; 99th Div GO 1, 15 Nov 42; Third Army ltr AG 320.2-Gen-GNMCA-4, 31 Dec 42; WD ltr AG 320.2 (11-19-42)OB-I, 19 Nov 42; Sec III, Third Army GO 102, 10 Sep 42; Third Army GO 86, 8 Aug 42; Third Army GO 73, 9 Jul 42; Third Army GO 30, 25 Mar 42; Third Army GO 36, 8 Apr 42; Third Army GO 54, 23 May 43; Third Army GO 47, 2 May 42; Third Army GO 134, 19 Dec 42.
122. GO 11, 11 Feb 42. AG Files 300.4 - GO.
123. GO 16, 18 Feb 42. Ibid.
124. WD 1st ind, 19 Nov 43, on Third Army ltr AG 330.32-GNMCP, 9 Nov 43, sub: Str Rpts, 1942. Hist files.
125. Third Army GO 94, 1942. AG 300.4 - GO.
126. Interview of Hist Off with Col W. W. Carr, AG Third Army, 25 May 43. Hist files.
127. Record of telephone conversations (C) between CG VIII Corps and CofS Third Army, 13 Jan 42. Telephone conversation files, CofS (C).
128. Record of telephone conversation (S) between CG 38th Div and CofS Third Army, 3:45 PM 14 Jan 42. Telephone conversation files, CofS (S).
129. Record of telephone conversation (C) between CofS Third Army and CofS AGF, 8:00 AM, 2 May 42. Telephone conversation files, CofS (C).
130. AGF ltr (C) 320.2/3 (AGF)-GNOPN/02187, 21 May 42, sub: Orgn of Comd of Army and GHQ Trs. AG confidential files.
131. Third Army GO 68, 17 Jun 42, AG 300.4 - GO.
132. Sources not accessible at Third Army Headquarters show that two provisional headquarters had previously been established by Second Army to supervise "spare parts" at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and Fort Custer, Michigan. The Fort Knox detachment was established in February 1942 and the Fort Custer detachment in April. 201 files of Col Mack Carr and Col George Byers. Second Army AG Records. (2) Army Ground Forces Headquarters on 21 May 1942 formally authorized the setting up of provisional headquarters for supervision of "spare parts" training by Second Army, Third Army, II Corps, and VII Corps. 322 (Hq and Hq Det Sp Trs) for each of these comds. AGF AG Records (Class).
133. Ltr Prov Hq Third Army Trs 320.2-GNMCP, 14 Aug 42, sub: Preliminary Rpt on Opns of Prov Hq and Hq Det Third Army Trs. AG 320.2, 1942.
134. Third Army ltr AG 320.2 Hq Third Army-GNMCF, 30 Dec 42, sub: Hq and Hq Dets Sp Trs Third Army. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. Third Army GO 44, 1942. AG 300.4 - GO.
137. Third Army GO announcing staff appointments, 1941-42. AG files.
138. Third Army ltr AG 352.9-K, 8 Apr 42, sub: Third Army Tng Center. Ibid.

- 139. Ibid.
- 140. Third Army ltr, 16 Mar 42, sub: Activation of Third Army Tng Center. Hist file.
- 141. Third Army Tng Memo 1, 19 Feb 42. Hist file.
- 142. Typical Sp Sch Rpt JOTC. Hist file.
- 143. Press release, Third Army, 15 Apr 42. PRO files.
- 144. Ibid.
- 145. See 1st ind to ltr in Note 138.
- 146. Third Army ltr AG 352-Gen, 20 Mar 42, sub: First Course, Prisoner of War (PW) Interrogation Sch -- German. Hist files.
- 147. Rpt on the IV Army Corps Sch for Interrogators of PWs (German), 8 Mar 42. Hist files.
- 148. See Note 146.
- 149. Third Army ltr G-2 Sec, 21 Apr 42; Rpt, IPW Sch, 13 May 43; Recommendations for WD IPW Sch, 17 Jun 43. Hist files.
- 150. See Note 149; also Tng Plan and Schedule, Third Army IPW Sch. Hist files.
- 151. Memo of Maps and Tng Off for G-2, 24 May 42. Hist files.
- 152. See Note 149.
- 153. WD ltr, 1 Jul 42, sub: Orders. AG 210.63. Record of telephone conversation between CofS Third Army and Comdt MITC, 24 Jul 42. Telephone conversation file, CofS, 1942.
- 154. Ibid.; also record of telephone conversation between Comdt MITC and G-2 Third Army, 25 Jul 42. Hist files.
- 155. Third Army Tng Memo 2, 28 Feb 42. Hist files.
- 156. Third Army Tng Memo 3, 13 Mar 42. Ibid.
- 157. Third Army Tng Memo 14, 26 May 42. Ibid.
- 158. Annex 2, Tng Memo 15; Tng Memo 15 proper; Tng Memos 16, 18 and 20. Ibid.
- 159. Record of telephone conversation (C) between CofS Third Army and CofS GHQ, 2 Mar 42. Telephone conversation files, CofS (C).
- 160. Critique C-7, Problem 10, VIII Corps maneuvers, 19 Sep 42. G-3 files.
- 161. AGF ltrs 354.2-GNGCT, 27 Sep, 31 Oct, 8 Nov, and 12 Nov 42, sub: Phases C-6-7-9. IV Corps Maneuvers, Phase C-6, VIII Corps Maneuvers. AG 354.2.
- 162. Critique, FW 1, 6 Aug 42. G-3 files.

- 163. Ibid.
- 164. Ibid.
- 165. Critique, FM 2, 11 Aug 42. G-3 files.
- 166. Ibid.
- 167. Critique, FM 3, 16 Aug 42. Ibid.
- 168. Ibid.
- 169. Critique, FM 6, 31 Aug 42. Ibid.
- 170. Ibid.
- 171. Critique, FM 8, 7 Sep 42. Ibid.
- 172. Critique, FM 10, 17 Sep 42. Ibid.
- 173. AGF ltr (R) 354.2/29(La)-GNGCT, 19 Nov 42, sub: Air-Ground CPXs, La Maneuver Area, Dec 1-15, 1942. AG 354.2.
- 174. Ibid.
- 175. Third Army ltr AG 354.2-Maneuvers, 1942 OGNMCC(4), 21 Dec 42, sub: Rpt of Air-Ground CPX. Ibid.
- 176. Ibid.
- 177. Critique, Air-Ground CPX, 12 Dec 42. Ibid.
- 178. Ibid.
- 179. WD ltr AG 320.2 OB-I-GN-M, 17 Dec 42. AG 320.2.
- 180. WD ltr (C) WD 370.5 OB-S-E-M, sub: Movement Orders, Shipment \*\*\*\*, 20 Dec 42. AG files (C).
- 181. WD TWX 340 (S), 30 Jan 43. AG files (S).
- 182. Third Army GO 17, 16 Feb 43.
- 183. Statement of Gen Hodges to Hist Off, 3 Jun 43. Third Army Hist file.
- 184. For methods used to attain this goal see pp 135-147.
- 185. For original general staff picked by General Hodges see Appendix, Exhibit I.
- 186. AGF ltr to CGs Second and Third Armies, 17 Dec 42, sub: Maneuvers -- Feb to Aug 43. 354.2.
- 187. AGF ltr, 9 Oct 42, sub: Tng Dir Effective Nov11, 42. 353.
- 188. AGF ltr, 3 Feb 43, sub: Estimated Tr Str on 1943 Maneuvers. 354.2/8.

189. See reference Note 186.
190. Memo of G-4 Sec Third Army for Gen Honnen CofS Third Army, 7 Jan 43. G-3 files 354.2.
191. Memo of G-3 Third Army for Gen Honnen, CofS Third Army, 29 Dec 43. Ibid.
192. Record of telephone conversation between Gen Honnen and Gen Parks, CofS AGF. CofS files.
193. Record of telephone conversation between Gen Parks and Gen Honnen. Ibid.
194. Ibid.
195. Record of telephone conversation between Col George Decker, DCofS Third Army and Gen Dan I. Sultan, CG VIII Corps, 21 Jan 43. Ibid.
196. Third Army VOOG. No orders published.
197. Third Army ltr to CG Eighth SvC, 2 Jan 43, sub: Laundry and Shoe Repair Rqmts, 43 Maneuvers, with ind. 354.2.
198. Statement of Col James A. Anding, G-4 Third Army to Hist Off, Mar 43. The Minimum figure represents gasoline used in maneuver "breaks," the maximum when a problem is in full play.
199. See Note 186.
200. Third Army ltr, 27 Dec 42, sub: Tentative Plan of Sup for Third Army Maneuvers Feb to Aug 43, and AGF 1st ind to CG Third Army, 14 Jan 43. 354.2.
201. AGF ltr to CG Third Army, 14 Jan 43, sub: Establishment of Base Depots for the 1943 Third Army Maneuvers. Ibid.
202. Third Army Maneuver Memo 1, with Annexes, 1 Jan 43. Ibid.
203. Third Army ltr, to CG AGF, 20 Dec 43, sub: QM Serv Units for 43 Maneuvers, and AGF 1st ind to CG Third Army, 3 Jan 43. Ibid.
204. AGF ltr to Third Army, 8 Jan 43, sub: Air Spt for 43 Maneuvers. Ibid.
205. Third Army ltr to CG Second Air Force, 26 Dec 43, sub: Air Spt, Third Army Maneuvers, 43, and three inds thereto. Ibid.
206. Third Army ltr to AGF, 7 Jan 43, sub: Rpt of Air Spt for First Maneuver Period (Feb 1 to Mar 28, 43). Ibid.
207. Memo of Col Charles R. Lehner, QM Third Army for G-4 Third Army, 31 Dec 42. (Incls w/d). The memos for maneuvers 1 Apr thru 12 Jun 43, atchd, were the same, with exceedingly minor changes, to those previously approved and in effect for the first maneuver period. QM files 354.2.
208. Third Army ltr to San Antonio QM Depot, 29 Dec 42, sub: Tr Str and Menu Schedules, 1943 Maneuvers, with one incl. 354.2.

- 209. Memo, G-3 Third Army to CofS Third Army, 23 Dec 42. G-3 file 354.2.
- 210. Memo, G-3 Third Army to Staff Sec Chiefs Third Army, 23 Dec 42. Ibid.
- 211. List of Dir Hq Pers, 29 Jan 43. Ibid (file 2).
- 212. Statement of WOJG Cy Long Jr to Hist Off, 1 Nov 43.
- 213. Third Army Dir Hq unnumbered memo, 1st Maneuver Period Scenario - First Phase, 1-14 Feb. G-3 file 354.2.
- 214. Interview of Hist Off with Lt Col Robert S. Allen, Asst G-2 Third Army, 1 Nov 43. Hist file.
- 215. AGF ltr to Third Army, 25 Feb 43, sub: Visit to Maneuvers. 354.2.
- 216. Third Army 1st ind on above ltr, 25 Mar 43. 354.2.
- 217. Summary of operations, Second Phase, First Maneuver Period, by Col Philip Thurber, Deputy Director. G-3 file 354.2.
- 218. Remarks by Maj Gen Henry Terrell, CG 90th Mtz Div at Critique, Second Phase First Maneuver Period. Ibid.
- 219. Ibid.
- 220. Ibid.
- 221. Ibid.
- 222. Critique by Maj Gen Dan I. Sultan, Director Second Phase First Maneuver Period. Ibid.
- 223. Memo of Gen Sultan for Gen Hodges, 19 Mar 43. Hist Off file.
- 224. See Signal Corps photographs, following pages.
- 225. "Deficiencies and Commendations, Second Phase, Third Army Maneuvers," publication of Third Army Dir Hq. G-3 files 354.2.
- 226. AGF ltr to Third Army, 24 Feb 43, sub: Emerg Sup by Air. AGF 401/138. (Third Army 354.2).
- 227. Third Army 1st ind to AGF, 22 Apr 43, on above ltr. 354.2.
- 228. AGF ltr to Third Army, 23 Mar 43, sub: Visit to Maneuvers. 353.02.
- 229. AGF ltr to Third Army, 12 Jan 43, sub: Participation of Units, Maneuvers-Feb to Aug 43. 354.2.
- 230. AGF ltr to Third Army, 4 Feb 43, sub as above. Ibid.
- 231. Record of telephone conversation between Maj Michalak, Asst G-3 Third Army and Cor Wyrick, Dir Hq Third Army, 23 Feb 43. G-3 file 354.2.

232. Summary of operations, Third Phase First Maneuver Period, Critique, Third Army Maneuvers. G-3 (opns) file.
233. Ibid.
234. "Deficiencies and Commendations, Third Phase, First Maneuver Period," Critique Third Army Maneuvers. G-3 file 354.2.
235. Interview of Hist Off with WOJG Cy Long Jr, PRO Sec Third Army, 1 Nov 43.
236. Critique - Maj Gen R. B. Woodruff, Third Army Maneuvers, Cp Polk, La, 28 Mar 43. G-3 file 354.2.
237. Remarks of Maj Gen Dan I. Sultan, Critique Third Phase, La Maneuvers, 14-28 Mar. G-3 (opns) file.
238. Ibid.
239. See Note 232.
240. Ibid.
241. Personal ltr of Gen Sultan to Gen Hodges, 29 Mar 43. Hist Off file.
242. ACF ltr to Third Army, 12 Apr 43, sub: Visit to Third Phase, Third Army Exercises. 354.2/61.
243. ACF ltr, sub: Initial Performances of New Divs at Maneuvers. 354.2/56.
244. ACF ltr to various comds, 8 Feb 43, sub: Transfer of Corps Units. 370.5.
245. IV Corps TWX to Third Army, 4 Mar 43. Hist Off files.
246. WD ltr to Third Army, 6 Feb 43, sub: Ordering into Active Serv Hq & Hq Co, XV Corps, in Feb 43. 320.2.
247. Third Army ltr to XV Corps, 9 Mar 43, sub: Conduct of Second Period, Third Army Maneuvers. 354.2.
248. Record of telephone conversation between Col Harding, ACF and Maj Pester, Asst G-3 Third Army, 24 and 27 Feb. G-3 file, telephone conversations 354.2.
249. See Note 190. First public reports of 100th Infantry in combat on the Italian front, appearing in the press late in October 1943, were highly commendatory.
250. This visit was highly successful as evidenced by stories appearing in the press, and the letter written to Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, at the close of the tour. (For full summary, see rpt of Col William DeWare, PRO, to CG Third Army, 13 May 43. CofS personal files).
251. Third Army ltr, 10 Mar 43, sub: List of Units for Second Period 43 Maneuvers. Gen dist. 354.2.
252. Second Maneuver Period Scenario, Field Exercise, 12-22 April, 85th Infantry Division (Reinforced)(BLUE). Dir Hq G-3 files.

253. Critique by Gen Hodges, La Maneuver Area, 6 Jul 43. CG's file.
254. Memo of Gen Lear for Gen Haislip, 13 May 43. CofS file - Gen.
255. AGF ltr to Third Army, 31 May 43, sub: Visit to Eighth Phase, Third Army Exercises. 354.2.
256. Critique of Ninth Phase, Third Army Maneuvers, 15-19 May 43. G-3 (opns) file.
257. Critique, Gen Haislip. Ibid.
258. Personal memo of Gen Lear for Gen Haislip. See Critique, Twelfth Phase Second Maneuver Period. G-3 (Opns) file.
259. Third Army 3d ind to AGF, sub: Rpt of Air Spt for Third Army Maneuver, Nov 2; and Chart, Air Ln Off, Third Army. Hist Off file.
260. Par 10, AGF Wkly Dir 11, 16 Mar 43.
261. Third Army ltr to AGF, 30 Jun 43, sub: Rpt on Interrogation of PW Teams Asgd to Third Army During Second Maneuver Period. 382.6.
262. Memo of Maj J. M. McKeand, G-3 Sec Third Army to Maj Dawson, G-3 Sec Third Army. G-3 file 354.2.
263. Record of conversation between Maj Dawson, G-3 Sec Third Army and Col Pressley, G-3 Sec AGF, 26 Apr 43. Ibid.
264. Memo of Capt Hilliard, G-3 Sec Third Army for Ex O, G-3. Ibid.
265. Third Army Dir Hq ltr to Third Army, 7 Jun 43, sub: Maneuver Participation Rpt of 85th Div. 354.2
266. This summary is a compilation of remarks made to the Historical Officer by four Third Army officers serving with Director Headquarters at the time. Two of the officers did not agree with the unsatisfactory rating given. Admitting that the 85th was the superior division, they said that its superiority was not so marked as the ratings indicated.
267. Third Army Dir Hq ltr to Third Army, 7 Jun 43, sub: Maneuver Participation Rpt of 93d Div. 354.2.
268. AGF ltr to Third Army, sub: Transfer of 93d Div to Desert Training Center (DTC). AGF ltr (R) 370.5/(85th Div) (GNGCT)(5-22-43) to Third Army, 22 May 43, sub: Transfer of 85th Div to DTC. 370.5 At the end of the second period, General Hodges had published instructions for the use of the command "Stand to." This command, which General Hodges remembered well in the First World War but which disappeared from military usage shortly afterwards, was to be employed by commanders to make inspection of the tactical disposition of troops in a strategic position, either on the defensive in assembly area or temporarily halted on the march; or to quickly alert such troops for orders for movement. See Maneuver Memo 27, 29 Jul 43. 354.2.
269. See Note 192.
270. The III Armored Corps, with headquarters at Camp Polk, Louisiana, and with principal units the 8th and 11th Armored Divisions joined Third Army of telephone conversation between Col Coyle, G-3 Sec AGF and Gen Davis, CofS Third Army, 27 Apr 43. CofS file No. 2.

271. Record of telephone conversation between Col Coyle, G-3 Sec AGF and Gen Davis, CofS Third Army, 27 Apr 43. CofS file No 2.
272. Record of telephone conversation between Col Dunne, G-3 Sec AGF and Gen Davis, 29 Apr 43. Ibid.
273. Record of telephone conversation between Col Ryan, G-3 Third Army and Col Coyle, 7 May 43. Neither files nor conversations with key Third Army personnel give clues as to why AGF, which previously had approved participation of all four corps, now so strongly favored participation of one corps only. G-3 file 354.2 (file 2).
274. Third Army GO 58, 8 Jun 43.
275. Third Army ltr to all trs, 15 May 43, sub: Third Maneuver Period, La Maneuvers, 28 Jun-23 Aug 43. 354.2.
276. Record of telephone conversation with Gen Davis, CofS Third Army, 1 Jul 43. Telephone conversations, CofS file 2.
277. G-3 AGF favored the flag exercises but felt strongly that they should be part of the D-Series. Third Army's contention, borne out by division commanders' testimony, was that AGF allowed no time in the D-Series for such exercises. Without them, the divisions were coming to maneuvers unprepared. See conversation of Col Ryan G-3 Third Army and Col Grant A. Schlieker, DCoS Third Army, 12 May 43. G-3 telephone conversation files 354.2 (2).
278. Critique by Maj Gen Willis D. Crittenberger, Comdg Blue Forces, 14 Jul 43. G-3 (opns) file.
279. Third Army ltr to AGF, 18 Aug, sub: March of 351st Inf. 353-Gen.
280. 201-Champeney, AS(0) 23 Aug 43 GNGCT to Third Army, 23 Aug 43, sub: March of 351st Inf. Col Champeney's 201 file; Hist Off file.
281. See p 67, issue Nov 43.
282. Critique by Gen Hodges, 14 Jul 43. CG's file.
283. Critique by Gen Crittenberger, same date. G-3 (opns) file.
284. 75,000 mines were made available for use in the maneuver area, as compared with 5,000 in 1942, and infantry troops received valuable experience in this comparatively new and deadly defensive weapon. Engineer troops clearing the fields used regulation detectors; umpires were particularly scrupulous in assessing casualties. Interview of Hist Off with Lt Col Foley, Asst Eng Off Third Army, 13 Nov 43. Hist file.
285. AGF ltr to Third Army, 4 Aug 43, sub: Visit to Third Army Exercises, 24-26 Jul 43. 354.2.
286. Only known exception was during the second phase, when the X Corps retreated so fast as to rob the maneuver of its training value. General Hodges at that time ordered the Corps to "stand to and fight," an order which an Army Commander might be expected to make, in combat, to any Corps Commander.
287. Critique, Maj Gen John Sloan. G-3 (opns) file.



288. Ibid.
289. In this phase the first in which an armored division had crossed the Sabine, the III Armored Corps troops marched 1,750,000 man miles; its 8,449 vehicles traveled 1,436,500 miles, consuming 140,000 gallons of gasoline. Critique by Gen Crittenberger, Sixth Phase. Ibid.
290. Ibid.
291. (No note shown)
292. Through General Hodges noted that camouflage was the "most efficient" of maneuvers to that date, he pointed out that "the camoufler thinks of the airplane as being directly overhead and forgets that 95% of air observations are made from an angle, with the plane anywhere from one-quarter to two-miles distant from the point being observed. A simple covering, preventing vertical identification, is never enough." Critique by Gen Hodges. G-3 (opns) file.
293. On arrival back in Washington, General McNair wrote to General Hodges: "Thanks very much for another fine visit to the maneuvers. I enjoyed every bit of it personally. You certainly have made a lot of progress and I know that units which go through your setup there will learn a great deal and be improved in every way. The usual letter of comment will come along in due time, but I can foresee nothing serious ... with best regards always and more power to you in your fine constructive efforts." CG's file.
294. Critique, Seventh Phase, 14 Aug 43.
295. Third Army ltr AG 353-GNMCM, 7 Aug 43, sub: Credit for Massed Arty Fire in Maneuvers.
296. AGF ltr 461 (FM 105-5)(& Aug 43)GNGCT, 14 Sep 43.
297. Critique, Eighth Phase.
298. Rpt of Gen A. W. Hickey, Jr, CO 54th AAA Brig to CG Third Army. G-3 files 353.
299. Third Army ltr to AGF, 15 Sep 43, sub: Rpt of Air Spt, Third Period, Third Army Maneuvers. 354.2.
300. See Note 257.
301. AGF ltr to Third Army, 23 Aug 43, sub: Transfer of 31st Inf Div. 370.5.
302. WD ltr (C) 370.5(11 Oct 43))B-S-E-M, 13 Oct 43, sub: Movement Orders, Shipment 8629.
303. Rpt of AG to CofS Third Army, 22 Feb 43. CofS telephone file No 2.
304. Third Army ltr -GNMCG, sub: Hq and Hq Dets Sp trs Third Army. 320.2.
305. AGF ltr to all comds, 18 Mar 43, sub: Plan for Activating Nondiv Units. 320.2.
306. This check list was entirely of Third Army origin, though AGF officially approved use of check list as "invaluable." See AGF ltr, 3 Mar 43, sub: Check Lists. 353.

- 307. Third Army ltr, 13 Apr 43, sub: Co Adm.
- 308. Record of telephone conversation between CofS Third Army and Col F. R. Lafferty, 3d Sub-Hq, 19 Feb 43. CofS files.
- 309. So frequently were Army Regulations, Circulars, and Directives changed and amended that it became impossible to keep the Administrative Check List printed up to date. It was subsequently discarded, and replaced by twelve mimeographed check lists, covering key records, and more easily correctible. See Third Army ltr, 2 Nov 43, sub: Adm. 320.2.
- 310. See record of conversation between CofS Third Army and Col Swab, CO 4th Sub-Hq, 7 Jun 43. CofS telephone file No 2.
- 311. See summary prepared for CofS. Hist Off file.
- 312. Record of telephone conversation between Gen McNair and Gen Hodges, 4 Jun 43. Hist file.
- 313. Third Army SO 55, 28 May 43.
- 314. AGF ltr to Third Army, 18 Sep 43, sub: Visit to Cp Maxey, Cp Howse and Ft Clark, 1-4 Sep. 353.
- 315. AGF ltr to Third Army, 4 Aug 43, sub: Visit to Cp Polk, Livingston and Claiborne, 27-28 Jul 43. Ibid.
- 316. AGF ltr, 12 Jul 43, sub: Visit to Cp Carson, 24-25 Jun, and Ft Bliss, 3 Jun. Ibid.
- 317. Ibid.
- 318. Third Army GOs 38, 1 Apr 43; 71, 16 Jul 43; and 129, 13 Nov 43, respectively.
- 319. AGF ltr, sub: Tng Dir Effective 1 Nov 42.
- 320. For a full list of training tests, those prescribed by AGF and those prescribed by Third Army, see Appendix, Exhibit 2.
- 321. Third Army ltr, 7 Sep 43, sub: Preparations and Conduct of "D" Series Fld Exercises and Maneuvers. 353 Gen. See also Note 216.
- 322. See Appendix, Exhibit 3.
- 323. For detailed instructions and sample card see Appendix, Exhibit 4.
- 324. For Gen Hodges' itinerary, see Appendix, Exhibit 5.
- 325. Third Army maint ltr No 4, 17 Apr 43. 451.
- 326. WD ltrs to AGF, 1 Apr 43 and 1 Jul 43, sub: Automotive Disability Rpts, with ind. See rpt, G-4 Sec to Hist Off. Hist file.
- 327. Third Army ltr, 14 Aug 43, sub: Extension of Tng Periods. In most cases, low intelligence (grades IV and V) of personnel was the reason. 353 Gen.
- 328. See incl 1 to AGF ltr, sub: Tng Periods. 353.

329. AGF ltr, 20 Apr 43, sub: Air-Ground Tng Tests. Ibid.
330. No note shown.
331. Third Army ltr, 23 Jul 43, sub: Sp Battle Courses. 353.
332. AGF ltr to CGs, 7 Jun 43, sub: Supplement to Tng Dir Effective 1 Nov 42. Ibid.
333. Third Army ltr, 1 Jul 43, sub: Mine and Bobby Trap Tng. Ibid.
334. AGF ltr to CGs all Armies, 17 Nov 43, sub: Individual Tng Tests. Ibid.
335. Third Army 1st ind on ltr cited above, 30 Nov 43. Ibid.
336. AGF ltr to all comds, 5 Jan 43, sub: Tng in Opns against Perm Land Fortifications. Ibid.
337. Third Army ltr, 30 Sep 43, sub as above. Ibid.
338. AGF ltr to all comds, 5 Jun 43, sub: Tng Periods. Ibid.
339. AGF ltrs to all comds, 19 Feb 43 and 28 Aug 43, sub: POM. 370.5.
340. Interview of Hist Off with Col James Anding, G-4 Third Army, 16 Oct 43. Hist file.
341. Third Army 1st ind, 4 Mar 43 on AGF ltr, 19 Feb 43, sub: POM. 370.5.
342. "Check List for Alerted Units." See Appendix, Exhibit 5.
343. Third Army 1st ind, 9 Sep 43, on AGF ltr, 28 Aug 43, sub: POM. 370.5.
344. Interview of Hist Off with Col Clarence C. Park, Army IG, 2 Nov 43. Hist Off files. Colonel Park said that Major General Virgil Peterson, the Inspector General, favored such an allotment, but there were insufficient IG personnel to fill such posts. General Davis, Chief of Staff, considered Sub-Headquarters personnel adequate without any increase in T/O.
345. Third Army ltr, 24 Mar 43, sub: Pers Status Rpt. 319.1.
346. Third Army Sup Ltr 10, no file, 28 May 43. 400-Gen.
347. Third Army Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), 29 Apr 43.
348. Example: Alert and Movement Plan, G-3 Sec Third Army, 14 May 43. See Appendix, Exhibit 6.
349. Third Army SOP, 16 Jun 43. See Appendix, Exhibit 7.
350. Third Army Staff Memo 5, 2 Nov 43. AG Book File.
351. See Note 216.
352. Third Army ltr AG 319.2 GNMCG to AGF, 26 Dec 43, sub: Rpt of Visit to NATO.

- 353. TWX (C) to all comds, 15 Jul 43. AG 210.2. Only 4 officers were eliminated from service in May 1943. General Marshall, pointing out that it was inconceivable that there were not more unfit, demanded vigorous action.
- 354. Third Army ltr to AGF, 16 Nov 43, sub: Reclassification of Offs. 201.6.
- 355. Record of telephone conversation between Col Phillips, AGF and Gen Davis, CofS Third Army, 7 Apr 43. CofS fil No 2.
- 356. Record of telephone conversation between Col Shoe, AGF, Col Gasper Rucker, CofS Eighth SvC, and Gen Davis, 14 Apr 43. Ibid.
- 357. Record of telephone conversation between Gen Finley and Gen Davis, 24 Apr 43. Ibid.
- 358. Chart, G-3 Sec Third Army, Flood Detail. Hist file.
- 359. Record of telephone conversation between Col Roper, CofS I Corps and Gen Davis, 8 Jun 43. CofS file No 2.
- 360. Record of telephone conversation between Col Shoe and Gen Davis, 8 Jun 43. Ibid.
- 361. Chart, G-3 Sec Third Army, Flood Rehabilitation Work. Hist file.
- 362. See Chart of Army Strength, Appendix, Exhibit 3.
- 363. See Changes in Corps and Divisions, Appendix, Exhibit 9.
- 364. For complete list see Third Army ltr, 20 Oct 43, sub: Publications to be kept in Files for Higher Hq. 461-Gen.
- 365. AGF ltr to CGs Armies and Sep Corps, 21 Jul 43, sub: 'Reorgn of Hq and Hq Cos, Corps. 320.2.
- 366. AGF ltr to all comds, 21 Jul 43, sub: Orientation with References to Revised Orgn. Ibid.
- 367. See Chart, Administrative Channels, Third Army, Appendix, Exhibit 10. This was published in August, following the AGF letter cited above.
- 368. See MR Rpt, 30 Nov 43. AG 310.
- 369. See Note 303.